If we were to judge the EU’s response to the Kremlin’s actions by the blacklist it compiled, then we would most probably say it was too lenient and based upon fears of weakening economic ties. Nevertheless, it could have been worse.
Heads of democracies from 28 countries belonging to the EU managed to remain unanimous, and despite recent forecasts, dared to impose sanctions on Moscow dignitaries. However, there is no certainty as to how long this unity throughout the EU will last, and whether the EU will have enough strength to play a prolonged rough game with Vladimir Putin. It seems that the Kremlin host is eager for it.
The EU is going to sign the political part of the EU-Ukraine association agreement on Friday, March 21. However, there is still no agreement promising Kiev that it will be able to knock on the EU’s door in the future. A prospect of membership would serve as a political guarantee that Ukraine, if it clearly does not want it, will not end up as a “no man’s land” between the East and the West. This important guarantee has already become all the more important, because Moscow offered Ukraine such a status yesterday. Putin would like to weaken Kiev by pushing federalization to such an extent that it would be easier for him to subjugate the entire country.
The EU turned the Russian offer down. However, the unspoken but obviously intended promise, “If you agree to our conditions, we will stop destabilizing Ukraine, we will not invade Donetsk, and peace will be restored once again,” will continue to tempt some of those ruling in the West.
Jeśli po kształcie czarnej listy Rosjan oceniać odpowiedź UE na działania Kremla, to jest za słaba i podszyta obawami przed psuciem sobie gospodarczych kontaktów. Ale mogło być jeszcze gorzej.
Szefom dyplomacji 28 krajów Unii udało się utrzymać jedność i - wbrew prognozom - odważyli się na jakiekolwiek restrykcje wobec dygnitarzy z Moskwy. Ale nie ma dziś pewności, jak długo ta jedność Unii potrwa. I czy będzie ona miała siłę do dłuższej, twardej gry z Władimirem Putinem. Bo gospodarz Kremla najwyraźniej ma na to ochotę.
W piątek Unia podpisze z Ukrainą polityczną część umowy stowarzyszeniowej. Wciąż nie ma jednak zgody, by dać Kijowowi obietnicę, że będzie mógł w przyszłości zapukać do drzwi UE. Perspektywa członkostwa byłaby polityczną gwarancją, że Ukraina - jeśli sama tego nie zechce - nie skończy jako "ziemia niczyja" między Wschodem i Zachodem. Gwarancją tym ważniejszą, że Moskwa zaproponowała wczoraj Ukrainie taki właśnie status. Przez forsowaną federalizację Putin chciałby tak osłabić Kijów, by łatwiej podporządkowywać sobie cały kraj.
Unia nie przyjęła rosyjskiej oferty. Jednak niewypowiedziana wprost, lecz oczywista obietnica - "jeśli zaakceptujecie nasze warunki, przestaniemy destabilizować Ukrainę, nie najedziemy Doniecka i znowu zapanuje spokój" - będzie niektórych rządzących na Zachodzie bardzo nęcić.
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Machado’s Nobel Prize is even more significant in light of recent U.S. military actions near Venezuela...A Nobel Prize that rewards peace should be viewed as a warning against military overreach.
Contempt for him is so great that, in this country, Trump is conceded little, and his successes are ignored. One of them is the peace plan for the Gaza Strip.
In [Weiss'] articles, she attacked the alleged excesses of the left, criticized the 2017 Women's March against Trump and described intersectionality as a new caste system.
In [Weiss'] articles, she attacked the alleged excesses of the left, criticized the 2017 Women's March against Trump and described intersectionality as a new caste system.
Machado’s Nobel Prize is even more significant in light of recent U.S. military actions near Venezuela...A Nobel Prize that rewards peace should be viewed as a warning against military overreach.
Contempt for him is so great that, in this country, Trump is conceded little, and his successes are ignored. One of them is the peace plan for the Gaza Strip.