Venezuela: Why the Political Transition Is with Chavismo and Not against Chavismo

At last the U.S. understands that the survival of the political transition in Venezuela requires the participation, commitment and contribution of Chavismo*, rather than its unconditional surrender, persecution and extermination. Donald Trump has spoken of an orderly transition; that translates into avoiding political opposition that would force Chavismo into armed resistance. Thus, he has decided to come to terms with those who have weapons — those who could unleash a wave of violence if a new government were to launch a witch hunt against Chavismo.

Referring to the role of María Corina Machado in Venezuela's political transition, Trump said, “I think it would be very tough for her to be the leader,” after the mission ended with Nicolas Maduro in U.S. custody. “She doesn’t have the support within, or the respect within, the country. She’s a very nice woman, but she doesn’t have the respect.”

Indeed, Machado does not have an institutional power base in parliament, governorships or mayorships to back her up; she does not control the territory. Nor does she control the National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela, the militia or the armed collectives. Machado is rejected by the opposition sector that participated in parliamentary and regional elections, and she was the victim of a smear campaign carried out by the network of journalists and activists who were part of the communications apparatus working for Maduro.

Trump reported that Delcy Rodríguez is dealing with Marco Rubio and that she is willing to cooperate. He jumped the gun by saying that she had been sworn in as acting president before the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela had met to make this decision — and before she was sworn in before the new National Assembly.

Trump used an iron first with the capture of Maduro; Chavismo no longer has any doubts about what he is capable of doing if the game bogs down. Now he is wearing a velvet glove, recognizing Rodríguez as acting president and allowing her some room to maneuver. However, at the same time, he is threatening that she will “pay a higher price than Maduro” if she does not do “the right thing.”

Trump will continue to impose oil sanctions, confiscate ships, interfere in Venezuelan airspace and exert pressure to force changes aligned with U.S. interests. To impose his conditions on the oil industry, Trump prefers to negotiate with a weak government struggling to survive. In light of what White House spokespeople have said, Trump's agenda includes the following:

Transition with Chavismo, Not against Chavismo

Trump is postponing a change of command that would give power to Machado and 2024 presidential candidate Edmundo González Urrutia, opting instead to oversee the transition in order to impose the following conditions:

1. Payment of compensation to Exxon Mobil and Conoco Phillips for the expropriations of 2007;
2. Opening the Venezuelan oil industry to U.S. companies;
3. Nonrenewal of agreements with China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and other geopolitical rivals of the U.S.

In anticipating the political transition, Rubio said, “We have short-term issues that must be addressed immediately.” Thus, the U.S. will work first with those who control the Venezuelan military and police apparatus. They recognize that institutional and armed power is still held by Chavismo rather than by the opposition led by Machado-Urrutia. Rodríguez is at the negotiating table because she represents administrative control to prevent institutional chaos; without that control, the country would be paralyzed. By being recognized by Trump, Rodriguez becomes the direct channel to decision-makers in the United Socialist Party of Venezuela and the National Bolivarian Armed Forces.

Government of National Unity

With the threat of political violence averted, the next step is to reorganize power by forming a Government of National Unity that includes other opposition leaders, technocrats and individuals acceptable to both the government and the opposition.

For Chavismo, Machado remains as an existential threat. Chavismo will oppose bringing her to the negotiating table or incorporating her into the Government of National Unity because she would block any pragmatic negotiation that represents the interests or survival of Chavismo.

Chavista governors, mayors and deputies who want to preserve their positions of power are supporting Rodríguez. They believe she will be able to set the government on the right course and will build cooperative agreements with the U.S. She will continue to defend national sovereignty, but will favor both the avoidance of a dangerous confrontation with the U.S. as well as the promotion of foreign investment — particularly U.S. oil investment — to revive the national economy and improve the living conditions of the population.

Call for Presidential Election

Finally, the phase of legitimizing power would come with the call for a new presidential election, once the period of temporary absence of the president of the republic expires. According to the constitution, that would come in 90 days, with a single extension of an additional 90 days. Therefore, the presidential election should be called in six months. That is when Machado could enter the picture.

For the Trump administration, the political transition is a matter of viability, not legitimacy. However, the logic behind Machado rests on the legitimacy granted to her by the results of the 2024 presidential election, which, according to the polls, was won by Urrutia. In fact, Marco Rubio and the State Department used the argument of “presidential election theft” to deny Maduro's legitimacy as constitutional president. From there, they constructed a narrative to convince the world that Venezuela is not governed by a government elected by the people, but by a narco-terrorist and criminal gang. With that rationale, the Trump administration's narrative was not about forcing regime change but about enforcing the results of the 2024 presidential election.

But after removing Maduro, Trump now doubts that Urrutia and Machado have sufficient recognition from the National Bolivarian Armed Forces, 23 of the 24 governors, 285 of the 335 mayors, or 256 of the 277 Chavista deputies in the National Assembly, all of whom would join an armed resistance if they were persecuted and their political space closed off. Gaining the support of parliament, governors and mayors is crucial to ensuring an orderly political transition that avoids a wave of violence and chaos that would turn Venezuela into an ungovernable country.

If one thing has become clear after the capture and removal of Maduro, it is that neither Trump nor Rubio has confidence in the Venezuelan opposition leadership to lead the transition. They cannot find anyone with sufficient support and respect to guarantee Venezuela's governability and the protection of U.S. investments and interests. Thus, they prefer to negotiate with a weak government in order to impose their conditions. For these reasons, Trump and Rubio consider that Machado is not the card to play in the early stages, but rather in the election and legitimization phase.

Incorporating her earlier would expose her and burn the hand of the United States. And so, Machado will not be the negotiator of the transition, but will be Trump's candidate who will be able capitalize electorally on national discontent to take political command, privatize Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., and open the Venezuelan oil industry to the control of U.S. companies and investors.

Is this what best serves the interests of the nation? I'll leave that question up to you.

*Translator’s note: Venezuela’s Chavismo is a left-leaning political ideology and movement, named after former President Hugo Chávez — a blend of socialism, populism, anti-imperialism and Bolivarianism.