Blind Faith in US ‘Security Commitments’ Is Short-Sighted

Published in Huanqiu Times
(China) on 14 July 2025
by 张家栋 (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Hannah La Porte. Edited by Patricia Simoni.
Recently, the United States Senate Armed Services Committee passed the “2026 National Defense Authorization Act.” Notably, the wording regarding Taiwan’s participation in the Rim of the Pacific military exercises was changed from "suggested" to “strongly recommended.” This adjustment has once again stirred excitement in pro-independence media on the island, with many citing it as another example of America "supporting Taiwan” — even interpreting it as a form of a "security commitment.”

At the same time, an analytical article from the American Foreign Policy magazine entitled “America Can’t Be Trusted Anymore” has been widely circulating on the internet. It argues that the Pentagon’s indecisiveness and policy inconsistency are leaving U.S. allies feeling abandoned. For those trying to leverage American military power for political gain — or even to provoke conflict — the question of U.S. reliability hangs like a sword over their heads, constantly triggering anxiety.

Historically, the U.S. has often been a “reluctant” ally, a clay-footed giant that needs to be pulled by its allies and pushed by its adversaries. Through both world wars, the U.S. was slow to get involved, casting doubt on its willingness to act without direct threats to its own interests.

During the Cold War, the U.S. only firmly adopted a containment strategy after external pressure: British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech helped stir anti-Soviet sentiment among the American public, and Soviet actions in Greece, Turkey and the Black Sea region pushed the U.S. into a more proactive stance. These events show that the U.S. leadership in the Cold War was largely in response to external pressure rather than internal initiative or spontaneous commitment.

Post-WWII history is littered with examples of the U.S. abandoning its allies when it no longer saw strategic value. In Vietnam, when the military stalemate became unsustainable, the U.S. chose to withdraw, directly leading to the rapid collapse of the Saigon regime. This pattern repeated in Afghanistan: After 20 years of military involvement, the U.S. withdrew in 2021, and the Kabul government swiftly fell to the Taliban. These events illustrate consistent patterns: When the cost of “American intervention” outweighs the benefits, the U.S. government makes a clear and calculated decision to step back.

There are many reasons why the U.S. abandons its allies, rooted in a combination of strategic, political and domestic factors. U.S. foreign policy is always centered on national interests, typically measured in terms of economic gains, military advantages or geopolitical influence. When military commitments no longer serve these interests — or their costs exceed the benefits — withdrawal becomes a likely option. This strategic approach enjoys bipartisan support in the U.S., particularly when it comes to ending “forever wars.”

Frequent elections and changing administrations also cause U.S. foreign policy to be highly volatile. For example, earlier this year, then-President Joe Biden repeatedly stressed the moral and strategic need to support Ukraine. After President Donald Trump returned to power, however, he has begun to withdraw from the conflict and seek rapprochement with Russia, attempting to transform an adversary into a partner.

The idea that the U.S. might abandon Ukraine is supported by several trends. Some Americans are weary of war, questioning the long-term costs and necessity of involvement in a distant conflict. Some American politicians advocate for isolationism, reducing U.S. involvement in foreign wars to focus on pressing strategic challenges. Some officials now argue that resources should be allocated to the “Indo-Pacific region,” especially given strategic competition with other global powers.

For Ukraine, this debate is existential. On the one hand, U.S. military support is crucial, including advanced weapon systems such as “HIMARS” and “Patriot” missile systems, as well as economic assistance to keep the government functioning. On the other hand, Ukraine is also well aware that the United States has a historical record and practical motivation to withdraw support when the political and strategic environment changes. In response, Ukraine is already diversifying its alliances, increasing local production and integrating more European elements into its military and economy.

In today’s world, relying on vague “security commitments” and alliances, or even taking risks with them, is undoubtedly a highly short-sighted approach. Historically, although the U.S. has had moments of global leadership, such as during World War II, it has also made embarrassing retreats from places like Vietnam and Afghanistan. History will not simply repeat itself, but its patterns are familiar. Commitments once hailed as “beacons of democracy” and guarantees that were portrayed as “rock-solid” may all be reevaluated in the calculation of real political interests.

The author is a professor at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies.


美国参议院军事委员会日前通过的“2026年国防授权法案”中,将邀请台湾海上军事力量参加环太军演的表述从“建议”更改为“强烈建议”。这一变动让不少岛内绿媒再度兴奋并纷纷进行炒作,将之看作美国的又一次“挺台”表态,甚至是“安全承诺”。与此同时,美国《外交政策》杂志题为“美国不可信”的分析文章在网络流传甚广,文章称五角大楼局势和政策的摇摆不定正让美国的盟友陷入被抛弃的困境。对于一些妄图依靠美国军事力量攫取政治私利乃至挑动冲突的势力,“美国是否可信”成为一柄高悬头上的剑,时刻刺激着他们敏感的神经。

从历史上看,美国经常是“不情愿”的盟友,是一个在战略上经常需要盟友拉着走、对手推着走的泥足巨人。在两次世界大战期间,美国都迟迟未加入战争,这让人质疑其在没有直接威胁自身利益的情况下对集体安全的承诺。冷战期间,美国虽然是西方阵营的核心,但却是在英国的拉动以及苏联的推动之下才确立的遏制战略。1946年,英国首相丘吉尔发表“铁幕”演说,极大地推动了美国公众和政治舆论的反苏情绪。苏联介入希腊与土耳其的危机,并对黑海海峡提出要求,推动美国在对抗苏联方面扮演更加积极的角色。这表明,美国在冷战初期的领导动作是对外界压力的回应,而非自发的承诺。

二战后的历史轨迹清晰勾勒出美国背弃盟友的典型模式。在越南战场上,当军事僵局难以突破时,美军选择大规模撤离,直接导致西贡政权迅速瓦解。这一模式在21世纪的阿富汗战场上再度重演:经过20年军事介入,美国于2021年完成撤军行动后,喀布尔政府在塔利班武装面前土崩瓦解,标志着美国全球战略的又一次重大转折。这些历史片段共同勾勒出一个事实,当“美国介入”的战略收益递减或国内压力增加时,华盛顿的决策是非常清楚的。

美国抛弃盟友的原因是多方面的,根植于战略、政治和国内因素的综合考虑。首先,美国的外交决策始终围绕着国家利益的核心轴旋转,其衡量标准往往简化为可量化的经济收益、军事优势或地缘政治收益。当美国的所谓军事承诺不再服务于这些利益时,或维持它的成本超过收益时,脱离或抛弃就成为高度可能的选项。值得注意的是,这种政策取向在美国政治精英阶层中形成了跨党派共识,在结束“永远战争”问题上,美国两党罕见达成共识。

其次,美国频繁的选举和更迭的政府,导致它的不少外交政策发生剧变。今年初,时任总统拜登还在反复强调支持乌克兰的道德义务和战略需要。特朗普总统上台以后,已经开始从这场冲突中抽身,并积极接触俄罗斯,试图将之从拜登政府时期的对手定位转化为可以争取的伙伴。

美国抛弃乌克兰的言论有几个主要来源。有些美国人产生了战争疲惫感,质疑支持一场遥远冲突对于美国的长期成本和必要性。一些美国政客放大孤立主义倾向,主张减少美国在外国战争中的参与,以集中力量应对更加重要的威胁。美国与其他大国的战略竞争关系,导致一些美国政要认为美国资源应重新分配到“印太地区”。从乌克兰的角度来说,美国是否值得信任似乎是一个关乎存亡的问题。一方面,美国的军事援助对于乌克兰来说不可或缺,包括提供“海马斯”、“爱国者”导弹系统等先进武器,以及维持乌克兰政府运转的经济援助。另一方面,乌克兰也清楚地意识到,当政治或战略环境发生变化时,美国有撤回支持的历史记录和现实动机。事实上,乌克兰已经在不断寻求盟友体系的多元化,从经济运行到军事装备,乌克兰的本土化比例和欧洲成分都在不断提升。

在当今世界,寄希望于虚无缥缈的所谓“介入承诺”和盟友关系,甚至以此铤而走险,无疑是一种高度近视。从历史上来看,美国既有在世界反法西斯阵营中作出相当贡献并取得胜利的高光时刻,也有从越南和阿富汗战场难堪的撤退。历史不会简单重复,但总有相似的规律。那些曾被视为“民主灯塔”的承诺和被渲染为“坚如磐石”的保障,都可能在现实政治利益的算盘上被重新称量。(作者是复旦大学美国研究中心教授)
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

Hot this week

Canada: Minnesota School Shooting Is Just More Proof That America Is Crazed

Canada: Carney Takes Us Backwards with Americans on Trade

Luxembourg: Thanks, Daddy: Trump Is Imposing Putin’s Will on Europe

Germany: The President and His Private Army

Topics

Ireland: We Must Stand Up to Trump on Climate. The Alternative Is Too Bleak To Contemplate

Canada: Carney Takes Us Backwards with Americans on Trade

Thailand: Appeasing China Won’t Help Counter Trump

Poland: Ukraine Is Still Far from Peace. What Was Actually Decided at the White House?

Ireland: Irish Examiner View: Would We Miss Donald Trump and Would a Successor Be Worse?

Canada: Minnesota School Shooting Is Just More Proof That America Is Crazed

Related Articles

Poland: Ukraine Is Still Far from Peace. What Was Actually Decided at the White House?

Turkey: Pay Up or Step Aside: Tariffs in America’s ‘Protection Money’ Diplomacy

Luxembourg: Thanks, Daddy: Trump Is Imposing Putin’s Will on Europe

Germany: The Art of Strategic Flattery