The End of Orientalism
There is no reason to be puzzled over the alliance between the West and political Islam. There are four reasons for this alliance: The first is tied to culture and religion, the second to ideology (the role of the state), the third to strategy (the Great Middle East Project) and the fourth to politics (the role of Egypt).
Both sides believe that culture mainly determines the paths of peoples and that the Islamic and Arab peoples in particular possess core characteristics preventing them from moving beyond their past and [the behavior of] their predecessors. The two sides see the history of these peoples as circular: The revolution is not a step beyond the past but a return of the situation to its previous state, to some extent.
The West has scientific and technological superiority. The East has God and religion. The East is lagging behind, and perhaps this can be traced to the West’s scientific and technological advancements, but it too has its strengths, which the Salafists interpret as following the righteous predecessors. The two sides believe that both the East and West have their strengths. The West’s strength is transcendence, which leads to progress — due to science and technology — and the breaking of the tyranny of the past and rule of tradition. The East, on the other hand — particularly Islamic culture — always ends up in the same place, no matter how many revolutions and intifadas it experiences. For the West, history is a rising helix; for Islam, it is circular. Both sides inevitably yield to their fates, which their cultures determine. Their histories determine their futures. The history of the East destines it to return to its beginnings. The history of the West prevents it from going backward and destines it for progress and transcendence. The two sides share this vision. They agree on this distinction and the fact that each culture has a core that determines its path.
The two sides resemble each other ideologically. Each envisions a small role for the state in connection with the community. No matter how much poverty increases and the economy declines, state intervention is undesirable. Strengthening the private sector is what must be encouraged, even if it is at the expense of progress and accomplishment.
The state serves capitalism, not the community. Even if the state does intervene, the public sector must serve the private sector. The West views this as a service to its corporations and its interests in the Islamic East, and Islamist Internationals see it as a service to its international organization.* They are both internationalist, but one side strives to serve the other in exchange for [the ability to] stay in power. They share the ideology of neoliberalism, which sees privatization as the solution, even if it occurs at the expense of the state and community. The difference is that in the West, neoliberalism serves the state — which is a strong entity — while in the Islamic East, which is governed by weak states that subjugate their communities to strong Western states, it serves the interests of the dominant class.
The strategic reason is connected to the future drawn up for the region in the Great Middle East Project. This plan abolishes Arabism so that political Islam can take control and construct supposed legitimacy, not on the basis of language and freedom, but on the Shariah and the restrictions political Islam imposes, and behind it, the West. Of course, it is not that the Shariah is not being implemented: A Muslim lives only by his Shariah or else it is doubtful that he is a Muslim. The issue is not the Shariah itself, but legitimacy as understood by political Islam and portrayed by the West. They both turn the Shariah into the antithesis of freedom. They are trying to shackle the Arab peoples and limit their freedom to determine their own fate. In every Arab and non-Arab state, the constitution is a part of self-determination or, more appropriately, is the framework for drawing freedoms.
The political reason is connected to Egypt’s role in the Arab region. The West strives to keep Egypt outside of the Arab domain, and it has succeeded in this task since the Camp David agreement. Political Islam works to subjugate Egypt to the needs of its international organization. It does not consider Egypt a homeland for its people, an expression of their will or an entity emanating from their will. Rather, along with everything else, Egypt is a tool and submits to whatever the Islamist International plans for it and, from behind, those overseeing the Great Middle East Project.
History repeats itself in one form or another. The West repeats itself, too: It is unable to cease the practices that pushed Abdel Nasser to Nasserism in the first half of the 1950s, which meant expanding Egypt’s Arab and international role and building the state, economy and society based on the demands of the Arab people, not submission to the will of the West.
To be continued ...
*Editor's note: The term seems to be a neologism by the author that references the Socialist International, which is a global organization of political parties that promulgates socialist ideals. It is not completely clear which international organization the author alludes to.
Both sides believe that culture mainly determines the paths of peoples and that the Islamic and Arab peoples in particular possess core characteristics preventing them from moving beyond their past and [the behavior of] their predecessors. The two sides see the history of these peoples as circular: The revolution is not a step beyond the past but a return of the situation to its previous state, to some extent.
The West has scientific and technological superiority. The East has God and religion. The East is lagging behind, and perhaps this can be traced to the West’s scientific and technological advancements, but it too has its strengths, which the Salafists interpret as following the righteous predecessors. The two sides believe that both the East and West have their strengths. The West’s strength is transcendence, which leads to progress — due to science and technology — and the breaking of the tyranny of the past and rule of tradition. The East, on the other hand — particularly Islamic culture — always ends up in the same place, no matter how many revolutions and intifadas it experiences. For the West, history is a rising helix; for Islam, it is circular. Both sides inevitably yield to their fates, which their cultures determine. Their histories determine their futures. The history of the East destines it to return to its beginnings. The history of the West prevents it from going backward and destines it for progress and transcendence. The two sides share this vision. They agree on this distinction and the fact that each culture has a core that determines its path.
The two sides resemble each other ideologically. Each envisions a small role for the state in connection with the community. No matter how much poverty increases and the economy declines, state intervention is undesirable. Strengthening the private sector is what must be encouraged, even if it is at the expense of progress and accomplishment.
The state serves capitalism, not the community. Even if the state does intervene, the public sector must serve the private sector. The West views this as a service to its corporations and its interests in the Islamic East, and Islamist Internationals see it as a service to its international organization.* They are both internationalist, but one side strives to serve the other in exchange for [the ability to] stay in power. They share the ideology of neoliberalism, which sees privatization as the solution, even if it occurs at the expense of the state and community. The difference is that in the West, neoliberalism serves the state — which is a strong entity — while in the Islamic East, which is governed by weak states that subjugate their communities to strong Western states, it serves the interests of the dominant class.
The strategic reason is connected to the future drawn up for the region in the Great Middle East Project. This plan abolishes Arabism so that political Islam can take control and construct supposed legitimacy, not on the basis of language and freedom, but on the Shariah and the restrictions political Islam imposes, and behind it, the West. Of course, it is not that the Shariah is not being implemented: A Muslim lives only by his Shariah or else it is doubtful that he is a Muslim. The issue is not the Shariah itself, but legitimacy as understood by political Islam and portrayed by the West. They both turn the Shariah into the antithesis of freedom. They are trying to shackle the Arab peoples and limit their freedom to determine their own fate. In every Arab and non-Arab state, the constitution is a part of self-determination or, more appropriately, is the framework for drawing freedoms.
The political reason is connected to Egypt’s role in the Arab region. The West strives to keep Egypt outside of the Arab domain, and it has succeeded in this task since the Camp David agreement. Political Islam works to subjugate Egypt to the needs of its international organization. It does not consider Egypt a homeland for its people, an expression of their will or an entity emanating from their will. Rather, along with everything else, Egypt is a tool and submits to whatever the Islamist International plans for it and, from behind, those overseeing the Great Middle East Project.
History repeats itself in one form or another. The West repeats itself, too: It is unable to cease the practices that pushed Abdel Nasser to Nasserism in the first half of the 1950s, which meant expanding Egypt’s Arab and international role and building the state, economy and society based on the demands of the Arab people, not submission to the will of the West.
To be continued ...
*Editor's note: The term seems to be a neologism by the author that references the Socialist International, which is a global organization of political parties that promulgates socialist ideals. It is not completely clear which international organization the author alludes to.