Déjà Vu in Afghanistan
Published in Moskovskie Novosti
(Russia) on 12 December 2011
by Mikhail Konorovskii (link to
original)
Both Kabul and Washington admitted the failure of the Western project in Afghanistan.
In the background of new political configurations in the Middle East and the crisis in Western relations with Tehran and Islamabad, the recent international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn has been left in the shadows. However, it was supposed to be the most critical event in elaborating the "roadmap" of the country's political development after foreign troops withdraw by 2014 and control is transferred to national institutions of authority.
Not only will the future of Afghanistan depend on the developments there, but also on stability in Central Asia and other neighboring regions where the interests of the biggest world empires and influential regional actors are concentrated.
However, it has not been easy to get rid of the impression that in the halls of the former Bundestag, some sort of apathy soared and a common spirit of uncertainty reigned. This is despite the large scale of the forum and the high level of diplomatic mission, despite assurances of preparedness to assist Afghanistan in providing stability and economic revival and despite Kabul's particularly emphasized readiness to take its own decisive measures.
One of the main reasons for such an impression is the realization by the international community — and first of all by Washington and its allies, which played "lead violin" in this country in the last decade — that after overthrowing the Taliban in 2001, the fundamental problems of Afghanistan still haven't been solved.
Ensuring thorough modernization of society is an old, ailing and fundamentally important problem for Afghanistan. The ruling circles of Kabul of every political orientation were well aware of this. However, none of the offered formulas were met with an adequate reaction from traditionalists and religiously conservative elites.
In 1992, the Mujahideen overthrew the tinged-with-socialism regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, but without agreeing on the distribution of influence, they couldn't hold on to power. The baton was picked up by the radicals, the Taliban, who attempted to force strict theocratic government with odious fundamental principles.
After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the next decade of NATO supervision was, in many ways, reminiscent of the situation in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
Ironically, the Soviet contingent was in this country once for the same period of time, and the socioeconomic experiment of Afghan "communists" was taking place. If we were to trace back the strategy and tactics of the USSR in Afghanistan at the end of last century and the actions of the U.S. in the first decade of this century, then many parallels would automatically become apparent.
The parallels include the justification of the military entry by foreign troops, their forced retraction in large military operations in the background of the increasing activity of armed opposition, attempts to create new state agencies and full reorganization of economic and power units and finally, elaboration of the course to "national reconciliation," which essentially demonstrates recognition of the failure of the experiment of new authorities and their external sponsors.
There are already hundreds of volumes of research and memoirs written on the failure of the Soviet experiment. The critical review on the American experience is still awaiting its hour. Nonetheless, the fiasco of the Western project in Afghanistan was openly recognized in both Kabul and Washington. The U.S. began the war in Afghanistan with a "frighteningly simplistic" view of the country, the former commander of coalition forces, American Gen. McChrystal, said openly.
All this, first of all, proves the significant and objective limits of external influence on the situation in the country and internal logic of its development. Neither in the Soviet nor the American case was a real base of central authority created, and Kabul's inability to reach a national consensus about development prevented it from attempting to move forward. As a result, additional conditions for activation of military-political activity of opponents to the regime were being created, no matter what ideology it had.
How will events develop in Afghanistan after gradual withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops, which began in summer of 2011? Only time will tell. For today's Kabul, the external situation looks much more favorable than it did at the end of the 1980s.
If the external outline of Afghan problems was once determined by Soviet-American bipolarity, today it is determined by multipolar tendencies. The geography of regional actors with their own interests and influence has significantly expanded in the Afghan arena.
Today, Afghanistan is much more influential as one of the most important constituents in the structure of international relations. Moreover, the turbulence in Afghanistan destabilizes not only the situation in central Asia, but also in Pakistan. This wasn't observed in two last decades of the previous century.
Afghanistan has become the main center of heroin production, which already puts international peace and stability at risk. All of this predetermines a special interest towards Kabul from external powers. This is why, unlike the pro-Soviet regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, current authorities in the country won't be left one-on-one with their opponents.
The international community is interested in ensuring security in Afghanistan and establishing peaceful processes. Even though the external actors have differences in tactical approaches, the unifying factor for them will be their common interest in securing regional stability. That is why, in spite of all new expenses (the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, demanded new annual financial aid of $10 billion over the next 10 years), the international community will aid Afghanistan in many ways.
Washington has attempted to actively note new external factors, trying to weaken its own burden and shift a significant share of responsibilities for the future of Afghanistan onto regional countries. However, the suggested doctrine of the "new Silk Road" caused a mixed reaction which was expressed by a number of influential neighbors of Afghanistan, including Russia, China and Iran. The political fragility of the American idea became apparent when Pakistan, a key figure in the region, boycotted the Bonn conference. The U.S. plans to build several military bases in Afghanistan by 2014 for security provoke many questions. Experience shows that Washington rarely adheres to the principle of leaving and staying out. That's why even now, the Americans evidently have a bigger agenda on this matter. Undoubtedly, the U.S. must fulfill all its undertaken obligations in Afghanistan. This, however, cannot be to the detriment of other countries' interests.
It is unlikely that in 2014 the process of transferring full authority to the government of Afghanistan will be conclusive, considering its current configuration. In order to ensure stability, significant efforts are still needed.
A lot will depend on practical implementation of Kabul's course to reconcile with the Taliban. The liquidation of bin Laden by Washington brought about serious adjustments not only in the Near and Middle East, but also to the Afghan issue. The fuss in al-Qaida left the Taliban without its principal ally, which may lead to a certain decrease of their militancy and more compliance in political bargaining with Kabul.
At the same time, if the Taliban agrees to reconciliation on the conditions of the Afghan authorities, then in exchange they will demand real, rather than formal, entry into power. This will inevitably facilitate further strengthening of the positions of traditionalism and will lead to the weakening of secular sources in the country.
The current ascent of political Islam in the Middle East, with its slogan, "return to the roots," is able to additionally provide this tendency with favorable outside context.
Time will tell whether forcing the country on the path of modernization will meet the interests of those who after the "Karzai era" will begin to elaborate the rules of the game in Kabul. After all, in this case, even the moving force of all the traditionalist origins of the Afghan community will be undermined. But, I wouldn't want to witness another déjà vu.
In the background of new political configurations in the Middle East and the crisis in Western relations with Tehran and Islamabad, the recent international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn has been left in the shadows. However, it was supposed to be the most critical event in elaborating the "roadmap" of the country's political development after foreign troops withdraw by 2014 and control is transferred to national institutions of authority.
Not only will the future of Afghanistan depend on the developments there, but also on stability in Central Asia and other neighboring regions where the interests of the biggest world empires and influential regional actors are concentrated.
However, it has not been easy to get rid of the impression that in the halls of the former Bundestag, some sort of apathy soared and a common spirit of uncertainty reigned. This is despite the large scale of the forum and the high level of diplomatic mission, despite assurances of preparedness to assist Afghanistan in providing stability and economic revival and despite Kabul's particularly emphasized readiness to take its own decisive measures.
One of the main reasons for such an impression is the realization by the international community — and first of all by Washington and its allies, which played "lead violin" in this country in the last decade — that after overthrowing the Taliban in 2001, the fundamental problems of Afghanistan still haven't been solved.
Ensuring thorough modernization of society is an old, ailing and fundamentally important problem for Afghanistan. The ruling circles of Kabul of every political orientation were well aware of this. However, none of the offered formulas were met with an adequate reaction from traditionalists and religiously conservative elites.
In 1992, the Mujahideen overthrew the tinged-with-socialism regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, but without agreeing on the distribution of influence, they couldn't hold on to power. The baton was picked up by the radicals, the Taliban, who attempted to force strict theocratic government with odious fundamental principles.
After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the next decade of NATO supervision was, in many ways, reminiscent of the situation in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
Ironically, the Soviet contingent was in this country once for the same period of time, and the socioeconomic experiment of Afghan "communists" was taking place. If we were to trace back the strategy and tactics of the USSR in Afghanistan at the end of last century and the actions of the U.S. in the first decade of this century, then many parallels would automatically become apparent.
The parallels include the justification of the military entry by foreign troops, their forced retraction in large military operations in the background of the increasing activity of armed opposition, attempts to create new state agencies and full reorganization of economic and power units and finally, elaboration of the course to "national reconciliation," which essentially demonstrates recognition of the failure of the experiment of new authorities and their external sponsors.
There are already hundreds of volumes of research and memoirs written on the failure of the Soviet experiment. The critical review on the American experience is still awaiting its hour. Nonetheless, the fiasco of the Western project in Afghanistan was openly recognized in both Kabul and Washington. The U.S. began the war in Afghanistan with a "frighteningly simplistic" view of the country, the former commander of coalition forces, American Gen. McChrystal, said openly.
All this, first of all, proves the significant and objective limits of external influence on the situation in the country and internal logic of its development. Neither in the Soviet nor the American case was a real base of central authority created, and Kabul's inability to reach a national consensus about development prevented it from attempting to move forward. As a result, additional conditions for activation of military-political activity of opponents to the regime were being created, no matter what ideology it had.
How will events develop in Afghanistan after gradual withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops, which began in summer of 2011? Only time will tell. For today's Kabul, the external situation looks much more favorable than it did at the end of the 1980s.
If the external outline of Afghan problems was once determined by Soviet-American bipolarity, today it is determined by multipolar tendencies. The geography of regional actors with their own interests and influence has significantly expanded in the Afghan arena.
Today, Afghanistan is much more influential as one of the most important constituents in the structure of international relations. Moreover, the turbulence in Afghanistan destabilizes not only the situation in central Asia, but also in Pakistan. This wasn't observed in two last decades of the previous century.
Afghanistan has become the main center of heroin production, which already puts international peace and stability at risk. All of this predetermines a special interest towards Kabul from external powers. This is why, unlike the pro-Soviet regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, current authorities in the country won't be left one-on-one with their opponents.
The international community is interested in ensuring security in Afghanistan and establishing peaceful processes. Even though the external actors have differences in tactical approaches, the unifying factor for them will be their common interest in securing regional stability. That is why, in spite of all new expenses (the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, demanded new annual financial aid of $10 billion over the next 10 years), the international community will aid Afghanistan in many ways.
Washington has attempted to actively note new external factors, trying to weaken its own burden and shift a significant share of responsibilities for the future of Afghanistan onto regional countries. However, the suggested doctrine of the "new Silk Road" caused a mixed reaction which was expressed by a number of influential neighbors of Afghanistan, including Russia, China and Iran. The political fragility of the American idea became apparent when Pakistan, a key figure in the region, boycotted the Bonn conference. The U.S. plans to build several military bases in Afghanistan by 2014 for security provoke many questions. Experience shows that Washington rarely adheres to the principle of leaving and staying out. That's why even now, the Americans evidently have a bigger agenda on this matter. Undoubtedly, the U.S. must fulfill all its undertaken obligations in Afghanistan. This, however, cannot be to the detriment of other countries' interests.
It is unlikely that in 2014 the process of transferring full authority to the government of Afghanistan will be conclusive, considering its current configuration. In order to ensure stability, significant efforts are still needed.
A lot will depend on practical implementation of Kabul's course to reconcile with the Taliban. The liquidation of bin Laden by Washington brought about serious adjustments not only in the Near and Middle East, but also to the Afghan issue. The fuss in al-Qaida left the Taliban without its principal ally, which may lead to a certain decrease of their militancy and more compliance in political bargaining with Kabul.
At the same time, if the Taliban agrees to reconciliation on the conditions of the Afghan authorities, then in exchange they will demand real, rather than formal, entry into power. This will inevitably facilitate further strengthening of the positions of traditionalism and will lead to the weakening of secular sources in the country.
The current ascent of political Islam in the Middle East, with its slogan, "return to the roots," is able to additionally provide this tendency with favorable outside context.
Time will tell whether forcing the country on the path of modernization will meet the interests of those who after the "Karzai era" will begin to elaborate the rules of the game in Kabul. After all, in this case, even the moving force of all the traditionalist origins of the Afghan community will be undermined. But, I wouldn't want to witness another déjà vu.