Will a Limited US Strike on Syria Have an Impact?

In 1994 Iraq was subjected to a no-fly zone in the north of the country, an international blockade and weapons of mass destruction inspections, all of which were intended to cause humiliation. President Clinton, who had long remained hesitant to launch a military strike on Iraq and whose administration was exposed to a smear campaign accusing it of docility, weakness and hesitation, was compelled to launch consecutive Tomahawk missile strikes on several of Iraq’s vital installations.

The night of the first strike on Baghdad, I was hosting a dinner party in the Jordanian ambassador’s residence (I was, at that time, the ambassador to Iraq). In attendance were a large number of eminent Iraqi ministers and officials, including Tariq Aziz; Taha Yasin Ramadan; Mohamed al-Rawy, the minister of trade; and Amr Rashid, minister of military industrialization, among others.

I was taken aback when the minister of military industrialization requested that the dinner be held early, before 9 p.m.; at that time the Americans were to launch a strike on a military industrialization complex in the Baghdad suburbs, as well as on other important facilities in Iraq. And at 9, the strike on the industrialization complex, one of the most important manufacturing facilities in the nation, occurred; the strikes went on intermittently, destroying the Rashid Hotel, the General Intelligence and dozens of other vital civil and military sites.

However, these strikes did not alter the Iraqi regime’s willful stance, nor did they change the situation on the ground. The limited strike that is to be launched on Syria appears to be some sort of masquerade to rehabilitate America’s position in light of the hesitation and weakness it has shown in resolving matters in Syria. This comes after many international powers fancied themselves capable of filling the gap left by the U.S. in the world; likewise, it comes after the U.S. stipulated that it would only intervene in the Syrian conflict in the case of the “red line” use of chemical weapons, which did not prevent the Syrian regime from challenging the U.S. and the international community; it comes after the revelation that the U.S. did not provide sufficient assistance to the opposition in Syria and did not adequately deter the Syrian regime.

A limited missile or air strike will not change the power balance in Syria; by making a premature and very public announcement on the limited strike, the U.S. has given the Syrian regime ample time to redistribute its ground forces and take all necessary precautions to ensure the soundness of its mobile forces on the ground. Tomahawk missiles tend to be launched on fixed targets such as facilities, airports and anti-missile air bases; thus, the impact of these strikes on the ground forces will be limited. As for military and presidential command centers, as well as intelligence centers, armies often have alternate command and operations centers and can easily evacuate these locations. Airports and air defense systems may be vulnerable to powerful strikes; however, aircraft can be moved to nearby airports within the Iraqi border.

The majority of chemical weapons caches, of which there are around 10, are hidden in the depths of Syria. There is a possibility that the chemical weapons center on the Jordanian border, as well as another along the Turkish border, can be taken over by U.S. Special Forces stationed in the region for this purpose. However, the remaining centers may be difficult to target or be seized since their destruction would be disastrous for Syrians and the citizens of surrounding nations.

This is therefore a truly limited strike which will not cause the regime to fall or comprehensively paralyze its military power. In the best case scenario, it might deter the regime and its allies from using chemical weapons again.

Nothing short of a consecutive military strike forming a continuous military pressure on Assad's forces will change the power balance in Syria. This must be accompanied by sound, impactful military aid to moderate opposition forces, with which they may compel Assad’s regime to accept a political, negotiations-based solution. Unfortunately, the lack of a unified, convincing leadership among the opposition highlights the gravity of any discussion of the absence of a viable alternative to Assad’s regime among the international community.

Obama still must wage a political battle in Congress in order to neutralize the opposing political powers’ scrutinizing of him and his party, hoping to use his administration’s mistakes against him in the upcoming election.

Just as U.S. presence can sometimes be disastrous, destructive and chaos-inducing, as was the case in Iraq, America’s absence can be just as disastrous and may lead to protracted conflicts and tragedies on the international front. U.S. presence in Middle East peace operations has changed the power balance: While the U.S. has always allowed the scales to tip in favor of Israel’s security and interests, its absence from the process would also have allowed Israel to build as many settlements as it liked and to devour what remains of Palestinian territory.

The U.S. is at times the disease and at other times the cure, particularly in our Arab world, which has become so weak and divided among itself. Drowning in religious and historical disputes, it has been left behind by time and exploited by its enemies and those who seek to infiltrate its ranks to hinder its progress and prevent unification.