Killing the Chicken No Longer Scares the Monkey*: Trump’s Authority Is Waning
In the past, Donald Trump hasn’t just been good at increasing tariffs but also at using them as a power play: threatening them today, reversing himself tomorrow and then upping the ante again the following day. This has left countries always unable to guess the next moves of the White House. Citing a former U.S. trade official, Reuters pointed out that, to Trump, uncertainty itself is leverage. As long as other countries fear what he will do next, they are more likely to concede. Reuters bluntly stated that now that the Supreme Court has limited Trump’s tariff power, they have weakened his favorite tool for pressuring others.
If constantly repeated, threats will not have continued efficacy; instead, their effect will weaken. Real trust with others is not built merely on whether you can flip the table, but whether you can maintain a stable order if others choose to follow you. Once American allies realize that the U.S. will even turn on friends at any time, and that tariffs are not just used for economic policy but as a tool for extortion, the rational response will not be just to submit; instead, they will begin to avoid the risk. Reuters vividly described America’s trading partners: they have already been “hurt” by Trump’s unpredictability.
In Europe, this shift has already appeared. Reuters reported that, at the Munich Security Conference, European leaders have already declared a desire to de-risk from the U.S. At the same time, the commentary cautioned that Europe can no longer be lulled by America’s superficially friendly sweet talk. Another commentary stated more bluntly that no leader among European, North American or Indo-Pacific allies is willing to actively provoke Trump. However, they all know that they must reduce their vulnerability as quickly as possible. This shows that allies' attitudes have already shifted from “trying to curry favor with the U.S.” to “trying not to be manipulated by the U.S.”
This loss of authority is Trump’s real problem. Once the marginal benefits from tariff threats decline, he will have to use high-intensity actions to prove once again that he can still define a situation. Therefore, what the rest of the world will see is not just trade pressure, but shocking acts of coercion. For example, in January, the U.S. captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, and Trump announced that the U.S. would “manage” Venezuela during this period of transition. In March, Ali Khamenei was killed in a joint American-Israeli military operation, and Trump said that the U.S. would play a role in selecting the next Iranian leader. These acts clearly go beyond implementing policies and are undisguised displays of power.
The key, however, is that Trump’s actions toward Venezuela and Iran cannot be applied to Canada, Germany, Japan or France. Snatching Maduro has already severely rocked the existing international order. How could he snatch the elected leader of a European ally? Even if allies can accept his heavy-handed action in Iran, how could they ever accept that he will decide who governs a NATO country? The extreme measures he takes toward the chicken cannot be replicated with the monkey.* U.S. allies obviously understand this difference. Therefore, just because they see how ruthlessly he has killed the chicken doesn’t mean they will give in to Trump on tariffs out of fear.
This is the essence of the current situation: Killing the chicken will not warn the monkey. Trump is still able to make big news and exert coercive power on individual opponents. However, as far as his allies are concerned, these actions seem to be proving something else: he can no longer rely only on stable institutional credibility and his leadership role among allies to maintain compliance. He can only continually escalate the intensity of his performances to make up for his loss of authority. The problem is, no matter how big the performance, he cannot change the fact that U.S. allies have already begun to collectively avoid and de-risk, as well as reduce their dependence on the U.S. Maybe the chicken was killed in vain, because the monkey has already learned not to go along with the performance anymore.
*Editor's note: "Killing the chicken to warn the monkey" is a Chinese proverb meaning to punish one person as a warning to others – to make an example of someone
If constantly repeated, threats will not have continued efficacy; instead, their effect will weaken. Real trust with others is not built merely on whether you can flip the table, but whether you can maintain a stable order if others choose to follow you. Once American allies realize that the U.S. will even turn on friends at any time, and that tariffs are not just used for economic policy but as a tool for extortion, the rational response will not be just to submit; instead, they will begin to avoid the risk. Reuters vividly described America’s trading partners: they have already been “hurt” by Trump’s unpredictability.
In Europe, this shift has already appeared. Reuters reported that, at the Munich Security Conference, European leaders have already declared a desire to de-risk from the U.S. At the same time, the commentary cautioned that Europe can no longer be lulled by America’s superficially friendly sweet talk. Another commentary stated more bluntly that no leader among European, North American or Indo-Pacific allies is willing to actively provoke Trump. However, they all know that they must reduce their vulnerability as quickly as possible. This shows that allies' attitudes have already shifted from “trying to curry favor with the U.S.” to “trying not to be manipulated by the U.S.”
This loss of authority is Trump’s real problem. Once the marginal benefits from tariff threats decline, he will have to use high-intensity actions to prove once again that he can still define a situation. Therefore, what the rest of the world will see is not just trade pressure, but shocking acts of coercion. For example, in January, the U.S. captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, and Trump announced that the U.S. would “manage” Venezuela during this period of transition. In March, Ali Khamenei was killed in a joint American-Israeli military operation, and Trump said that the U.S. would play a role in selecting the next Iranian leader. These acts clearly go beyond implementing policies and are undisguised displays of power.
The key, however, is that Trump’s actions toward Venezuela and Iran cannot be applied to Canada, Germany, Japan or France. Snatching Maduro has already severely rocked the existing international order. How could he snatch the elected leader of a European ally? Even if allies can accept his heavy-handed action in Iran, how could they ever accept that he will decide who governs a NATO country? The extreme measures he takes toward the chicken cannot be replicated with the monkey.* U.S. allies obviously understand this difference. Therefore, just because they see how ruthlessly he has killed the chicken doesn’t mean they will give in to Trump on tariffs out of fear.
This is the essence of the current situation: Killing the chicken will not warn the monkey. Trump is still able to make big news and exert coercive power on individual opponents. However, as far as his allies are concerned, these actions seem to be proving something else: he can no longer rely only on stable institutional credibility and his leadership role among allies to maintain compliance. He can only continually escalate the intensity of his performances to make up for his loss of authority. The problem is, no matter how big the performance, he cannot change the fact that U.S. allies have already begun to collectively avoid and de-risk, as well as reduce their dependence on the U.S. Maybe the chicken was killed in vain, because the monkey has already learned not to go along with the performance anymore.
*Editor's note: "Killing the chicken to warn the monkey" is a Chinese proverb meaning to punish one person as a warning to others – to make an example of someone
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