A Hand Overplayed
Published in Die Tageszeitung
(Germany) on August 11th, 2008
by JÜRGEN GOTTSCHLICH (link to
original)
Georgia’s attempt to bring South Ossetia under control has failed. President Saakashvili is counting on help from the USA-–a serious miscalculation.
Michail Saakashvili backed the wrong horse. His attempt last Friday to regain control over the breakaway province of South Ossetia by military force has failed and resulted in a bloodbath. Additionally, with this military adventure Saakashvili may have squandered any chances to salvage anything from the losses Georgia suffered in the early 90s. What could have possibly motivated the Georgian President, and what did he gamble on?
While reliable information is still scant at this point, it’s apparent Saakashvili took it for granted that his American supporters, principally U.S. President George W. Bush, would make sure that Russia remained silent until U.S.-trained Georgian troops could change conditions on the ground in South Ossetia.
It was a catastrophic mistake that probably cost several thousand lives, left South Ossetia in ruins, and turned many towns in the rest of Georgia into combat zones.
Whether or not the conflict between Georgia and its two breakaway provinces, South Ossetia and Abchasia, had already begun in 1992, it picked up strength when the former Serbian province of Kosovo declared its independence in February this year. Independence in Kosovo was an indication to the people of Abchasia and South Ossetia that independence was also possible for them. The Russians saw the two provinces as revenge against the west, proof that democracy and self-determination could be turned against western interests. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia at the time, declared he would have dealings with the leaders of the two provinces, something equal to de-facto recognition.
Michail Saakashvili recognized correctly that the 15-year truce concerning Georgia’s borders was entering a new phase for the future, but he played the wrong cards. Instead of negotiating a deal with Russia, he sent in his troops instead.
The run-up began in Abchasia. Around late April and early May, Georgian troops began massing on the armistice line between Abchasia and Georgia. A period of saber-rattling followed, during which Russian fighter planes shot down several Georgian spy drones over Abchasia, thereby making clear their objection to Georgian military intervention in the region. Saakashvili quickly denied ensuing rumors that Georgian and Russian mediators were discussing the possibility of a territorial swap – western Abchasia would return to Gerogia in exchange for independence in the rest of Abchasia – as an alternative to military action. Instead, disputes on the Georgia-Ossetia border suddenly escalated.
The United States sharply criticized the Russian course of action in South Ossetia, but that was about it. Not even Bush entertained the remotest thoughts of sending American troops on behalf of Georgian interests in the region.
To say nothing of NATO, upon which Saakashvili had also gambled. Fraser Cameron of the EU Russian think-tank was quoted in Brussels as saying that Saakashvili had sufficient warnings from the west and should have known that “nobody would pull his chestnuts out of the fire, and no knights would be riding in to help him.” James Nixey, an analyst with the Royal Institute for International Relations in London remarked, “On the contrary, people in most western capitals were disappointed at Saakashvili’s overreaction. He is in grave danger of squandering the cachet he has built up in the west.”
What the United States, the European Union, and Germany’s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, wanted to accomplish was peace in the Caucasus, even if Georgia had to make concessions in areas it had in reality long since lost. To accomplish this, Saakashvili should have shown diplomatic flexibility during his August meeting in Berlin with Steinmeier when they discussed Abchasian and South Ossetian issues. The meeting was a failure and Saakashvili subsequently decided on a course that has presented Russia with a golden opportunity to create a new reality in the region by military means. Putin made it clear long ago from the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz that a South Ossetian return to Georgian rule was out of the question. The same applied to Abchasia.
Saakashvili bet far too much on his cards - and lost.
Michail Saakashvili backed the wrong horse. His attempt last Friday to regain control over the breakaway province of South Ossetia by military force has failed and resulted in a bloodbath. Additionally, with this military adventure Saakashvili may have squandered any chances to salvage anything from the losses Georgia suffered in the early 90s. What could have possibly motivated the Georgian President, and what did he gamble on?
While reliable information is still scant at this point, it’s apparent Saakashvili took it for granted that his American supporters, principally U.S. President George W. Bush, would make sure that Russia remained silent until U.S.-trained Georgian troops could change conditions on the ground in South Ossetia.
It was a catastrophic mistake that probably cost several thousand lives, left South Ossetia in ruins, and turned many towns in the rest of Georgia into combat zones.
Whether or not the conflict between Georgia and its two breakaway provinces, South Ossetia and Abchasia, had already begun in 1992, it picked up strength when the former Serbian province of Kosovo declared its independence in February this year. Independence in Kosovo was an indication to the people of Abchasia and South Ossetia that independence was also possible for them. The Russians saw the two provinces as revenge against the west, proof that democracy and self-determination could be turned against western interests. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia at the time, declared he would have dealings with the leaders of the two provinces, something equal to de-facto recognition.
Michail Saakashvili recognized correctly that the 15-year truce concerning Georgia’s borders was entering a new phase for the future, but he played the wrong cards. Instead of negotiating a deal with Russia, he sent in his troops instead.
The run-up began in Abchasia. Around late April and early May, Georgian troops began massing on the armistice line between Abchasia and Georgia. A period of saber-rattling followed, during which Russian fighter planes shot down several Georgian spy drones over Abchasia, thereby making clear their objection to Georgian military intervention in the region. Saakashvili quickly denied ensuing rumors that Georgian and Russian mediators were discussing the possibility of a territorial swap – western Abchasia would return to Gerogia in exchange for independence in the rest of Abchasia – as an alternative to military action. Instead, disputes on the Georgia-Ossetia border suddenly escalated.
The United States sharply criticized the Russian course of action in South Ossetia, but that was about it. Not even Bush entertained the remotest thoughts of sending American troops on behalf of Georgian interests in the region.
To say nothing of NATO, upon which Saakashvili had also gambled. Fraser Cameron of the EU Russian think-tank was quoted in Brussels as saying that Saakashvili had sufficient warnings from the west and should have known that “nobody would pull his chestnuts out of the fire, and no knights would be riding in to help him.” James Nixey, an analyst with the Royal Institute for International Relations in London remarked, “On the contrary, people in most western capitals were disappointed at Saakashvili’s overreaction. He is in grave danger of squandering the cachet he has built up in the west.”
What the United States, the European Union, and Germany’s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, wanted to accomplish was peace in the Caucasus, even if Georgia had to make concessions in areas it had in reality long since lost. To accomplish this, Saakashvili should have shown diplomatic flexibility during his August meeting in Berlin with Steinmeier when they discussed Abchasian and South Ossetian issues. The meeting was a failure and Saakashvili subsequently decided on a course that has presented Russia with a golden opportunity to create a new reality in the region by military means. Putin made it clear long ago from the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz that a South Ossetian return to Georgian rule was out of the question. The same applied to Abchasia.
Saakashvili bet far too much on his cards - and lost.
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