US Is Pushing Moscow and Beijing Toward Strategic Alliance

Russian and Chinese pilots recently conducted joint patrols in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan, flying 19 strategic aircraft for 10 hours in a region where the United States opposes both Moscow and Beijing. True, the presence of Americans in its area of communications and vital interests is much more significant for China; but Russia, which is doomed to turn to the East, is not a stranger in the Asia-Pacific region. This is our joint security.

The most recent patrol is not the first; the two countries deployed strategic aircraft together last summer. Such exercises confirm the growing rapprochement between the two countries. But is there a limit to Russo-Chinese cooperation? Are we moving toward a military alliance, or are we just friends against the Americans? What happens if Washington changes its policy toward Russia or China?

Worry about this subject began again two months ago. In response to a question about the possibility of a Russian-Chinese military alliance, Vladimir Putin unexpectedly said that we do not set such a task for ourselves now –- because "our relations have already reached such a degree of interaction and trust that we do not need it." But, theoretically, Putin added, it is quite possible to imagine such a thing. This "but ... ” combined with " ... in principle, and we are not going to exclude this. So let's see," should have set the hair of many Western analysts on fire.

How so? After all, Putin has always said that Russia and China do not need a military alliance, and Chinese geopolitical strategy does not provide for military alliances. This has been the starting point for Western (and many domestic) analysts when arguing about the prospects of a Russian-Chinese partnership, while supporting their conclusions with a lot of reinforced, concrete argument. Whatever happens in the world, Moscow and Beijing will not bind themselves to mutual military obligations; it is simply not profitable for them. Russia is afraid of falling subordinate to China, China has no interest in participating in potential Russian conflicts with the West, and it is not profitable for Russia to take sides in China's disputes with its neighbors in the South China Sea. There are dozens of other reasons. Yet suddenly Putin says, “We'll see.”

A simple thing is happening: The United States, that is, the Atlanticists, are, with all their force and policy, pushing Russia and China toward a full-fledged strategic military alliance. At the same time, however, Moscow and Beijing are consciously choosing to build close strategic cooperation in all areas, including the military, because by working together, they can restructure the current world order much more successfully.

This is not only in response to American pressure and deterrence, but meant to create a new post-Atlantic world order. It can be called Pacific or even Eurasian (though only after the emancipation of Europe), but in any case, Russia and China can only build it together and certainly not by feuding with each other. This is a strategy for the entire 21st century, and especially for its first half, by the end of which the new world order will be adopted in any case.

Regardless of the position of the United States (that is, the supranational Atlantic elites who govern it), it is good if it wants to peacefully negotiate a new balance of power and new rules, and bad if it tries to stop the course of history by military means. In fact, the second way would be a disaster for the United States itself. If the failing superpower tries to extend its already nonexistent dominance by force and fails, it will collapse.

Despite its existent military superiority, the United States cannot fight either China or Russia; nuclear deterrence works. Therefore, its entire strategy consists of one of three options. First, Russia and China must crack from the inside, as happened with the Soviet Union. Domestic problems should stop the rise of China. Americans liked to make such forecasts in the 1990s and the decade that followed, and now it's not amusing.

Another way to eliminate competitors is to pit them against each other. In the case of Russia and China, this is absolutely impossible; no "threat of Chinese settlement in Siberia" or "conflict between Russia and China over Central Asia" will work. The unique situation that allowed the United States to play on the conflict between Moscow and Beijing in the 1970s arose through the fault of the Russians and the Chinese, and will not happen again. The Henry Kissinger triangle no longer works, as Washington will never have a closer relationship with Moscow or Beijing than Moscow and Beijing have with each other. Even if at some point the new isolationists win in the United States and abandon their claims to global hegemony and destroy the Atlantic alliance, Moscow and Beijing will continue to build a new Pacific world order together, but with the United States, not in spite of it.

The third deterrence option is to bog Russia and China down in regional problems, impose border conflicts on them, and hang a plethora of distracting problems around their necks. This is now the main strategy of the Americans. Applying it to Russia, they simply seized upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, leaving China to assess and effectively sort through existing problems.

In any case, Russia will regain and keep Ukraine, and will restore its influence somewhere in the post-Soviet space; no matter how seriously this distracts its forces, it has no alternative. China lacks similar weaknesses within its historical space; neither Hong Kong nor Xinjiang are able to affect the march of the Chinese. There is only Taiwan, but the last thing the Taiwanese want is to become an American aircraft carrier in a war with China.

Therefore, the Atlanticists have to sort through China's problems with its neighbors,- that is, work according to the scenario of containing Russia in Europe. But, if in Europe the goal is to prevent rapprochement between Europe (basically, Germany) and Russia, and no sane and independent-minded Europeans believe in the "Russian threat,” then in Asia they look at China as a natural hegemon which awoke from hibernation and became interested in its environment again. Such a giant can frighten the locals, which is what the Americans are doing with Japan, South Korea and all the states in the South China Sea that have disputes with China over the Spratly Islands. In addition, there are India and Australia, the former of which is afraid of China's expansion into Pakistan and the Indian Ocean, and the latter which is has fear about simply remaining a loyal part of the Anglo-Saxon world. The United States has not only imposed its military bases on China, but is also trying to build a defensive redoubt along the entire perimeter of its borders.

This presents poorly, both because the Americans appeared in the region 100 years ago and the Chinese have been present for millennia, and because China is needed by all its neighbors. You can play on the fears of Japan or Vietnam, but you can't build an anti-Chinese equivalent of NATO out of this. Moreover, there are also Russian interests in the same region, and Moscow is not playing on an anti-Chinese field, but on an anti-American field.

Thus, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing could be described as "standing back to back, defending against attackers,” and under these circumstances, Russia and China really would not need any formal military alliance. Moscow is dealing with American pressure through NATO and Europe, China is gradually pushing the Americans out of the Pacific region, and together they are working to push the Atlantists into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which has already spread to South Asia).

What do the Americans do in this situation? They are beginning to set NATO up to counter China. Although the Europeans do not want to turn the Atlantic alliance into a Pacific alliance, they will not be left behind so easily. We are not formally talking about a military confrontation, not about the Europeans participating in the policy of deterring China from its shores (for this they have not only the desire, but also the strength); we are talking about economic threats, about the threat to Western values and democracy coming from Beijing. However, the goal is clear: not just to separate China and Europe and disrupt their mutually beneficial cooperation, but also to turn the Chinese into second Russians for the Europeans, that is, a bogeyman and a threat. Yes, so far there is just a potential threat, but this is the first step to becoming a real threat. If the Americans justified creating new missile defense systems in Europe linked to Russia by citing the threat from Iran, then it is quite logical to frighten Europeans with Chinese "communist" missiles.

But if so, why would Moscow and Beijing hide their military alliance? If the existing relationship needs to be formalized legally, this will not be the case, but it will be a reciprocal step. In fact, this is exactly what Putin said when he answered the question about the military alliance of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China:

"We need to watch exactly what happens, what threats it will create for us, and depending on this, we will take retaliatory measures to ensure our security."

Joint security. That's the whole point.