Obama’s Asia Visit: Half the Results with Twice the Effort
Obama’s Asia tour is underway. The news began flooding the American media space as soon as he arrived in the Pacific. While we have yet to learn what will unfold next with the United States’ high-priority Asia-Pacific alliance when he visits the Philippines, we can, by observing the outcome of his previous two stops in South Korea and Japan, take some educated guesses as to what is going to happen: Attentive preparation. Half the results with twice the effort. Achievements few and far between.
In Japan, Obama set out with guns blazing, stating that “the U.S.–Japan defense treaty includes the Diaoyu Islands.”* But Obama couldn’t get any flexibility with Shinzo Abe over the United States’ foremost concern, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). As a result, the visit has been criticized as being a “foreign relations failure,” and Obama has “fallen for Abe’s trap.” Obama has even less to boast about with the country that ranks lower in his priorities — Malaysia. Malaysia’s foreign minister said that although Malaysia views the TPP as being beneficial to the country, they will not accept any preconditions to join something that could end up harming Malaysia’s national interests.
Given the increasingly complex nature of global security strategy, the arduous recovery of the U.S. economy, and the bitter polarization of the U.S. political system, issues demand that Obama not only “return to Asia,” but also that he “return to the U.S.” It’s difficult for Obama to achieve simultaneous political support for both his domestic economic policies and his foreign ones. The fact that Obama is once again needing to go to Asia to personally supervise and explain U.S. policy demonstrates just how difficult the year 2014 is becoming for his TPP plans. The TPP is the foundational economic point for the United States’ “return to Asia” policy. The troubles it is encountering stem from the displays of opposition some have over the United States’ wider Asia-Pacific strategy and are a reflection of how “the world will no longer play along with how the U.S. conducts itself.”
From what we’ve seen up to this point, Obama’s fifth visit to Asia has been dull and lifeless. The “return to Asia” movement has lost the momentum that was present in its first year, when Obama got on his high horse and made his solemn pledge to it. He planned the trip for half a year and opened it with a lofty tone, yet as he progressed along his route, his words softened and his views scattered. He simply reaffirms his main topic, the “promise of security toward allied friends,” and leaves any economic points to fade away. What a miserable anti-climax.
Abe played a cunning move, letting Obama come to Japan for a bite of sushi and a bit of policy prattling. No sooner had Obama left than Japan’s chief cabinet secretary came out and mocked Obama over his weak domestic coordination skills. When in South Korea, Obama spoke out on the “comfort women” issue. Japan’s ministers voiced objection to Obama doing this. Such an objection would have been unimaginable in previous eras of U.S.–Japan relations. Obama has already personally experienced what kind of “troublemaker” Abe can be. Obama wants to pull together strategic support among the United States’ allies, but with its incessant desire to be independent of the U.S., Japan is the biggest splitting point in the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance.
In Obama’s speech at a U.S. base in South Korea, Obama could have found an opportunity to invigorate his tour message. But in front of over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, Obama could only evoke cheers for the sake of cheering. He made a strong point of how the U.S. is a protecting force for its allies, but he still left a hole where it came to new ideas on moving forward with resolving the divide of the Korean Peninsula. The previous day, it had been leaked by Park Geun-hye at a press conference that “the U.S. will not apply military strength to resolve the North-South Korea issue.” So with the Obama government telling its troops to stay put just to maintain the status quo — neither intervening to end the Korean conflicts nor even trying to tone the tensions down — any restart to talks over the Korean divide is unlikely to amount to much.
In Obama’s upcoming visit to the Philippines, he will try to sign a treaty allowing U.S. troops to use the Philippines’ land and bases under a shared system. If this agreement goes ahead, then insofar as America’s Asia-Pacific military rebalance strategy goes, it could be considered a quality step of progress. But still, it will do little for the U.S. regarding the issue of ending the conflict between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea. If anything, it will allow the Philippines to continue being confrontational with China to no end.
Weakness and emptiness are the shameful traits of U.S. leaders when they are in Asia. They rely on their words to give a strong impression, but in their Asian allies’ eyes they are considered suspect and subject to mockery because of this. Under the framework of the United States’ “return to Asia” strategy, these Asian allies have each figured out some degree of give and take. But on their most pressing issues, none of them can make any earnest progress. This kind of allied system can hardly be considered ironclad. It’s not even worthy of being called paper-thin. If Obama doesn’t learn from his mistakes, then this Asia trip will do very little to advance his “return to Asia” strategy in any meaningful way. Even so, his failure might stimulate reflection on where he went wrong. Such introspection would be unlikely to cure the U.S. of its hegemonic thinking, but it might allow for pragmatic revisions that will quickly filter down into further bouts of U.S. and Asia-Pacific foreign negotiations. And in his being opportunistic for scooping up some political capital from Obama’s visit, Abe has, without doubt, offended many in Washington. For this Japan will definitely pay a long-term price.
Chinese public opinion over Obama’s Asia visit has revolved almost entirely around his outspokenness on the Diaoyu Islands issue and the concerns that it brings. This could also be because the Diaoyu Islands relate to China’s core interests, so how the U.S. has shifted on this point can be viewed as a movement toward a U.S. versus China strategy. Frankly, over the past year America’s browbeating of the People’s Republic of China over its growing military influence has been drawing vocal responses from Chinese citizens. To this kind of ill sentiment, Chinese officials have no easy way to respond. They are, however, keeping strategically calm at the moment.
On April 25 at Harvard University, the Chinese ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai, said that the U.S. once preferred to “not take sides” on the Diaoyu Islands issue, but it is obvious that America is now “taking a stance.”* Moreover, “it’s very possible they have chosen the wrong side.”* The very next day, in “America’s backyard” of Latin America, the visiting Chinese foreign minister, Mr. Wang Yi, did not directly answer reporter’s questions on this topic, but made a profound statement instead: “To become a great nation, China has both confidence and the strategic aptitude for foreign relations. China also has the ability to back up its strategic moves. China will not be influenced by the one-off statement of one individual or the actions of any specific country. We have absolutely no intentions of changing direction on our foreign policy issues.”
From both ministers’ words on this issue, it is clear that China will not give a knee-jerk reaction to either this recent revelation from Obama on the Diaoyu Islands issue or to U.S.-Japan relations in general. But it will “listen to Obama’s words and watch his moves.” China will not allow this issue to come between it and the U.S., and it will not let any frivolous provocations or misunderstandings upset the future course of U.S.-China cooperation. It is foolish to assign any truth to matters on mere presumptions or surface impressions. China cannot allow itself to be led along by such kinds of thinking.
*Editor’s note: The original quotations, accurately translated, could not be verified.
In Japan, Obama set out with guns blazing, stating that “the U.S.–Japan defense treaty includes the Diaoyu Islands.”* But Obama couldn’t get any flexibility with Shinzo Abe over the United States’ foremost concern, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). As a result, the visit has been criticized as being a “foreign relations failure,” and Obama has “fallen for Abe’s trap.” Obama has even less to boast about with the country that ranks lower in his priorities — Malaysia. Malaysia’s foreign minister said that although Malaysia views the TPP as being beneficial to the country, they will not accept any preconditions to join something that could end up harming Malaysia’s national interests.
Given the increasingly complex nature of global security strategy, the arduous recovery of the U.S. economy, and the bitter polarization of the U.S. political system, issues demand that Obama not only “return to Asia,” but also that he “return to the U.S.” It’s difficult for Obama to achieve simultaneous political support for both his domestic economic policies and his foreign ones. The fact that Obama is once again needing to go to Asia to personally supervise and explain U.S. policy demonstrates just how difficult the year 2014 is becoming for his TPP plans. The TPP is the foundational economic point for the United States’ “return to Asia” policy. The troubles it is encountering stem from the displays of opposition some have over the United States’ wider Asia-Pacific strategy and are a reflection of how “the world will no longer play along with how the U.S. conducts itself.”
From what we’ve seen up to this point, Obama’s fifth visit to Asia has been dull and lifeless. The “return to Asia” movement has lost the momentum that was present in its first year, when Obama got on his high horse and made his solemn pledge to it. He planned the trip for half a year and opened it with a lofty tone, yet as he progressed along his route, his words softened and his views scattered. He simply reaffirms his main topic, the “promise of security toward allied friends,” and leaves any economic points to fade away. What a miserable anti-climax.
Abe played a cunning move, letting Obama come to Japan for a bite of sushi and a bit of policy prattling. No sooner had Obama left than Japan’s chief cabinet secretary came out and mocked Obama over his weak domestic coordination skills. When in South Korea, Obama spoke out on the “comfort women” issue. Japan’s ministers voiced objection to Obama doing this. Such an objection would have been unimaginable in previous eras of U.S.–Japan relations. Obama has already personally experienced what kind of “troublemaker” Abe can be. Obama wants to pull together strategic support among the United States’ allies, but with its incessant desire to be independent of the U.S., Japan is the biggest splitting point in the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliance.
In Obama’s speech at a U.S. base in South Korea, Obama could have found an opportunity to invigorate his tour message. But in front of over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, Obama could only evoke cheers for the sake of cheering. He made a strong point of how the U.S. is a protecting force for its allies, but he still left a hole where it came to new ideas on moving forward with resolving the divide of the Korean Peninsula. The previous day, it had been leaked by Park Geun-hye at a press conference that “the U.S. will not apply military strength to resolve the North-South Korea issue.” So with the Obama government telling its troops to stay put just to maintain the status quo — neither intervening to end the Korean conflicts nor even trying to tone the tensions down — any restart to talks over the Korean divide is unlikely to amount to much.
In Obama’s upcoming visit to the Philippines, he will try to sign a treaty allowing U.S. troops to use the Philippines’ land and bases under a shared system. If this agreement goes ahead, then insofar as America’s Asia-Pacific military rebalance strategy goes, it could be considered a quality step of progress. But still, it will do little for the U.S. regarding the issue of ending the conflict between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea. If anything, it will allow the Philippines to continue being confrontational with China to no end.
Weakness and emptiness are the shameful traits of U.S. leaders when they are in Asia. They rely on their words to give a strong impression, but in their Asian allies’ eyes they are considered suspect and subject to mockery because of this. Under the framework of the United States’ “return to Asia” strategy, these Asian allies have each figured out some degree of give and take. But on their most pressing issues, none of them can make any earnest progress. This kind of allied system can hardly be considered ironclad. It’s not even worthy of being called paper-thin. If Obama doesn’t learn from his mistakes, then this Asia trip will do very little to advance his “return to Asia” strategy in any meaningful way. Even so, his failure might stimulate reflection on where he went wrong. Such introspection would be unlikely to cure the U.S. of its hegemonic thinking, but it might allow for pragmatic revisions that will quickly filter down into further bouts of U.S. and Asia-Pacific foreign negotiations. And in his being opportunistic for scooping up some political capital from Obama’s visit, Abe has, without doubt, offended many in Washington. For this Japan will definitely pay a long-term price.
Chinese public opinion over Obama’s Asia visit has revolved almost entirely around his outspokenness on the Diaoyu Islands issue and the concerns that it brings. This could also be because the Diaoyu Islands relate to China’s core interests, so how the U.S. has shifted on this point can be viewed as a movement toward a U.S. versus China strategy. Frankly, over the past year America’s browbeating of the People’s Republic of China over its growing military influence has been drawing vocal responses from Chinese citizens. To this kind of ill sentiment, Chinese officials have no easy way to respond. They are, however, keeping strategically calm at the moment.
On April 25 at Harvard University, the Chinese ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai, said that the U.S. once preferred to “not take sides” on the Diaoyu Islands issue, but it is obvious that America is now “taking a stance.”* Moreover, “it’s very possible they have chosen the wrong side.”* The very next day, in “America’s backyard” of Latin America, the visiting Chinese foreign minister, Mr. Wang Yi, did not directly answer reporter’s questions on this topic, but made a profound statement instead: “To become a great nation, China has both confidence and the strategic aptitude for foreign relations. China also has the ability to back up its strategic moves. China will not be influenced by the one-off statement of one individual or the actions of any specific country. We have absolutely no intentions of changing direction on our foreign policy issues.”
From both ministers’ words on this issue, it is clear that China will not give a knee-jerk reaction to either this recent revelation from Obama on the Diaoyu Islands issue or to U.S.-Japan relations in general. But it will “listen to Obama’s words and watch his moves.” China will not allow this issue to come between it and the U.S., and it will not let any frivolous provocations or misunderstandings upset the future course of U.S.-China cooperation. It is foolish to assign any truth to matters on mere presumptions or surface impressions. China cannot allow itself to be led along by such kinds of thinking.
*Editor’s note: The original quotations, accurately translated, could not be verified.