Repeal Vulnerable In-Prefecture Relocation Plan
Published in Ryūkyū Shimpō
(Japan) on 2 September 2014
by (link to original)
(Japan) on 2 September 2014
by (link to original)
Translated from
by Stephanie Sanders.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
Continuing to concentrate U.S. military bases in Okinawa is illogical, even from a military strategy standpoint. It is significant that diplomacy and security experts have recognized this.
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye contributed an article to a U.S. news site (Huffington Post) in which he pointed out that, “As China invests in advanced ballistic missiles, the fixed bases on Okinawa become increasingly vulnerable,” and suggested that “the U.S. and Japan must rethink the structure of their alliance.”
Mr. Nye’s suggestion highlights the obstinacy of both the Japanese and U.S. governments in dispensing with reason and adhering to the current plan. If one were to predict the future of the relationship between Okinawa, Japan and the United States, it should be clear. Both governments should rethink the absurdity of confining military bases to just Okinawa.
It is very interesting that Mr. Nye based his argument on Chinese missiles. If four militaries’ bases are concentrated in Okinawa, in the event of an emergency, a few rounds of Chinese missiles would destroy the U.S. military bases in Japan, and cause injury and death to countless American soldiers. It is logical to disperse the risk and avoid concentrating the military in one region within missile range. The logic of ensuring a certain distance from enemy forces is known in military terms as "vertical depth."
In fact, the United States' Air-Sea Battle concept is steeped with this vertical depth guarantee. But in Japan, the aim of the concept is just stressed as being to hem in China, and the matter of being strongly aware of vertical depth is overlooked.
If one wishes to ensure vertical depth, concentrating U.S. forces on one prefecture is irrational. Defense and foreign affairs officials should be aware of this as a matter of course. But decentralization requires effort. It is not difficult to imagine that officials wish to avoid that effort. It might be because defense and foreign affairs officials have intentionally concealed this point of view that this idea is not being discussed from a vertical depth standpoint in Japan.
The article's reference to anger against the burden of U.S. bases in Okinawa is also significant. It appears to recognize that the overconcentration in Okinawa is, from both a geographic and political sense, a vulnerability. In 2011, Mr. Nye also contributed to the New York Times, where he offered the analysis that, "The current official plan to move the Marines inside Okinawa is unlikely to be acceptable to the Okinawan people."
This current reference to anger is probably because of a nearly identical analysis. In light of public opinion, it is clear that his evaluation is accurate. The Japanese and U.S. governments should repeal the politically and technologically irrational in-prefecture relocation plan before the wound becomes too deep.
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye contributed an article to a U.S. news site (Huffington Post) in which he pointed out that, “As China invests in advanced ballistic missiles, the fixed bases on Okinawa become increasingly vulnerable,” and suggested that “the U.S. and Japan must rethink the structure of their alliance.”
Mr. Nye’s suggestion highlights the obstinacy of both the Japanese and U.S. governments in dispensing with reason and adhering to the current plan. If one were to predict the future of the relationship between Okinawa, Japan and the United States, it should be clear. Both governments should rethink the absurdity of confining military bases to just Okinawa.
It is very interesting that Mr. Nye based his argument on Chinese missiles. If four militaries’ bases are concentrated in Okinawa, in the event of an emergency, a few rounds of Chinese missiles would destroy the U.S. military bases in Japan, and cause injury and death to countless American soldiers. It is logical to disperse the risk and avoid concentrating the military in one region within missile range. The logic of ensuring a certain distance from enemy forces is known in military terms as "vertical depth."
In fact, the United States' Air-Sea Battle concept is steeped with this vertical depth guarantee. But in Japan, the aim of the concept is just stressed as being to hem in China, and the matter of being strongly aware of vertical depth is overlooked.
If one wishes to ensure vertical depth, concentrating U.S. forces on one prefecture is irrational. Defense and foreign affairs officials should be aware of this as a matter of course. But decentralization requires effort. It is not difficult to imagine that officials wish to avoid that effort. It might be because defense and foreign affairs officials have intentionally concealed this point of view that this idea is not being discussed from a vertical depth standpoint in Japan.
The article's reference to anger against the burden of U.S. bases in Okinawa is also significant. It appears to recognize that the overconcentration in Okinawa is, from both a geographic and political sense, a vulnerability. In 2011, Mr. Nye also contributed to the New York Times, where he offered the analysis that, "The current official plan to move the Marines inside Okinawa is unlikely to be acceptable to the Okinawan people."
This current reference to anger is probably because of a nearly identical analysis. In light of public opinion, it is clear that his evaluation is accurate. The Japanese and U.S. governments should repeal the politically and technologically irrational in-prefecture relocation plan before the wound becomes too deep.
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