If South Korea, the US and Japan Clash with North Korea, China Cannot Stop Them

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 21 September 2016
by Editorial (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Jake Eberts. Edited by Elizabeth Cosgriff.
The foreign ministers of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan used the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly to issue their first joint statement since 2010, regarding North Korean nuclear tests. South Korea’s minister of foreign affairs, Yun Byung-se, stated that all three parties agreed that North Korea must pay additional costs for its newest provocation. America’s secretary of state, John Kerry, urged North Korea to freeze its nuclear test plans so as to promote the start of serious negotiations among the countries involved.

Recent reports in America and South Korea say analysts believe that, based on satellite imagery, North Korea may have already finished preparatory work for its third round of underground nuclear testing; another test could begin at any time.

The three-party joint statement demonstrated their unyielding posture toward North Korea, but it also revealed serious anxiety over the difficulty of remedying the possible reality of another nuclear test with international sanctions. These three head diplomats may well be quite skeptical of the prescription they have written proving useful thus far. However, they continue to display such an unwavering stance because the three countries have already lost the creativity to otherwise deal with North Korea in their policy; regardless of whether or not it works, they only have one trick up their sleeve.

North Korea has already displayed strong resistance to international sanctions, and its goal of developing self-sustaining nuclear capabilities is largely taking shape. On the one hand, South Korea, America and Japan are strengthening sanctions as if they are trying to wring a cloth even drier, and on the other, North Korean nuclear and ballistic tests continue to produce breakthroughs. At the very least, Pyongyang will soon adopt a much more active posture.

What is worse is that the already isolated Pyongyang appears to be misusing this initiative, pushing the situation toward the brink. At present, the North Korean nuclear threat is still a theoretical one, such that some even see it as fictional. But if North Korea was to actually complete its warhead miniaturization and nuclear ballistics [project], its threat to America would become all the more real and urgent – what would happen then? Surely, the thought of impetuous conflict has flashed through the minds of those policymakers facing this problem.

China faces serious difficulties in influencing North Korea, to say nothing of satisfying South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. While we have certainly exerted much effort, it is increasingly clear that the deteriorating situation has fallen out of China’s hands. China is firmly opposed to war or disturbance in the Korean Peninsula, but this is itself only an attitude and general goal to work toward; it cannot be an absolute duty that exceeds those we have elsewhere.

If the conflict between North Korea and South Korea, Japan and the U.S. begins to become irrational, China must then consider both striving to block this conflict as well as gradually building power that will prevent its being dragged into the chaos of the peninsula. At first glance this seems quite daunting, but it is still possible.

As it stands, South Korea, the United States, Japan and North Korea all have impractical demands of China. China must make both sides accustomed to our present stance and gradually relieve them of their fantasies. On this basis, China must greatly expand its ability to guard against threats to its interests on the peninsula and publicly establish red lines, such as a minimum distance of North Korea nuclear tests from the Chinese border, that South Korean and American deployments cannot directly threaten China, and so on.

If China allows North Korea to contend against America, Japan and South Korea, if both sides wished to avoid war, perhaps by the time they became deeply concerned about a single spark igniting the fire they would be all the more willing to heed China’s view, taking a step back under China’s purview.

Maintaining a low profile during this period of time does not at all mean that China is actively abandoning its influence in Northeast Asia; we can utilize this time to improve our strategic nuclear force and to strengthen the military’s rapid-response capability regarding the peninsula, demonstrating in the end our say in the matter. As a result of both geographic and historical considerations, powerful China must speak softly and carry a big stick. The problems in the peninsula are exceedingly complex, and Chinese interests are often sidelined. The situation in the Korean Peninsula must be made cleaner and simpler; the more this is so, the less these issues can serve as a public nuisance for China.

China ought to make some preparations for the worst-case scenario on the Korean Peninsula, while simultaneously striving for the best outcome, but it mustn’t overextend itself in doing so. If China has a means to cope with the worst possible outcome, then everything else is well. In this way, we can recover a sense of strategic ease in the region.


韩美日三国外长借参加联合国大会聚首纽约,就朝鲜核试发表联合声明,这是三国外长自2010年以来第一次发表联合声明。韩国外长尹炳世表示,三方一致认为,要让朝鲜为新的挑衅付出额外代价。美国国务卿克里敦促朝鲜冻结核计划,以便把各国召集在一起,开始有关未来的认真谈判。
美韩媒体近日报道,分析人士在研究了卫星图像之后认为,朝鲜可能已经完成了下面三次核试验的准备工作。新的核试验随时都会开始。
三方联合声明展示了对朝强硬姿态,但也透出了面对朝鲜可能举行新核试、而国际制裁又难以奏效这一现实的某种焦躁。三国外长大概都对他们开出的药方哪怕能起到部分作用很悲观,但他们表面上做出坚定不移的样子,因为三国已经失去调整对朝政策的想象力,不论管不管用,它们手里就只有这一招。
如今的情况是,朝鲜已经对国际制裁产生了很强的抗压力,它围绕发展核武的自我循环能力似乎已大体形成。一边是韩美日像拧干毛巾里最后一滴水那样强化制裁,一边是朝鲜核试验和导弹试验不断实现新突破,平壤至少在短时间内掌握了主动权。
更为糟糕的是,已陷入完全孤立的平壤看上去在滥用这一主动权,从它的角度把局势向临界点推。目前朝鲜的核威慑仍是“理论上的”,甚至被认为是“虚构的”。一旦朝鲜真正完成核弹头的小型化,实现核武器导弹化,它对美国的核威慑变得真实而紧迫,到那时会发生什么呢?相信面对这个问题不止一方决策层的脑子里曾经闪过相当冲动的念头。
 
中国一来很难影响朝鲜,二来说服不了韩美日,我们尽管做了很多努力,但眼看着形势的恶化大大超出了中国的掌控力。中国反对半岛生战生乱,但这只能是态度和努力方向,不能是我们高出所有其他方面的绝对责任。
如果朝鲜与韩美日之间的对峙朝着丧失理性的方向发展,中国就应考虑一方面尽量阻止这种对峙,一方面逐渐建构不被半岛乱局深度拖进去的能力。这乍一看很难操作,但它的现实可能性是存在的。
  当下韩美日和朝鲜都对中国有不切实际的要求,中国要让双方都习惯我们目前的姿态,逐渐去除它们的幻想。在这个基础上,中国需大力加强防范半岛危机威胁中国利益的能力,公开设置红线,比如朝鲜核试验地点不能距离中国边境更近,美韩军事部署不能直接威胁中国等等。
  中国假如任由朝鲜与韩美日相互恶斗一阵,如果双方都不想发生战争,到它们都深感战争一触即发并且忧心忡忡时,就有可能变得更愿意听取中国的意见,在中国的调解下各往后退一步。
  保持低调的这段时间并不意味着中国主动放弃对东北亚的影响,我们可利用这段时间升级战略核力量,强化军队针对半岛的快速反应能力,展示我们对半岛问题最终结局的发言权。基于地缘原因和历史原因,有力量的中国必将在东北亚“不怒自威”。半岛问题过于复杂,中国的利益常被兜着圈子侵蚀。要促使半岛问题变得清晰简单,越那样越没有力量敢于公开同中国过不去。
  中国应当对半岛的最坏情况有所准备,同时朝着最好情况努力,但不必为此而过于为难自己。中国有了应对最坏情况的充足手段,其他情况就都是相对好的。那样的话我们就会在半岛方向重获战略上的轻松感。
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