US and Europe: A Partnership of Anxiety
U.S.-European relations currently seem to be at a tight and dangerous turning point. Differences are no longer discussed behind closed doors. And the recent stance on the war against Iran has put these differences in the spotlight on international media platforms and channels. The situation reached the point of U.S. President Trump declaring a withdrawal from NATO in protest of European countries' refusal to participate in a naval deployment to open the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation.
On the other hand, U.S.-European relations have gone through many turns before the current one and managed to overcome and endure them. In my opinion, the relationship between the two resembles a marriage of convenience. It may see a cooling of emotions, but it cannot tolerate discussing the idea of separation or divorce because of the common threats and challenges both sides face from China and Russia.
Does this mean that current differences could lead to European independence and forgoing the U.S.’ nuclear umbrella? Given the facts before us, the simplest and most realistic answer is "no." Independently building European nuclear defenses would require many years and massive funding, and it would come at the expense of other priorities.
Can trust be rebuilt between the two sides? Based on previous historical facts, while keeping the differences in mind, the answer is "yes." The first example is the crisis sparked by French President Charles de Gaulle when he withdrew his country from NATO's military command, expelling allied forces from military bases and moving the command headquarters to Belgium. The second example is the crisis of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson refusing a call from U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to send British forces to Vietnam — even a symbolic battalion consisting of a military band — to provide international cover for the U.S. intervention. Later, France returned to NATO's military command in 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy, and Britain quickly overcame its crisis with Washington, with relations returning to a honeymoon phase.
Based on the foregoing, the U.S.-European relationship is not merely a transient military alliance, but rather the infrastructure of the Western world since the end of World War II. It is difficult to dismantle without causing a collapse for both sides. However, returning to a policy of complete harmony as in the past may not be as easy this time.
Why does the current turn differ from those of de Gaulle and Wilson in the 1960s? The fundamental difference lies in the fact that past crises, according to commentators, revolved around how to manage the conflict with the common enemy (the former Soviet Union). Today's dispute, however, centers around what can be called “priorities of enmity” and its efficacy. Europe views China as an indispensable economic partner and Iran as a troublesome neighbor that must be contained, not fought. The Trump administration, meanwhile, views both as threats that must be neutralized.
U.S. threats to withdraw from NATO, or the imposition of sanctions and tariffs without differentiating between friend and foe, have pushed European leaders, for the first time since World War II, to seriously consider strategic sovereignty. However, this path is very costly and not a bed of roses. Europe's strained budgets cannot afford to replace the U.S. nuclear umbrella or the massive intelligence and logistical capabilities that Washington provides.
Are we, then, witnessing a divorce between the two allies, or are we seeing a reshuffling of the deck aimed at drafting a new contract? The historic alliance is not yet a thing of the past, and it may never become that, but it can be described as entering a transitional phase from a contract of subjugation led solely by Washington since the alliance's founding, to an equal partnership, albeit an anxious one.
Restoring trust between partners and allies in general after a severe crisis does not happen quickly or automatically simply by turning the page as if nothing has happened. Rather, it requires time and a series of mutually positive steps. The final result may not restore the relationship exactly to what it was before; instead, if trust returns, it will be marked by caution and may appear in some aspects as forced trust. It would be an arrangement imposed by necessity and self-interest, given that China and Russia are the only ones who would benefit if the allies decide to go their separate ways.
Ultimately, in my opinion, the U.S.-European alliance will remain steadfast. The cost of separation would leave Europe exposed to security vulnerabilities and place the U.S. in international isolation.
On the other hand, U.S.-European relations have gone through many turns before the current one and managed to overcome and endure them. In my opinion, the relationship between the two resembles a marriage of convenience. It may see a cooling of emotions, but it cannot tolerate discussing the idea of separation or divorce because of the common threats and challenges both sides face from China and Russia.
Does this mean that current differences could lead to European independence and forgoing the U.S.’ nuclear umbrella? Given the facts before us, the simplest and most realistic answer is "no." Independently building European nuclear defenses would require many years and massive funding, and it would come at the expense of other priorities.
Can trust be rebuilt between the two sides? Based on previous historical facts, while keeping the differences in mind, the answer is "yes." The first example is the crisis sparked by French President Charles de Gaulle when he withdrew his country from NATO's military command, expelling allied forces from military bases and moving the command headquarters to Belgium. The second example is the crisis of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson refusing a call from U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to send British forces to Vietnam — even a symbolic battalion consisting of a military band — to provide international cover for the U.S. intervention. Later, France returned to NATO's military command in 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy, and Britain quickly overcame its crisis with Washington, with relations returning to a honeymoon phase.
Based on the foregoing, the U.S.-European relationship is not merely a transient military alliance, but rather the infrastructure of the Western world since the end of World War II. It is difficult to dismantle without causing a collapse for both sides. However, returning to a policy of complete harmony as in the past may not be as easy this time.
Why does the current turn differ from those of de Gaulle and Wilson in the 1960s? The fundamental difference lies in the fact that past crises, according to commentators, revolved around how to manage the conflict with the common enemy (the former Soviet Union). Today's dispute, however, centers around what can be called “priorities of enmity” and its efficacy. Europe views China as an indispensable economic partner and Iran as a troublesome neighbor that must be contained, not fought. The Trump administration, meanwhile, views both as threats that must be neutralized.
U.S. threats to withdraw from NATO, or the imposition of sanctions and tariffs without differentiating between friend and foe, have pushed European leaders, for the first time since World War II, to seriously consider strategic sovereignty. However, this path is very costly and not a bed of roses. Europe's strained budgets cannot afford to replace the U.S. nuclear umbrella or the massive intelligence and logistical capabilities that Washington provides.
Are we, then, witnessing a divorce between the two allies, or are we seeing a reshuffling of the deck aimed at drafting a new contract? The historic alliance is not yet a thing of the past, and it may never become that, but it can be described as entering a transitional phase from a contract of subjugation led solely by Washington since the alliance's founding, to an equal partnership, albeit an anxious one.
Restoring trust between partners and allies in general after a severe crisis does not happen quickly or automatically simply by turning the page as if nothing has happened. Rather, it requires time and a series of mutually positive steps. The final result may not restore the relationship exactly to what it was before; instead, if trust returns, it will be marked by caution and may appear in some aspects as forced trust. It would be an arrangement imposed by necessity and self-interest, given that China and Russia are the only ones who would benefit if the allies decide to go their separate ways.
Ultimately, in my opinion, the U.S.-European alliance will remain steadfast. The cost of separation would leave Europe exposed to security vulnerabilities and place the U.S. in international isolation.
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