A Step Back*
*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.
Foreign relations expert Polina Chupriyanova discusses the softening of U.S. sanctions against Syria and what this means for Russia.
The change of the political leadership in Syria facilitated the process of softening the restrictions from the U.S. The first two rounds of sanction lifting were undertaken in January and May of this year, when the United States Department of the Treasury issued several general licenses. The first one allowed dealings with the Syrian government in the field of energy, and also allowed carrying out personal and commercial transactions. The second one made possible transactions with the Central Bank of Syria, as well as 27 more governmental and private enterprises.
Much more serious steps in removing restrictions were undertaken by the U.S. leadership at the beginning of the week. On June 30, Donald Trump approved the abolition of six executive orders on sanctions against Syria all at once. Among them was Executive Order 13338 of 2004, which introduced a ban on exporting military and dual-purpose goods, restricted access to the U.S. for Syrian civil aviation, and obligated relevant authorities to apply blocking measures against people connected to ex-President Bashar Assad. Trump also canceled, in particular, Executive Order 13460 of 2008, providing for the possibility of using blocking restrictions against Syrian citizens and organizations linked to corruption.
Other measures to soften restrictions were also taken. The U.S. Department of State began working on the issue of fully or partially lifting sanctions introduced within the framework of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which provided for the possibility of restrictions on dealings with the Central Bank of Syria, as well as establishing the mechanism for introducing sanctions against third countries for cooperating with the republic’s authorities. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 has been suspended.
Blocking financial restrictions, which forbade any operations with the people in the sanctions lists, were removed from more than 500 Syrian private persons and organizations. But, at the same time, almost 140 individuals and legal entities linked to Assad's previous government (former state officials, members of their families, and others) were banned. With that, the U.S. is showing that any restriction relief is only possible if a leadership loyal to the U.S. is maintained.
Russian entities were also in the list of individuals and organizations blocked in accordance with the now-lifted anti-Syrian sanctions. Among them were state companies Rosoboronexport and Promsyrioimport, several banks (RFC-Bank, Mir Business Bank), and others. However, it’s a mistake to talk about restrictions being removed from them. Some of them were transferred under the jurisdiction of other restrictive documents, in particular Executive Order 13894. Others were initially blocked due to several sanction regimes, and the abolition of one such regime doesn’t change anything. For example, blocking restrictions were introduced against Rosoboronexport on several grounds — due to the situation in Ukraine and restrictions against Iran. In other words, for a range of Russian and foreign enterprises the situation hasn’t changed, and sanctions were left intact.
The very fact of this speedy removal of restrictions against Syria, which have been consistently tightened over more than two decades, made headline news. Such steps can inadvertently be perceived by Russian observers as a signal of the U.S. being ready for negotiations and potential agreements to reconsider its sanctions policy against Moscow. Such a perception is only strengthened by the last several months’ tendencies, as the U.S. has avoided introducing new anti-Russian restrictions.
At the same time, such expectations are premature. The key factor for sanctions being lifted from Syria is the change of the political leadership of the country, which now begins to conduct a policy compliant with the interests of the U.S. In the Russian case, shifts like these are impossible. Other countries, which are under significant restrictions from the U.S., including Iran and North Korea, also show no signs of changing their positions.
However, calls to tighten anti-Russian restrictions continue to be raised in the U.S. Congress — from both the Democrats and the Republicans. For instance, Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham has introduced a bill that would bring about 500% tariffs for imports from the countries that purchase oil, petroleum products, natural gas, uranium and other products from Russia. Such radical propositions rarely pass farther than the first round of consideration but could be then passed if amended. On July 3, Trump and Vladimir Putin had another phone call. There were no reports of threatening new sanctions. However, the risk of their escalation remains.
It’s also important to note that the current softening of sanctions on Syria doesn’t guarantee the sustainability of such a policy. All steps undertaken by the American government are easily reversible. First, the executive orders could be resumed in full swing if Damascus conducts a policy that would be inconvenient for the U.S. The entire restrictive measure complex against Iran was reinstated in that way after the U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. Second, federal law exemptions can be quickly canceled. And canceling the laws themselves is almost impossible due to the specificity of the American practice for making decisions.
In the end, we should treat the potential sustainability of the current U.S. course regarding Syria, as well as the possibility of extending this policy on Russia, with a degree of caution. In the Syrian case, the U.S. has the ability to manipulate active exemptions, to force certain conditions and rules of the game on the Syrian government. Softening anti-Russian restrictions is only possible if Russia makes significant concessions. Moscow won’t make them. As such, any comparisons with Syria are pointless.
Foreign relations expert Polina Chupriyanova discusses the softening of U.S. sanctions against Syria and what this means for Russia.
The change of the political leadership in Syria facilitated the process of softening the restrictions from the U.S. The first two rounds of sanction lifting were undertaken in January and May of this year, when the United States Department of the Treasury issued several general licenses. The first one allowed dealings with the Syrian government in the field of energy, and also allowed carrying out personal and commercial transactions. The second one made possible transactions with the Central Bank of Syria, as well as 27 more governmental and private enterprises.
Much more serious steps in removing restrictions were undertaken by the U.S. leadership at the beginning of the week. On June 30, Donald Trump approved the abolition of six executive orders on sanctions against Syria all at once. Among them was Executive Order 13338 of 2004, which introduced a ban on exporting military and dual-purpose goods, restricted access to the U.S. for Syrian civil aviation, and obligated relevant authorities to apply blocking measures against people connected to ex-President Bashar Assad. Trump also canceled, in particular, Executive Order 13460 of 2008, providing for the possibility of using blocking restrictions against Syrian citizens and organizations linked to corruption.
Other measures to soften restrictions were also taken. The U.S. Department of State began working on the issue of fully or partially lifting sanctions introduced within the framework of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which provided for the possibility of restrictions on dealings with the Central Bank of Syria, as well as establishing the mechanism for introducing sanctions against third countries for cooperating with the republic’s authorities. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 has been suspended.
Blocking financial restrictions, which forbade any operations with the people in the sanctions lists, were removed from more than 500 Syrian private persons and organizations. But, at the same time, almost 140 individuals and legal entities linked to Assad's previous government (former state officials, members of their families, and others) were banned. With that, the U.S. is showing that any restriction relief is only possible if a leadership loyal to the U.S. is maintained.
Russian entities were also in the list of individuals and organizations blocked in accordance with the now-lifted anti-Syrian sanctions. Among them were state companies Rosoboronexport and Promsyrioimport, several banks (RFC-Bank, Mir Business Bank), and others. However, it’s a mistake to talk about restrictions being removed from them. Some of them were transferred under the jurisdiction of other restrictive documents, in particular Executive Order 13894. Others were initially blocked due to several sanction regimes, and the abolition of one such regime doesn’t change anything. For example, blocking restrictions were introduced against Rosoboronexport on several grounds — due to the situation in Ukraine and restrictions against Iran. In other words, for a range of Russian and foreign enterprises the situation hasn’t changed, and sanctions were left intact.
The very fact of this speedy removal of restrictions against Syria, which have been consistently tightened over more than two decades, made headline news. Such steps can inadvertently be perceived by Russian observers as a signal of the U.S. being ready for negotiations and potential agreements to reconsider its sanctions policy against Moscow. Such a perception is only strengthened by the last several months’ tendencies, as the U.S. has avoided introducing new anti-Russian restrictions.
At the same time, such expectations are premature. The key factor for sanctions being lifted from Syria is the change of the political leadership of the country, which now begins to conduct a policy compliant with the interests of the U.S. In the Russian case, shifts like these are impossible. Other countries, which are under significant restrictions from the U.S., including Iran and North Korea, also show no signs of changing their positions.
However, calls to tighten anti-Russian restrictions continue to be raised in the U.S. Congress — from both the Democrats and the Republicans. For instance, Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham has introduced a bill that would bring about 500% tariffs for imports from the countries that purchase oil, petroleum products, natural gas, uranium and other products from Russia. Such radical propositions rarely pass farther than the first round of consideration but could be then passed if amended. On July 3, Trump and Vladimir Putin had another phone call. There were no reports of threatening new sanctions. However, the risk of their escalation remains.
It’s also important to note that the current softening of sanctions on Syria doesn’t guarantee the sustainability of such a policy. All steps undertaken by the American government are easily reversible. First, the executive orders could be resumed in full swing if Damascus conducts a policy that would be inconvenient for the U.S. The entire restrictive measure complex against Iran was reinstated in that way after the U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. Second, federal law exemptions can be quickly canceled. And canceling the laws themselves is almost impossible due to the specificity of the American practice for making decisions.
In the end, we should treat the potential sustainability of the current U.S. course regarding Syria, as well as the possibility of extending this policy on Russia, with a degree of caution. In the Syrian case, the U.S. has the ability to manipulate active exemptions, to force certain conditions and rules of the game on the Syrian government. Softening anti-Russian restrictions is only possible if Russia makes significant concessions. Moscow won’t make them. As such, any comparisons with Syria are pointless.
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