Snowden Has Put Russia in a Stalemate
Why there is no good choice for Moscow in the story of the American fugitive.
The Edward Snowden affair has put Russia in an uncomfortable situation. Perhaps Putin meant it when he said in Helsinki that he’d rather not deal with such matters.
Thanks to information provided to the press by Snowden, it became known that since 2009, hackers working for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) have been hacking into computers in China and Hong Kong, as well as the bases of Chinese mobile connection operators. Previously, the U.S. had accused the Chinese of hacking American computers. In other words, the Snowden case fits perfectly within the framework of a cold cyberwar between Beijing and Washington. Moreover, it gives Beijing the trump card in the image game.
However, the Chinese authorities have decided not to use their trump card. Officially remaining “neutral” — Hong Kong, where Snowden stayed for over a month, enjoys a high level of autonomy — China de facto booted Snowden into Russia, a country that had nothing to do with this matter and was not entirely prepared to deal with the development of these events. As a result, Moscow suddenly became a main player in a purely American — or Sino-American — affair, and even Ecuador is shifting responsibility onto Russia.
This is an unpleasant story with respect to image; there is no obviously correct decision to be made. Give up Snowden to the Americans? Human rights activists and much of the press, which sympathizes with the ex-employee of the NSA, would view that negatively. Give him asylum or release him to Ecuador? No one will see any real principles or content behind this position, but they will undoubtedly label it as another anti-American gesture. And this problem is dragging on. It’s as if Russia has been put on a very narrow bed, and here she is, tossing and turning, trying to get comfortable.
In the case of the “Snowden affair” — just as with the earlier “Assange affair” — there is a universal motif that forces human rights activists, publishers and journalists around the world to at least partially sympathize with the man. This motif is that of the invasion of privacy, or more specifically, the unacceptability of such actions when undertaken by the government. It is the motif of the lack of transparency in government structures and the decisions they make. In their own turn, these universal values are formulated simply: transparency and public accountability of the government and personal privacy (including correspondences).
In the current situation, Russia would have a good course of action to take with respect to image if it consistently — in the present and in the past — championed this universal value and aggressively positioned itself as the embodiment of the principles described above. Then, granting Snowden asylum or exit would look natural and, with respect to reputation, it would be an irreproachable move. We aren’t about to sacrifice the bulwark of our principled position.
The thing is, Russia has never defended these sorts of values. When Putin stated in an interview with journalists at Russia Today that the implementation of wiretaps in our country without a court order would be simply impossible, it sounded unconvincing. It is impossible to find even a single law passed in Russia limiting the power of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in order to protect citizens’ privacy.
The only thing that Russia has consistently defended in the international arena is her own sovereignty, or more specifically, her right to make sovereign decisions and the principle of noninterference in her domestic affairs. This approach works, but it is characteristic of “second-world” nations that find themselves in the shadow of world powers. The state is taking this approach — that is, promoting universal values. But Russia is having problems with this; when it comes to defending sovereignty, the Snowden affair (in contrast to the “Magnitsky list”) does not seem to harmonize at all.
The Edward Snowden affair has put Russia in an uncomfortable situation. Perhaps Putin meant it when he said in Helsinki that he’d rather not deal with such matters.
Thanks to information provided to the press by Snowden, it became known that since 2009, hackers working for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) have been hacking into computers in China and Hong Kong, as well as the bases of Chinese mobile connection operators. Previously, the U.S. had accused the Chinese of hacking American computers. In other words, the Snowden case fits perfectly within the framework of a cold cyberwar between Beijing and Washington. Moreover, it gives Beijing the trump card in the image game.
However, the Chinese authorities have decided not to use their trump card. Officially remaining “neutral” — Hong Kong, where Snowden stayed for over a month, enjoys a high level of autonomy — China de facto booted Snowden into Russia, a country that had nothing to do with this matter and was not entirely prepared to deal with the development of these events. As a result, Moscow suddenly became a main player in a purely American — or Sino-American — affair, and even Ecuador is shifting responsibility onto Russia.
This is an unpleasant story with respect to image; there is no obviously correct decision to be made. Give up Snowden to the Americans? Human rights activists and much of the press, which sympathizes with the ex-employee of the NSA, would view that negatively. Give him asylum or release him to Ecuador? No one will see any real principles or content behind this position, but they will undoubtedly label it as another anti-American gesture. And this problem is dragging on. It’s as if Russia has been put on a very narrow bed, and here she is, tossing and turning, trying to get comfortable.
In the case of the “Snowden affair” — just as with the earlier “Assange affair” — there is a universal motif that forces human rights activists, publishers and journalists around the world to at least partially sympathize with the man. This motif is that of the invasion of privacy, or more specifically, the unacceptability of such actions when undertaken by the government. It is the motif of the lack of transparency in government structures and the decisions they make. In their own turn, these universal values are formulated simply: transparency and public accountability of the government and personal privacy (including correspondences).
In the current situation, Russia would have a good course of action to take with respect to image if it consistently — in the present and in the past — championed this universal value and aggressively positioned itself as the embodiment of the principles described above. Then, granting Snowden asylum or exit would look natural and, with respect to reputation, it would be an irreproachable move. We aren’t about to sacrifice the bulwark of our principled position.
The thing is, Russia has never defended these sorts of values. When Putin stated in an interview with journalists at Russia Today that the implementation of wiretaps in our country without a court order would be simply impossible, it sounded unconvincing. It is impossible to find even a single law passed in Russia limiting the power of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in order to protect citizens’ privacy.
The only thing that Russia has consistently defended in the international arena is her own sovereignty, or more specifically, her right to make sovereign decisions and the principle of noninterference in her domestic affairs. This approach works, but it is characteristic of “second-world” nations that find themselves in the shadow of world powers. The state is taking this approach — that is, promoting universal values. But Russia is having problems with this; when it comes to defending sovereignty, the Snowden affair (in contrast to the “Magnitsky list”) does not seem to harmonize at all.