Edited by Gillian Palmer
Syria: Obama, Back Against the Wall
Published in Le Nouvel Observateur
(France) on 29 August 2013
by Philippe Boulet-Gercourt (link to
original)
By using chemical weapons, Bashar al-Assad crossed the red line, a provocation that cannot go unanswered. The Obama administration, however, remains very cautious.
A senior official in the U.S. Department of State confers with a group of reporters to justify the White House’s hesitation to take on a more hawkish role: “Economic interests are paramount. We simply don’t have the leverage, we don’t have the inclination to use military force [abroad].” We are in May 1993. Bill Clinton has just taken the office as president. Two years and three months later, this same President Clinton will launch Operation Deliberate Force, under the aegis of NATO, against Milosevic’s troops.
Bush’s activism, Obama’s election and the initial excitement about the Arab Spring had made us forget that the eternal power struggle between interventionists and isolationists in the United States, with all its pendulum-like movements, is more real than ever. The current climate also recalls that of America in 1993: barely out of a recession and no longer in the grips of the Cold War. Two days before the massive use of chemical weapons in Syria, Michael Hirsh of the very serious “National Journal,” summarized the sentiment of many: “Maybe everyone should remain as calm as Obama seems to be right now […] [L]ooked at from a purely realpolitik, versus humanitarian, viewpoint, the bloodshed in both Egypt and Syria is not necessarily hurting U.S. interests. […] In Syria, the main antagonists are both declared enemies of the United States.”
The Immense Reticence of the Americans
Even after the announcement of the massacre at Gotha, a Reuters-Ipsos poll confirmed the immense reticence of Americans: Only 25 percent of them approve of a military intervention in the event of chemical arms usage by the Assad regime; 46 percent are opposed to it.
So? Earlier this week, no one, or nearly no one, in Washington doubted that America would intervene in the days or hours to come, simply because Assad’s action was, according to Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations, “an incredible insolence” in the face of an American president who one year ago drew a “red line” which would be crossed if “we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” “Obama would seem truly powerless if he did not respond to such an enormous provocation,” Patrick said.*
This is particularly true since Assad’s challenge accompanies a series of diplomatic reversals by Washington in the region: In Egypt, its Israeli and Saudi allies overtly support the military’s iron grip; in Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere, the troubles are multiplying and the Arab Spring is only a distant memory. With Syria at least the allies are prepared to fall in behind Washington. “Even if France and Great Britain speak of intervention, absolutely nothing can happen without the United States. Everyone, from Jordan to Israel, wants Uncle Sam to get into the game in Syria and take care of the problem,” states Joshua Landis, professor at the University of Oklahoma and one of the top experts on Syria.*
The Last Taboo
Behind these political considerations, another more strategic motive pushes Obama to intervene: “The chemical weapon is truly the last taboo of the international community. If we let Assad violate it, that will set a precedent for other countries,” notes Stewart Patrick.* During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States reacted softly to the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield (even if the CIA was well aware of Iraq’s desire to use them, as the journal Foreign Policy just revealed).
Nor did Washington balk after the massacre of Iraqi Kurd civilians at Halabja in 1988. It is true that images and videos of it were rare at the time … but since the end of the 1980s the prohibition against chemical weapons had been respected. “A great number of countries with access to this ‘poor man’s nuclear bomb’ have dismantled their stockpiles. The prohibition is not perfect, but remains rather solid,” Patrick recalls.*
'A Limited but Destructive Strike'
How to intervene? “I do not believe that it will be necessary to strike government buildings at this stage. The most effective thing would be a limited but destructive strike, such as bombing the units responsible for the attacks — their command — and the units responsible for logistics. That would send a clear signal to the regime, indicating that they have crossed the Rubicon,” reckons Jeffrey White, a former Pentagon intelligence official working at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.*
We have evoked the precedents of Kosovo and Libya, but not many in Washington envision a military campaign with the goal of ending Assad’s rule, or even of depriving Syria of its chemical weapons. These weapons are spread around the whole country, mostly in densely populated cities. Multiple bombardments would be necessary, perhaps even special forces missions, with the additional danger — overestimated, according to some — of a release of chemical substances into the atmosphere.
The risks of an American action, even limited, have been enough to dissuade Obama until now: civilian victims, a flood of refugees into Jordan and Lebanon, worsening policies of the Assad regime perhaps providing chemical weapons to its allies in Hezbollah or elsewhere. But “one barely speaks of the inverse scenario,” Jeffrey White adds. “What would happen if Assad won? If he crushes the rebellion where will we find ourselves? A victorious alliance of Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Assad, who will settle the score with those who defied him.” The old veteran adds, however, “Frankly, there is no possible ‘happy end’ to this Syrian crisis, at least in the short term. Whatever the outcome of the crisis, it will be chaotic and not pretty.”*
'A Policy of Small Steps'
This is a justification that the White House has put forward since the beginning. “Here’s what we wrestle with: There are huge costs and unintended consequences that go with a military intervention that could last for many years,” states National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes. No military intervention, no matter how limited it may be, is harmless; if there is to be an intervention, “Obama will find himself immediately criticized for taking a stand on chemical weapons and then doing nothing about the numerous civilians killed by conventional weapons,” indicates Joshua Landis.* Senator John McCain will be the first to jump at the opportunity. But these reservations take nothing from the fact that for a year now, the Syrian question has not ceased to concern the American president.
Firstly, there is this not-to-be-crossed “red line,” a proposition that he had improvised in a press conference on Aug. 20, 2012, without warning anyone in advance. Since then, Barack Obama’s impatience in private has only been equaled by his reticence to speak about Syria in public. We saw him belatedly promise to provide aid to the rebels, which still only arrives in trickles, and then justify each procrastination by Russian and Chinese opposition in the U.N. Security Council.
“The president has used this obstruction as an excuse. He has actually adopted a policy of small steps,” Stewart Patrick observes.* Six years after an election which made the whole world dream, Obama is today the president of a nation withdrawn into itself. A few months ago, his adviser, Ben Rhodes, delivered the key to the whole story: “The country is exhausted.”
*Editor’s Note: These quotes, accurately translated, could not be verified.
A senior official in the U.S. Department of State confers with a group of reporters to justify the White House’s hesitation to take on a more hawkish role: “Economic interests are paramount. We simply don’t have the leverage, we don’t have the inclination to use military force [abroad].” We are in May 1993. Bill Clinton has just taken the office as president. Two years and three months later, this same President Clinton will launch Operation Deliberate Force, under the aegis of NATO, against Milosevic’s troops.
Bush’s activism, Obama’s election and the initial excitement about the Arab Spring had made us forget that the eternal power struggle between interventionists and isolationists in the United States, with all its pendulum-like movements, is more real than ever. The current climate also recalls that of America in 1993: barely out of a recession and no longer in the grips of the Cold War. Two days before the massive use of chemical weapons in Syria, Michael Hirsh of the very serious “National Journal,” summarized the sentiment of many: “Maybe everyone should remain as calm as Obama seems to be right now […] [L]ooked at from a purely realpolitik, versus humanitarian, viewpoint, the bloodshed in both Egypt and Syria is not necessarily hurting U.S. interests. […] In Syria, the main antagonists are both declared enemies of the United States.”
The Immense Reticence of the Americans
Even after the announcement of the massacre at Gotha, a Reuters-Ipsos poll confirmed the immense reticence of Americans: Only 25 percent of them approve of a military intervention in the event of chemical arms usage by the Assad regime; 46 percent are opposed to it.
So? Earlier this week, no one, or nearly no one, in Washington doubted that America would intervene in the days or hours to come, simply because Assad’s action was, according to Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations, “an incredible insolence” in the face of an American president who one year ago drew a “red line” which would be crossed if “we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” “Obama would seem truly powerless if he did not respond to such an enormous provocation,” Patrick said.*
This is particularly true since Assad’s challenge accompanies a series of diplomatic reversals by Washington in the region: In Egypt, its Israeli and Saudi allies overtly support the military’s iron grip; in Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere, the troubles are multiplying and the Arab Spring is only a distant memory. With Syria at least the allies are prepared to fall in behind Washington. “Even if France and Great Britain speak of intervention, absolutely nothing can happen without the United States. Everyone, from Jordan to Israel, wants Uncle Sam to get into the game in Syria and take care of the problem,” states Joshua Landis, professor at the University of Oklahoma and one of the top experts on Syria.*
The Last Taboo
Behind these political considerations, another more strategic motive pushes Obama to intervene: “The chemical weapon is truly the last taboo of the international community. If we let Assad violate it, that will set a precedent for other countries,” notes Stewart Patrick.* During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States reacted softly to the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield (even if the CIA was well aware of Iraq’s desire to use them, as the journal Foreign Policy just revealed).
Nor did Washington balk after the massacre of Iraqi Kurd civilians at Halabja in 1988. It is true that images and videos of it were rare at the time … but since the end of the 1980s the prohibition against chemical weapons had been respected. “A great number of countries with access to this ‘poor man’s nuclear bomb’ have dismantled their stockpiles. The prohibition is not perfect, but remains rather solid,” Patrick recalls.*
'A Limited but Destructive Strike'
How to intervene? “I do not believe that it will be necessary to strike government buildings at this stage. The most effective thing would be a limited but destructive strike, such as bombing the units responsible for the attacks — their command — and the units responsible for logistics. That would send a clear signal to the regime, indicating that they have crossed the Rubicon,” reckons Jeffrey White, a former Pentagon intelligence official working at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.*
We have evoked the precedents of Kosovo and Libya, but not many in Washington envision a military campaign with the goal of ending Assad’s rule, or even of depriving Syria of its chemical weapons. These weapons are spread around the whole country, mostly in densely populated cities. Multiple bombardments would be necessary, perhaps even special forces missions, with the additional danger — overestimated, according to some — of a release of chemical substances into the atmosphere.
The risks of an American action, even limited, have been enough to dissuade Obama until now: civilian victims, a flood of refugees into Jordan and Lebanon, worsening policies of the Assad regime perhaps providing chemical weapons to its allies in Hezbollah or elsewhere. But “one barely speaks of the inverse scenario,” Jeffrey White adds. “What would happen if Assad won? If he crushes the rebellion where will we find ourselves? A victorious alliance of Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Assad, who will settle the score with those who defied him.” The old veteran adds, however, “Frankly, there is no possible ‘happy end’ to this Syrian crisis, at least in the short term. Whatever the outcome of the crisis, it will be chaotic and not pretty.”*
'A Policy of Small Steps'
This is a justification that the White House has put forward since the beginning. “Here’s what we wrestle with: There are huge costs and unintended consequences that go with a military intervention that could last for many years,” states National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes. No military intervention, no matter how limited it may be, is harmless; if there is to be an intervention, “Obama will find himself immediately criticized for taking a stand on chemical weapons and then doing nothing about the numerous civilians killed by conventional weapons,” indicates Joshua Landis.* Senator John McCain will be the first to jump at the opportunity. But these reservations take nothing from the fact that for a year now, the Syrian question has not ceased to concern the American president.
Firstly, there is this not-to-be-crossed “red line,” a proposition that he had improvised in a press conference on Aug. 20, 2012, without warning anyone in advance. Since then, Barack Obama’s impatience in private has only been equaled by his reticence to speak about Syria in public. We saw him belatedly promise to provide aid to the rebels, which still only arrives in trickles, and then justify each procrastination by Russian and Chinese opposition in the U.N. Security Council.
“The president has used this obstruction as an excuse. He has actually adopted a policy of small steps,” Stewart Patrick observes.* Six years after an election which made the whole world dream, Obama is today the president of a nation withdrawn into itself. A few months ago, his adviser, Ben Rhodes, delivered the key to the whole story: “The country is exhausted.”
*Editor’s Note: These quotes, accurately translated, could not be verified.
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