Trump vs. Cuba: More of the Same
Despite the media hype, President Donald Trump's recent measures against the Cuban government do not represent a radical break or the beginning of a new era in U.S. policy on the island. They are more of the same: secondary sanctions in the context of an economic strangulation strategy that has failed to achieve its objective for more than six decades.
The economic, financial and commercial blockade imposed by Washington since 1962 remains the United States' main tool. Its persistence, however, has not guaranteed it will be strategically effective. As the Council on Foreign Relations aptly summarizes, “the (U.S.) policy toward the island serves to send signals, but rarely changes the results.”*
The measures that Trump announced on June 30 — the only formally new component of this second administration — follow the logic of attrition: to hinder the Cuban government's access to foreign currency through indirect restrictions. But they are far from changing the power structure on the island, although they are designed to increase the suffering of an already severely punished population.
If U.S. politicians looked to history, they would understand why the intentions of successive administrations have failed: The Cuban government has demonstrated its ability to sustain itself even under extreme economic isolation, and the revolutionary leadership has managed to maintain domestic legitimacy, above all through its resistance to U.S. intervention. The unilateral and interventionist nature of the blockade has politically isolated the U.S., as evidenced by the now traditional U.N. votes against Washington's unilateral actions against Cuba.
Trump has signed a new executive order that revives, with slight updates, the hard line of his first term, which the Biden administration maintained. Although presented as a return to firmness, the order is a gesture of continuity disguised as change. Restrictions on flights, remittances and tourism were already very limited to a greater or lesser extent, and the economic blockade continues to be the core of the pressure. The supposed new developments revolve around the application of secondary sanctions on foreign companies linked to state entities or figures in the Cuban government.
The State Department went a step further on July 11 and announced for the first time personal sanctions against President Miguel Díaz-Canel, Armed Forces Minister Álvaro López Miera, and Interior Minister Lázaro Álvarez Casas, barring them from entering the U.S. Eleven hotels were also added to the list of accommodations restricted to U.S. citizens, and the ban on “direct or indirect” financial transactions with Cuban companies, especially those linked to the GAESA conglomerate, was reiterated.*
Reactions on the island were swift: The measures have been met with a mixture of contempt, sarcasm and political reaffirmation. Numerous social media users ridiculed them, arguing that no senior Cuban official has any intention of vacationing in Miami or investing in Wall Street. Many messages expressed solidarity with Díaz-Canel, whom they described as “a worthy successor to Fidel.” For many, these sanctions, which have no real consequences for the Cuban leadership, are another reward from Trump to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose unhealthy obsession with the country where his parents were born is well known.
On the other hand, the measures do not satisfy the most extremist sectors of the Cuban immigrants in Florida. A coalition of Miami organizations described Trump's memo as “insufficient,” considering that it “reflects a distorted view of the political reality to be employed in the case of Cuba …"
For diehards, economic sanctions are not enough: They are calling for the full implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, the total suspension of flights and educational trips, the revocation of commercial licenses, the withdrawal of immigration benefits for former Cuban officials, and a witch hunt with the opening of investigations into espionage in federal institutions.
Underlying these demands is a deep conviction: The measures have not worked. Extreme conservatives do not want palliative measures, but intervention. They do not want more gestures that they consider cosmetic, but actions to annihilate the government in Havana, preferably by force.
The paradox is clear: Trump is toughening his tone but not changing the substance. These measures do not alter the core of the U.S. approach because the mother of all coercive actions has been in place for decades and has failed to achieve its objective.
The impact is, as the Council on Foreign Relations itself admits, more propagandistic than effective, and policy toward Cuba remains tied to the same strategic error as always: abundant rhetoric and little understanding of what is happening 90 miles away.
*Editor’s note: Although accurately translated, these quotes could not be independently verified.
The economic, financial and commercial blockade imposed by Washington since 1962 remains the United States' main tool. Its persistence, however, has not guaranteed it will be strategically effective. As the Council on Foreign Relations aptly summarizes, “the (U.S.) policy toward the island serves to send signals, but rarely changes the results.”*
The measures that Trump announced on June 30 — the only formally new component of this second administration — follow the logic of attrition: to hinder the Cuban government's access to foreign currency through indirect restrictions. But they are far from changing the power structure on the island, although they are designed to increase the suffering of an already severely punished population.
If U.S. politicians looked to history, they would understand why the intentions of successive administrations have failed: The Cuban government has demonstrated its ability to sustain itself even under extreme economic isolation, and the revolutionary leadership has managed to maintain domestic legitimacy, above all through its resistance to U.S. intervention. The unilateral and interventionist nature of the blockade has politically isolated the U.S., as evidenced by the now traditional U.N. votes against Washington's unilateral actions against Cuba.
Trump has signed a new executive order that revives, with slight updates, the hard line of his first term, which the Biden administration maintained. Although presented as a return to firmness, the order is a gesture of continuity disguised as change. Restrictions on flights, remittances and tourism were already very limited to a greater or lesser extent, and the economic blockade continues to be the core of the pressure. The supposed new developments revolve around the application of secondary sanctions on foreign companies linked to state entities or figures in the Cuban government.
The State Department went a step further on July 11 and announced for the first time personal sanctions against President Miguel Díaz-Canel, Armed Forces Minister Álvaro López Miera, and Interior Minister Lázaro Álvarez Casas, barring them from entering the U.S. Eleven hotels were also added to the list of accommodations restricted to U.S. citizens, and the ban on “direct or indirect” financial transactions with Cuban companies, especially those linked to the GAESA conglomerate, was reiterated.*
Reactions on the island were swift: The measures have been met with a mixture of contempt, sarcasm and political reaffirmation. Numerous social media users ridiculed them, arguing that no senior Cuban official has any intention of vacationing in Miami or investing in Wall Street. Many messages expressed solidarity with Díaz-Canel, whom they described as “a worthy successor to Fidel.” For many, these sanctions, which have no real consequences for the Cuban leadership, are another reward from Trump to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose unhealthy obsession with the country where his parents were born is well known.
On the other hand, the measures do not satisfy the most extremist sectors of the Cuban immigrants in Florida. A coalition of Miami organizations described Trump's memo as “insufficient,” considering that it “reflects a distorted view of the political reality to be employed in the case of Cuba …"
For diehards, economic sanctions are not enough: They are calling for the full implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, the total suspension of flights and educational trips, the revocation of commercial licenses, the withdrawal of immigration benefits for former Cuban officials, and a witch hunt with the opening of investigations into espionage in federal institutions.
Underlying these demands is a deep conviction: The measures have not worked. Extreme conservatives do not want palliative measures, but intervention. They do not want more gestures that they consider cosmetic, but actions to annihilate the government in Havana, preferably by force.
The paradox is clear: Trump is toughening his tone but not changing the substance. These measures do not alter the core of the U.S. approach because the mother of all coercive actions has been in place for decades and has failed to achieve its objective.
The impact is, as the Council on Foreign Relations itself admits, more propagandistic than effective, and policy toward Cuba remains tied to the same strategic error as always: abundant rhetoric and little understanding of what is happening 90 miles away.
*Editor’s note: Although accurately translated, these quotes could not be independently verified.
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