Trump the Multipolarist*
*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.
Fyodor Lukyanov: What will the next world order look like?
The diplomatic start of the month was a reminder of multipolarity. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus Summit and China’s military parade showcased the non-Western part of the world in an impressive way. Even Donald Trump took notice — his half-respectful, half-sarcastic posts on social media made clear that the spectacle did not leave him indifferent.
Commentators quickly jumped to talk of a “new world order,” supposedly just around the corner. But what exactly does “order” mean? The word implies rules and structures that all actors in the system recognize and follow. That was true of past orders that are well known to everyone: the post–World War II settlement and, later, the Cold War framework. Neither was flawless, but both offered clear boundaries.
Today, as hegemony erodes, so does hierarchy — and with it, the directive rules. Beijing’s preferred rhetoric (now wrapped in the concept of “global governance”) emphasizes lofty principles of proper conduct rather than binding rules. A joint statement can always be drafted based on these principles, but international institutions can’t be built on such vague foundations — not in the way the world has grown accustomed to.
In fact, that’s not even the goal. What’s emerging isn’t a “world order” at all, but rather a "world system" — fluid and adaptable to constantly changing circumstances. There are many significant players, linked together in countless dependencies, and many factors that influence international processes. It’s this complexity, more than the rise of alternative power centers, that has undermined hegemony.
In this system, no overarching balance is possible. At best, temporary equilibriums can be struck at the local level, and even then, only situationally. That’s what distinguishes a “system” from an “order"; the latter requires some kind of stable balance, while the former does not. What is referred to as the multipolar world consists of many unequal centers of power. They interact however they can, based on their own capabilities and interests.
In the “liberal world order,” international institutions served as a leveling mechanism of sorts. The vulnerabilities of some actors were partly offset by restrictions placed on others. But that era has passed and things are tougher now. Today, power relations are measured directly, without the mediation of different bodies — “by the Hamburg standard” (an old idiom that doesn’t quite fit here, since today’s high-stakes game largely bypasses Europe).
Paradoxically, the most consistent expression of multipolar logic comes from Donald Trump’s “peace through strength.” He despises institutions and prefers to negotiate only one-on-one. He believes that in a head-to-head matchup, the U.S. has virtually no equal. In other words, Trump has no problem with multipolarity because he assumes the U.S. is still the strongest "pole" in the system.
Trump seems like a paradox in this camp, although he would surely bristle at that assessment. But he shouldn’t. Multipolarity is not a fellowship of like-minded nations; it is a space of competing interests and rivalries. Within it, conflicts flare up, coalitions emerge, and temporary alignments, even alliances, take shape. However, these arrangements look nothing like NATO, which not long ago was considered the gold standard of an alliance.
Trump’s frustration often stems from the refusal of major players to follow Washington’s lead. Yet he clearly respects leaders and states that stand their ground firmly — far more than he respects America’s allies who bend over backward just to avoid upsetting “Daddy.”
Much as “real socialism” bore little resemblance to its ideological blueprint, today’s “real multipolarity” looks very different from the visions sketched out 25 years ago. But like those earlier visions, this one is here to stay. The task now is to learn how to live in it and how to live with it.
Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Fyodor Lukyanov: What will the next world order look like?
The diplomatic start of the month was a reminder of multipolarity. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus Summit and China’s military parade showcased the non-Western part of the world in an impressive way. Even Donald Trump took notice — his half-respectful, half-sarcastic posts on social media made clear that the spectacle did not leave him indifferent.
Commentators quickly jumped to talk of a “new world order,” supposedly just around the corner. But what exactly does “order” mean? The word implies rules and structures that all actors in the system recognize and follow. That was true of past orders that are well known to everyone: the post–World War II settlement and, later, the Cold War framework. Neither was flawless, but both offered clear boundaries.
Today, as hegemony erodes, so does hierarchy — and with it, the directive rules. Beijing’s preferred rhetoric (now wrapped in the concept of “global governance”) emphasizes lofty principles of proper conduct rather than binding rules. A joint statement can always be drafted based on these principles, but international institutions can’t be built on such vague foundations — not in the way the world has grown accustomed to.
In fact, that’s not even the goal. What’s emerging isn’t a “world order” at all, but rather a "world system" — fluid and adaptable to constantly changing circumstances. There are many significant players, linked together in countless dependencies, and many factors that influence international processes. It’s this complexity, more than the rise of alternative power centers, that has undermined hegemony.
In this system, no overarching balance is possible. At best, temporary equilibriums can be struck at the local level, and even then, only situationally. That’s what distinguishes a “system” from an “order"; the latter requires some kind of stable balance, while the former does not. What is referred to as the multipolar world consists of many unequal centers of power. They interact however they can, based on their own capabilities and interests.
In the “liberal world order,” international institutions served as a leveling mechanism of sorts. The vulnerabilities of some actors were partly offset by restrictions placed on others. But that era has passed and things are tougher now. Today, power relations are measured directly, without the mediation of different bodies — “by the Hamburg standard” (an old idiom that doesn’t quite fit here, since today’s high-stakes game largely bypasses Europe).
Paradoxically, the most consistent expression of multipolar logic comes from Donald Trump’s “peace through strength.” He despises institutions and prefers to negotiate only one-on-one. He believes that in a head-to-head matchup, the U.S. has virtually no equal. In other words, Trump has no problem with multipolarity because he assumes the U.S. is still the strongest "pole" in the system.
Trump seems like a paradox in this camp, although he would surely bristle at that assessment. But he shouldn’t. Multipolarity is not a fellowship of like-minded nations; it is a space of competing interests and rivalries. Within it, conflicts flare up, coalitions emerge, and temporary alignments, even alliances, take shape. However, these arrangements look nothing like NATO, which not long ago was considered the gold standard of an alliance.
Trump’s frustration often stems from the refusal of major players to follow Washington’s lead. Yet he clearly respects leaders and states that stand their ground firmly — far more than he respects America’s allies who bend over backward just to avoid upsetting “Daddy.”
Much as “real socialism” bore little resemblance to its ideological blueprint, today’s “real multipolarity” looks very different from the visions sketched out 25 years ago. But like those earlier visions, this one is here to stay. The task now is to learn how to live in it and how to live with it.
Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
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