The US and Terror in Iraq and Syria: A Deep Split
It was the “dumb war” that a young senator named Barack Obama once talked about and used to move into the White House. When America brought its troops back home from Iraq in December 2011, this war was supposed to be over once and for all. That was a historical hoax.
The war, which Obama’s predecessor George W. Bush built based on smoke and mirrors, was never truly over; Obama, an America tired of war, and most parts of the world only told themselves so. It was only a question of time before the Nobel Peace Prize winner would set in motion the most momentous policy change of his term. When the stone-age jihadis of the “Islamic State” started terrorizing Mesopotamia and made the government in Baghdad appear a failure, he had to do something. Letting thousands of civilians die from thirst and hunger while ISIL terrorists closed in to kill them was a scenario that Washington could not bear, despite Syria and all the other examples of America’s patient — and fatal — waiting.
Instructing the drop of care packages to alleviate the most severe suffering and launching surgical airstrikes against terrorists, even under the most restrained conditions, was a decision Obama did not make easily.
The withdrawal of troops from Iraq, which Obama pushed for two and a half years ago, was actually necessary. However, considering the real balances of power on the ground, it came too early; Baghdad’s terror network benefited from it. A hotbed for jihadis turned into a regional terror regime.
Whoever really wants to stop ISIL terrorists could be drawn, step-by-step, into a much bigger conflict again. American airstrikes would be seen as support for President Maliki, who is detested across wide areas of Iraq. He is a man whom Washington initially fabricated and whom the U.S. would now rather see removed from office.
Also, with airstrikes, there is always the risk of civilian casualties.
If ISIL groups mingle among the normal people and seek shelter in schools or residential areas, and civilians die from airstrikes, this could trigger unforeseen solidarity within the Arab world. Moderate Sunnis could turn against America or even enter alliances with the extremists.
This [result] would be a big test for Obama’s red line (i.e., not sending U.S. troops back into combat), especially as the facts remain the same: The Iraqi army will not be able to effectively pacify the country, no matter how many U.S. military advisers support them. The green light that Obama gave for using military forces is a break from this policy, but it doesn’t really give rise to hope.
The war, which Obama’s predecessor George W. Bush built based on smoke and mirrors, was never truly over; Obama, an America tired of war, and most parts of the world only told themselves so. It was only a question of time before the Nobel Peace Prize winner would set in motion the most momentous policy change of his term. When the stone-age jihadis of the “Islamic State” started terrorizing Mesopotamia and made the government in Baghdad appear a failure, he had to do something. Letting thousands of civilians die from thirst and hunger while ISIL terrorists closed in to kill them was a scenario that Washington could not bear, despite Syria and all the other examples of America’s patient — and fatal — waiting.
Instructing the drop of care packages to alleviate the most severe suffering and launching surgical airstrikes against terrorists, even under the most restrained conditions, was a decision Obama did not make easily.
The withdrawal of troops from Iraq, which Obama pushed for two and a half years ago, was actually necessary. However, considering the real balances of power on the ground, it came too early; Baghdad’s terror network benefited from it. A hotbed for jihadis turned into a regional terror regime.
Whoever really wants to stop ISIL terrorists could be drawn, step-by-step, into a much bigger conflict again. American airstrikes would be seen as support for President Maliki, who is detested across wide areas of Iraq. He is a man whom Washington initially fabricated and whom the U.S. would now rather see removed from office.
Also, with airstrikes, there is always the risk of civilian casualties.
If ISIL groups mingle among the normal people and seek shelter in schools or residential areas, and civilians die from airstrikes, this could trigger unforeseen solidarity within the Arab world. Moderate Sunnis could turn against America or even enter alliances with the extremists.
This [result] would be a big test for Obama’s red line (i.e., not sending U.S. troops back into combat), especially as the facts remain the same: The Iraqi army will not be able to effectively pacify the country, no matter how many U.S. military advisers support them. The green light that Obama gave for using military forces is a break from this policy, but it doesn’t really give rise to hope.