Expert Claims China Must Excel at“Fair Charging” in U.S.-China Military Affairs

Published in Sina
(China) on 21 January 2012
by Wang Honggang (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Nathan Hsu. Edited by Steven Stenzler.
China must excel at “fair charging”* in the arena with the United States, and even more importantly, it must prevent strategic competition between the two nations from escalating into a mold of confrontation and ensure that both sides establish a long-term, peaceful coexistence in Asia and the Pacific.

Recently, the Obama administration ostentatiously announced its new military strategy, dubbed “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” marking the official beginning of the United States' third military restructuring since the end of the Cold War.

If one says that the first post-Cold War military reorganization was in response to the new world order brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and that the core mission of the second was to adapt to the practical necessities of the global war on terror, then the defining characteristic of this round of restructuring is the chief importance of the Asia-Pacific region in [America's] military layout.

On the surface, the aforementioned strategy does not discuss China at any great length. China is only directly mentioned in three places within the document: once to mention that China's sudden rise has affected the whole of America while pointing out that the U.S. and China have mutual interests in and a responsibility to promote security in East Asia; once to criticize the lack of transparency in Chinese military planning; and once to state that the strategy of “area denial” pursued by China cannot be tolerated. While these viewpoints don't appear to be anything new and the choice of words was fairly restrained, behind [the words] actually lies an abundance of profound meaning. Compared with the proactive tone used in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2010 encouraging China to “take on a role as a global leader,” the new military strategy's take on the position of U.S.-Chinese relations has clearly come down an octave; combine that with [the fact that] one of the core objectives of this round of restructuring is the remodeling of the security order in Asia and the Pacific, and [it is clear that] although the sections in writing concerning China are few, responding to the Chinese challenge was unquestionably one of the core factors which prompted the revision of America's military strategy.**

From the end of the Cold War to today, it has been difficult to develop military relations between the U.S. and China within the cycle of constantly being “reset,” “broken off,” “reset again,” and “broken off again.” Military collaboration between the two sides has lagged far behind cooperation in trade and political agreements, and it has become a noticeable “short board” (translator's note: limiting factor) in U.S.-China relations. Following the great strides taken forward in the modernization of China's military and America's thorough restructuring of the security order in Asia and the Pacific, the relationship between the two militaries has not only been a topic difficult to avoid in the two countries' relations, but it is also increasingly becoming a source of tension and even antagonism between China and the U.S.

Even more importantly, a new round of tensions which may exist between the Chinese and American militaries would be occurring precisely at a delicate stage in overall relations between China and the U.S. As a result of the simultaneous start of multiple transitions into the “post-anti-terrorism,” “post-crisis,” “post-withdrawal,” etc., periods, as well as the ever-shrinking disparity in strength between the two nations, U.S.-China relations are currently undergoing a period of extensive recovery and transformation. In the process, each side will reexamine and reevaluate the other, as well as re-plan their own nation's strategies. In the past few years, bumps in the U.S. and China's relationship have already indicated a high level of sensitivity in relations during this regrouping phase, and the 2012 U.S. elections already being under way will further heat up the debate on policies towards China. One can say that U.S.-China relations are now at an important crossroads. Whether or not military relations can be dealt with successfully will by a large degree decide the fundamental nature of U.S.-China relations in the future. If handled well, the two sides' “cooperative partnership” will live up to its name, and the United States, China and all other parties will be winners; if handled poorly, the outcome will be an unbearable weight on all nations.

For China, “peaceful development” is neither a wished-for but unachievable gesture of compromise nor a disingenuous stopgap measure, but rather the most rational choice for an up-and-coming power to achieve a low cost, highly efficient and sustainable rise to prominence. As the United States' new military strategy becomes deeply intertwined with its policies on China and China's strategies on its periphery coincide more and more with those concerning the United States, China must excel at “fair charging” in the arena with the United States, and even more [importantly], must prevent strategic competition between the two nations from escalating into a mold of confrontation and ensure that both sides establish a long-term, peaceful coexistence in Asia and the Pacific. This has already become a prerequisite and foundation for China's continued “peaceful development” and devoted management of the national and public welfare, and will also be the crucial element which defines the essence of U.S.-China relations in the 21st century.

Wang Honggang (Deputy Director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)

*Editor's Note: a soccer term meaning a legal shoulder tackle
**Translator's Note: the author of this article seems to have only loosely quoted the 2010 National Security Strategy; the original quote in English is " takes on a responsible leadership role", while the Chinese reads closer to "take on a role as a global leader".


  王鴻剛 (中國現代國際關係研究院美國研究所副所長)

  中國既要善於與美在競技場上「合理衝撞」,更要防止兩國的戰略競爭升級為結構性對峙,確保雙方在亞太長期和平共存。

  近日,奧巴馬政府高調公佈名為《維持美國全球領導地位:21世紀的國防重點》的新軍事戰略,標誌著冷戰後美國第三次軍事轉型正式啟動。

  如果說冷戰後的第一次軍事轉型是為應對蘇聯解體帶來的全球新局,第二次的核心任務是適應全球反恐戰爭的現實需要,那麼,此次轉型的核心特徵則是突出亞太在其軍事佈局中的首要位置。

  從表面看,該戰略並沒有對中國長篇大論。文件中只有三處正面談及中國:一處是說中國崛起對美造成全面影響,並同時指出中美在東亞安全方面有重大責任和共同利益;一處是批評中國軍事意圖不透明;一處是說中國奉行的「地區拒止」戰略不可接受。這些觀點看似了無新意,用詞也較為克制,但背後實則大有玄機。同2010年美國《國家安全戰略報告》中鼓勵中國「發揮全球領導作用」的積極調門相比,新軍事戰略對中美關係的定位明顯降了八度;結合到此次轉型的核心目標之一是重塑亞太地區的安全秩序,因此,涉華部分雖寥寥數筆,但應對中國挑戰無疑是牽動美軍事戰略調整的核心要素之一。

  冷戰結束至今,中美軍事關系就一直在「重啟、中斷、再重啟、再中斷」的循環中艱難發展,雙方軍事合作遠落後於經貿合作和政治協商,成為中美關係的突出「短板」。隨著中國軍事現代化大步前行和美國對亞太安全秩序深度重塑,兩軍關係不僅是兩國關係難以迴避的話題,而且日益成為引發中美關係緊張甚或對抗的誘因。

  更為重要的是,中美兩軍之間可能存在的新一輪緊張,恰恰發生在中美整體關係的微妙階段。由於「後反恐時代」、「後危機時代」、「後撤軍時代」等多重變局同時開啟,以及中美兩國實力對比日益縮小,中美關係正經歷深刻的盤整轉型期。在此過程中,雙方都會重新審視和定位對方,並重新規劃本國戰略。近幾年中美關係的顛簸震盪,已然表明盤整期間中美關係的高度敏感性;已經啟動的2012美國大選,更會進一步推高對華政策辯論熱度。可以說,目前中美關係正處在重要的十字路口,能否處理好軍事關系,將在很大程度上決定著未來中美關係的根本性質。處理得好,雙方「合作夥伴關係」名至實歸,中美及其他各方都是贏家;處理不好,結果對所有國家而言均是不可承受之重。

  從中國方面講,「和平發展」既非有心無力的妥協之舉,也非表裡不一的權宜之計,而是後起大國實現低成本、高效率、可持續崛起的最合理選擇。在美國的新軍事戰略與對華戰略深度交織、中國的周邊戰略與對美戰略也日益重合之時,中國既要善於與美在競技場上「合理衝撞」,更要防止兩國的戰略競爭升級為結構性對峙,確保雙方在亞太長期和平共存。這已經成為中國繼續「和平發展」和全心全意搞好國計民生的基礎與前提,也將是定義21世紀中美關係本質的關鍵因素。
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