Will the U.S. Intervene in the South China Sea Dispute?
On June 28, when news of the U.S.-Philippine joint military exercise came out, I quickly associated it with the South China Sea territory. Given the South China Sea dispute in this period of time, the association is both logical and reasonable.
However, is this association accurate? Let’s hypothesize that the worst situation happens: China and the Philippines engage in military confrontation. Will the U.S. intervene? This would naturally explain why the U.S. and the Philippines had joint military exercises, making their aim seem obvious.
After World War II, the U.S. adopted a geostrategic mindset to carry out its global military layout. After the Cold War, the layout was adjusted slightly, but there was basically no big change. Its core strategic focuses are Europe, the Middle East, East Asia and South America. South America is the backyard of the U.S.; except for Cuba, basically there’s no threat to the U.S. Traditionally, Europe is America’s ally; the European Union’s attitude toward the U.S. has been increasingly competitive after the Cold War, but because the collapse of the USSR and events in the East led to global ideological dominance by the U.S., Europe ironically became the one region that the U.S. can feel most assured about. The Middle East is the most troublesome area to the U.S. Relying on ambiguous relationships with countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. currently is just seeking balance to some extent, seeking peace on the whole, responding to Iran’s challenge and attempting to bring about change and development. After Middle East events in 2011, the region has turned out to be a new focus of America’s diplomatic strategy.
East Asia, and even the whole of Asia, is the most embarrassing place for the U.S. to carry out its geostrategy. In the Far East, the U.S. needs to contain Russia’s power expansion. In East Asia, it needs to restrain China’s rising power. In addition, it finds it difficult to ascertain North Korea’s intentions.
After World War II, America’s military presence in Japan and South Korea remained the same even though it aroused each country's people’s strong opposition. Even though there are no troops stationed in Taiwan, it has always been shrouded by the forces of the Seventh Fleet.
What, then, is the military presence in the Philippines? In fact, the South China Sea has never been the strategic focus of the U.S. even though it is part of the East Asia strategy. If there is a strategic focus of the U.S. in the Asian region, then it should be the Indian Ocean instead of the South China Sea. Since the U.S. lost the Jinlanwan Gulf after the Vietnam War, the U.S. has basically given up on the South China Sea region in its military strategy.
In South Asia and Southeast Asia, the U.S. is more concerned about the competition and conflict between the two nuclear countries, India and Pakistan; besides, there’s anti-terrorism and al-Qaida problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. India has no conflicts with the U.S. ideologically; there's only market competition between the two. In terms of strategic location, India is not as important as Pakistan. However, to South East Asia, which consists of many weak countries, market demands are much more critical than strategic demands.
After looking at America’s strategic layout, we can find that the South China Sea region is not important at all in America’s strategic map. If we have to list a place that the U.S. will most probably use its army, the Korean peninsula will be at the top, followed by Japan. Even Taiwan is not enough motivation for the U.S. to sacrifice its people.
Therefore, the U.S.-Philippine joint military exercise was just a routine action targeted at East Asian security; there’s no necessity to be surprised inexplicably.
After the Cold War in the late 20th century, though there was a period of extremely violent antiterrorism war, America’s military strategic thinking had already changed fundamentally. In the years of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the U.S., and even the U.S.-Europe military bloc centered NATO, adopted the active “containment strategy;” the Korean War and Vietnam War both came out of this strategy. However, in the era of globalization, America’s strategy is to develop its high-tech military means and spare no efforts in constructing a defense-based military system. In East Asia, the U.S. is guarding against the unstable North Korea, keeping an eye on China (which has different ideologies) and supervising Russia, which is competing with U.S. interests.
As for the U.S., it has no territorial ambition; all it pursues is market, cultural and ideological “domination.” Military action paves the way for all its ambition. Whether it is East Asia or the South China Sea, it has neither the intention nor the ability to send its army there. It is true that the U.S. is anxious about China’s economic rise and political expansion, which troubles its heart ideologically. Though U.S.-China relations have been developing in twists and turns and is full of ups and downs, there has never been any threat of war between them. Even if we look at the long-term competitive situation, all the two countries have are conflicts in the aspects of market, culture and ideology; military conflict is impossible.
As for our extremely vulnerable, sensitive, noisy and agitated territorial complex, I think we can calm down a little bit. We have lots of disputes with neighbor countries: India in South Asia, Russia in the north, Japan in the east, and the South China Sea in the south; none of these can be resolved in a short time. Many territorial problems are related to many other issues which can be dated back to the colonial period or even earlier. On one hand, only by having enough strength can a country obtain speaking power; on the other hand, only with enough time and economic development can two parties negotiate under a relatively rational premise. In defending our rights, perhaps we will only get what we want by waiting.
The author is a senior figure in the media.
However, is this association accurate? Let’s hypothesize that the worst situation happens: China and the Philippines engage in military confrontation. Will the U.S. intervene? This would naturally explain why the U.S. and the Philippines had joint military exercises, making their aim seem obvious.
After World War II, the U.S. adopted a geostrategic mindset to carry out its global military layout. After the Cold War, the layout was adjusted slightly, but there was basically no big change. Its core strategic focuses are Europe, the Middle East, East Asia and South America. South America is the backyard of the U.S.; except for Cuba, basically there’s no threat to the U.S. Traditionally, Europe is America’s ally; the European Union’s attitude toward the U.S. has been increasingly competitive after the Cold War, but because the collapse of the USSR and events in the East led to global ideological dominance by the U.S., Europe ironically became the one region that the U.S. can feel most assured about. The Middle East is the most troublesome area to the U.S. Relying on ambiguous relationships with countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. currently is just seeking balance to some extent, seeking peace on the whole, responding to Iran’s challenge and attempting to bring about change and development. After Middle East events in 2011, the region has turned out to be a new focus of America’s diplomatic strategy.
East Asia, and even the whole of Asia, is the most embarrassing place for the U.S. to carry out its geostrategy. In the Far East, the U.S. needs to contain Russia’s power expansion. In East Asia, it needs to restrain China’s rising power. In addition, it finds it difficult to ascertain North Korea’s intentions.
After World War II, America’s military presence in Japan and South Korea remained the same even though it aroused each country's people’s strong opposition. Even though there are no troops stationed in Taiwan, it has always been shrouded by the forces of the Seventh Fleet.
What, then, is the military presence in the Philippines? In fact, the South China Sea has never been the strategic focus of the U.S. even though it is part of the East Asia strategy. If there is a strategic focus of the U.S. in the Asian region, then it should be the Indian Ocean instead of the South China Sea. Since the U.S. lost the Jinlanwan Gulf after the Vietnam War, the U.S. has basically given up on the South China Sea region in its military strategy.
In South Asia and Southeast Asia, the U.S. is more concerned about the competition and conflict between the two nuclear countries, India and Pakistan; besides, there’s anti-terrorism and al-Qaida problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. India has no conflicts with the U.S. ideologically; there's only market competition between the two. In terms of strategic location, India is not as important as Pakistan. However, to South East Asia, which consists of many weak countries, market demands are much more critical than strategic demands.
After looking at America’s strategic layout, we can find that the South China Sea region is not important at all in America’s strategic map. If we have to list a place that the U.S. will most probably use its army, the Korean peninsula will be at the top, followed by Japan. Even Taiwan is not enough motivation for the U.S. to sacrifice its people.
Therefore, the U.S.-Philippine joint military exercise was just a routine action targeted at East Asian security; there’s no necessity to be surprised inexplicably.
After the Cold War in the late 20th century, though there was a period of extremely violent antiterrorism war, America’s military strategic thinking had already changed fundamentally. In the years of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the U.S., and even the U.S.-Europe military bloc centered NATO, adopted the active “containment strategy;” the Korean War and Vietnam War both came out of this strategy. However, in the era of globalization, America’s strategy is to develop its high-tech military means and spare no efforts in constructing a defense-based military system. In East Asia, the U.S. is guarding against the unstable North Korea, keeping an eye on China (which has different ideologies) and supervising Russia, which is competing with U.S. interests.
As for the U.S., it has no territorial ambition; all it pursues is market, cultural and ideological “domination.” Military action paves the way for all its ambition. Whether it is East Asia or the South China Sea, it has neither the intention nor the ability to send its army there. It is true that the U.S. is anxious about China’s economic rise and political expansion, which troubles its heart ideologically. Though U.S.-China relations have been developing in twists and turns and is full of ups and downs, there has never been any threat of war between them. Even if we look at the long-term competitive situation, all the two countries have are conflicts in the aspects of market, culture and ideology; military conflict is impossible.
As for our extremely vulnerable, sensitive, noisy and agitated territorial complex, I think we can calm down a little bit. We have lots of disputes with neighbor countries: India in South Asia, Russia in the north, Japan in the east, and the South China Sea in the south; none of these can be resolved in a short time. Many territorial problems are related to many other issues which can be dated back to the colonial period or even earlier. On one hand, only by having enough strength can a country obtain speaking power; on the other hand, only with enough time and economic development can two parties negotiate under a relatively rational premise. In defending our rights, perhaps we will only get what we want by waiting.
The author is a senior figure in the media.