Further Into the Dead End
Just seven weeks after Obama’s inauguration, even the most optimistic among us must realize that the campaign slogan “change” isn’t applicable to the new administration’s Afghanistan policy. Troop strength is being increased by some 17,000 soldiers for a total now of 55,000, and an additional 13,000 soldiers is also being evaluated. If one counts the 32,000 troops from other NATO countries already there, the 100,000-point could be reached this year – the same number of foreign troops that were in Afghanistan in 1988 shortly before the Soviet Union threw in the towel.
Obama appears to be determined to carry on down this path – whether because he’s helpless to do otherwise or he actually believes military victory over the insurgents is possible. It would behoove the “beacon of hope” to reflect on the lessons of Vietnam. Within just three years of America’s assumption of responsibility for all of Afghanistan in the fall of 2006, the number of foreign troops will have doubled. What has the massive ramp up of American and NATO troops accomplished in those three years? The answer would appear to be a stagnating program of infrastructure repair, less security, more civilian victims, and an expansion of hostilities into neighboring Pakistan. A fatal record – fatal above all for the Afghan people.
For two years, Germany has been saying that the more civilian-oriented European engagement there would be successful. Not much remains of that. The focus of police force training has long since followed the American model of creating a force that would assist in making war on the insurgency. If the United States provides a troop surge, it will be immediately clear to the people of Afghanistan who the boss is and who the underlings are. On the other hand, one can’t shake the impression that this role as underling seems quite agreeable to Germany.
The role of the German army in combat will be expanded, but with very little public fanfare. For now, 600 additional soldiers will be sent to Afghanistan, 400 of them for extended tours of duty. If the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) unit is deployed there from Geilenkirchen, the legally mandated troop strength ceiling will have to be raised. The 400 “long-term guests” will be sent to augment the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This last decision shows that the mission no longer is to protect the civilian reconstruction teams. The QRF is a flexibly deployable combat unit designed to engage insurgent forces. The QRF, therefore, represents an increasing acceptance of the American strategy, and the dead end in which they will find themselves.
The withdrawal of German forces is and remains the order of the day. Ending NATO intervention in Afghanistan is in the interest of the Afghan people. A survey recently showed that a majority of the population there favored the withdrawal of foreign troops within two years. If common sense prevails, the groundwork for that must be laid at the NATO summit early next month.
Obama appears to be determined to carry on down this path – whether because he’s helpless to do otherwise or he actually believes military victory over the insurgents is possible. It would behoove the “beacon of hope” to reflect on the lessons of Vietnam. Within just three years of America’s assumption of responsibility for all of Afghanistan in the fall of 2006, the number of foreign troops will have doubled. What has the massive ramp up of American and NATO troops accomplished in those three years? The answer would appear to be a stagnating program of infrastructure repair, less security, more civilian victims, and an expansion of hostilities into neighboring Pakistan. A fatal record – fatal above all for the Afghan people.
For two years, Germany has been saying that the more civilian-oriented European engagement there would be successful. Not much remains of that. The focus of police force training has long since followed the American model of creating a force that would assist in making war on the insurgency. If the United States provides a troop surge, it will be immediately clear to the people of Afghanistan who the boss is and who the underlings are. On the other hand, one can’t shake the impression that this role as underling seems quite agreeable to Germany.
The role of the German army in combat will be expanded, but with very little public fanfare. For now, 600 additional soldiers will be sent to Afghanistan, 400 of them for extended tours of duty. If the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) unit is deployed there from Geilenkirchen, the legally mandated troop strength ceiling will have to be raised. The 400 “long-term guests” will be sent to augment the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This last decision shows that the mission no longer is to protect the civilian reconstruction teams. The QRF is a flexibly deployable combat unit designed to engage insurgent forces. The QRF, therefore, represents an increasing acceptance of the American strategy, and the dead end in which they will find themselves.
The withdrawal of German forces is and remains the order of the day. Ending NATO intervention in Afghanistan is in the interest of the Afghan people. A survey recently showed that a majority of the population there favored the withdrawal of foreign troops within two years. If common sense prevails, the groundwork for that must be laid at the NATO summit early next month.