US Will Not Oppose Japan’s Intention to Amend Constitution
Ever since he took office at the end of last year, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and his government have ceaselessly been trying to push forward the process of amending Japan’s constitution by exaggerating external threats, especially from China. That Japan’s intention to amend its constitution will generate more benefits than disadvantages to the U.S. is reflected in the Obama administration's optimistic view of the project at this time.
First, the consolidation of the U.S.-Japan coalition comes from a firm bilateral political commitment. The U.S. will make its decision based on Japanese political trends and will not disregard mainstream political forces advocating for amending the constitution, which could endanger the coalition's strength. Because Japan is already deeply embedded in the system that the U.S. has built in Europe and Asia, the U.S. is not concerned about the potential negative impacts of bolstering Japanese military power.
Second, if the amendment is successful, a transition from the Japan Self-Defense Forces to a national army — with the right to participate in wars — will take place, which will enhance Japan’s position in the Asia-Pacific security network, thus enabling it to effectively contain China or Russia. Giving impetus to the strengthening of Japan’s defense ability will cause Japan to share in its security and economic burdens.
Third, Japan is the only "abnormal" country in the U.S.' global alliance system, because its special relationship does not abide by the legitimate principles epitomized in the American alliance structure. Out of concern for maintaining and consolidating the long-term vitality and credibility of this U.S.-led alliance, the U.S. will promote Japan’s development along the trajectory of a "normal" country.
Fourth, America’s "rebalancing" strategy in the Asia-Pacific is backed by the existence of the U.S.-Japan coalition. Japan’s ability to amend its constitution and the possibility for the U.S. of realizing its strategy are correlated. Having the right to participate in wars and having a defense army will be key components to Japan’s striving for status as a great political power and to heightening its regional and international position.
Therefore, the U.S. will not tie up or put pressure on Abe’s efforts to amend the constitution.
The key to success lies in the outcomes of domestic political competition among different parties. In recent years, Japanese domestic politics have increasingly leaned toward the right. The faction in favor of amending the constitution — mainly from the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Restoration Association — has gradually gained importance. There is a high possibility that the amendment of both Article 96 and Article 6 will be successful. Although the U.S. has also realized that this might trigger protests from a number of countries in the Asia-Pacific, it will still determine its standpoint on this matter by sticking to the principle of strengthening and consolidating Japan’s power in the region. The U.S.-Japan relationship will be subjected to constant re-adjustment under this framework as Japan’s constitutional amendments and improvements to its military power take place.
First, the consolidation of the U.S.-Japan coalition comes from a firm bilateral political commitment. The U.S. will make its decision based on Japanese political trends and will not disregard mainstream political forces advocating for amending the constitution, which could endanger the coalition's strength. Because Japan is already deeply embedded in the system that the U.S. has built in Europe and Asia, the U.S. is not concerned about the potential negative impacts of bolstering Japanese military power.
Second, if the amendment is successful, a transition from the Japan Self-Defense Forces to a national army — with the right to participate in wars — will take place, which will enhance Japan’s position in the Asia-Pacific security network, thus enabling it to effectively contain China or Russia. Giving impetus to the strengthening of Japan’s defense ability will cause Japan to share in its security and economic burdens.
Third, Japan is the only "abnormal" country in the U.S.' global alliance system, because its special relationship does not abide by the legitimate principles epitomized in the American alliance structure. Out of concern for maintaining and consolidating the long-term vitality and credibility of this U.S.-led alliance, the U.S. will promote Japan’s development along the trajectory of a "normal" country.
Fourth, America’s "rebalancing" strategy in the Asia-Pacific is backed by the existence of the U.S.-Japan coalition. Japan’s ability to amend its constitution and the possibility for the U.S. of realizing its strategy are correlated. Having the right to participate in wars and having a defense army will be key components to Japan’s striving for status as a great political power and to heightening its regional and international position.
Therefore, the U.S. will not tie up or put pressure on Abe’s efforts to amend the constitution.
The key to success lies in the outcomes of domestic political competition among different parties. In recent years, Japanese domestic politics have increasingly leaned toward the right. The faction in favor of amending the constitution — mainly from the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Restoration Association — has gradually gained importance. There is a high possibility that the amendment of both Article 96 and Article 6 will be successful. Although the U.S. has also realized that this might trigger protests from a number of countries in the Asia-Pacific, it will still determine its standpoint on this matter by sticking to the principle of strengthening and consolidating Japan’s power in the region. The U.S.-Japan relationship will be subjected to constant re-adjustment under this framework as Japan’s constitutional amendments and improvements to its military power take place.