Balance in Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and U.S.
The power struggle between the civilian and military authorities in Turkey, which resurfaced with the recent Supreme Military Council, does not stir the same degree of excitement in Washington anymore.
The fact that the holiday season has begun in the American capital is not the only reason. Before, when Turkish generals snapped at Turkish governments, not only Ankara but also everyone in Washington would go to great lengths to appeal to the Turkish Armed Forces, arguably the most important political actor in Turkey, a strategically important country to the U.S. A lot is different nowadays. The new thinking prevalent in many circles is that the Turkish military has continuously lost ground to the civilian authority, though its role can still not be completely ignored. The radical change that has occurred is obvious from the fact that the American media now feel it necessary to add “once powerful” while reporting news from the Turkish Supreme Military Council.
One particular thing that most worried the folks in Washington amidst civil-military struggle was the possibility that the army would lose its temper and attempt another coup d’état. And coup d’états had not posed much of a trouble for the United States during the Cold War years. Sometimes coup d’états were even preferred by the United States over other alternatives. Yet, with the Cold War behind them, the U.S. has given a red light to any de facto coup d’états in Turkey, which is also a NATO member. After all, NATO is an alliance of democratic countries. Antidemocratic images coming out of a Turkish army, which has established one of the closest links with the U.S., would damage the United States both domestically and in the international arena. This means that any coup d’état in Turkey, planned or still to be planned, will therefore have to be anti-American too from now on.
In my opinion, one reason why anti-Americanism in the Turkish Armed Forces is recently on the rise has something to do with the subjection of tradition of political militarism, prevalent in the Turkish army, to the civilian democracy thanks to the reforms with U.S. backing. Many in the Turkish army see the American support, though intermittent, for further consolidation of Turkish democracy as American backing for the incumbent AK Party government. Hence, the U.S. constitutes the chief obstacle to their chances of rising to power. The close relations connecting some military people who have been associated with the Sledgehammer coup plans and the Americans result purely from realpolitik and pragmatism. Aside from the people with an ideological baggage, among whom some neoconservatives can also be counted, this abovementioned close connection has realpolitik and pragmatic implications for the American side as well. Needless to say, in such close established connections, the reason for cooperation is not that the parties are the apples of the eye to one another.
The unbalanced weight the Turkish military possesses in Turkish politics has shaken the Pentagon's role in shaping American policy towards Turkey as well. The more civilian authorities declare their control over the Turkish army, the more sway American civilians will have within certain mechanisms whereby Washington’s policy towards Turkey is formed. In other words, the role of the State Department, the CIA and other non-state actors will essentially expand. Turkish generals trying to exert more pressure on the Turkish government and Turkish Grand National Assembly to bring out favorable outcomes to the U.S. is getting more unlikely. When Washington starts working more with the civilian authorities in Turkey, this will also eliminate a dark zone for corruption in the Turkish army due to the billion-dollar arms agreements, which are deliberately kept outside the purview of civilian officials.
Some figures from the American foreign policy elite might be skeptical of the wholesale civilianization process in Turkey because they are stuck back in the Cold War years. At the root of the hot “shift of axis” debate lies the bewilderment with and lack of understanding of the shifting of Turkish foreign policy, besides other things, to civilian democratic ground. Yet, there is no doubt that these elites will get accustomed to the new situation and adjust their expectations accordingly. Clearly everybody will have to get used to Turkey, which, unlike before, now revolves 360 degrees around its own interests.
The Turkish Armed Forces has long been a revered institution for the United States because it was a modernizing force and contributed positively to global security. Being a member of NATO has also helped the Turkish army drop its radical elements. Nevertheless, neither the Pentagon nor NATO has gone to great lengths to enable the rather mental modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. It can even be argued that “anti-democratic” means that the Turkish Armed Forces used against internal enemies such as “Islamic fundamentalism” or the Kurdish issue have usually been swept under the carpet. Should the allegations state prosecutors brought in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases get legally evidenced, the U.S. might find itself under criticism as well. The American public and other members of the international community might ask Washington if the U.S. was cognizant of these coup plans and what they did to stop these people if they were aware. Therefore, the weaning of the Turkish military from its bad habits such as coup d’états, human rights violations and partisanship will certainly benefit the interests of the U.S. The fairness and consistency of the legal and political tactics used in the justified struggle against such harmful habits of the Turkish army will further facilitate this process.
A Turkish army that is subservient to the civilian authority, more democratic and more respectful of human rights will suit not only Turkey but also its counterparts elsewhere including the United States. The civilianization of Turkey in general and the consolidation of civilian control and inspection over the Turkish army will definitely buttress Turkey’s overall power and prestige abroad, not undermine the army as some allegedly claim. For being a lackey to democracy is far more honorable than being a master in an autocracy.
The fact that the holiday season has begun in the American capital is not the only reason. Before, when Turkish generals snapped at Turkish governments, not only Ankara but also everyone in Washington would go to great lengths to appeal to the Turkish Armed Forces, arguably the most important political actor in Turkey, a strategically important country to the U.S. A lot is different nowadays. The new thinking prevalent in many circles is that the Turkish military has continuously lost ground to the civilian authority, though its role can still not be completely ignored. The radical change that has occurred is obvious from the fact that the American media now feel it necessary to add “once powerful” while reporting news from the Turkish Supreme Military Council.
One particular thing that most worried the folks in Washington amidst civil-military struggle was the possibility that the army would lose its temper and attempt another coup d’état. And coup d’états had not posed much of a trouble for the United States during the Cold War years. Sometimes coup d’états were even preferred by the United States over other alternatives. Yet, with the Cold War behind them, the U.S. has given a red light to any de facto coup d’états in Turkey, which is also a NATO member. After all, NATO is an alliance of democratic countries. Antidemocratic images coming out of a Turkish army, which has established one of the closest links with the U.S., would damage the United States both domestically and in the international arena. This means that any coup d’état in Turkey, planned or still to be planned, will therefore have to be anti-American too from now on.
In my opinion, one reason why anti-Americanism in the Turkish Armed Forces is recently on the rise has something to do with the subjection of tradition of political militarism, prevalent in the Turkish army, to the civilian democracy thanks to the reforms with U.S. backing. Many in the Turkish army see the American support, though intermittent, for further consolidation of Turkish democracy as American backing for the incumbent AK Party government. Hence, the U.S. constitutes the chief obstacle to their chances of rising to power. The close relations connecting some military people who have been associated with the Sledgehammer coup plans and the Americans result purely from realpolitik and pragmatism. Aside from the people with an ideological baggage, among whom some neoconservatives can also be counted, this abovementioned close connection has realpolitik and pragmatic implications for the American side as well. Needless to say, in such close established connections, the reason for cooperation is not that the parties are the apples of the eye to one another.
The unbalanced weight the Turkish military possesses in Turkish politics has shaken the Pentagon's role in shaping American policy towards Turkey as well. The more civilian authorities declare their control over the Turkish army, the more sway American civilians will have within certain mechanisms whereby Washington’s policy towards Turkey is formed. In other words, the role of the State Department, the CIA and other non-state actors will essentially expand. Turkish generals trying to exert more pressure on the Turkish government and Turkish Grand National Assembly to bring out favorable outcomes to the U.S. is getting more unlikely. When Washington starts working more with the civilian authorities in Turkey, this will also eliminate a dark zone for corruption in the Turkish army due to the billion-dollar arms agreements, which are deliberately kept outside the purview of civilian officials.
Some figures from the American foreign policy elite might be skeptical of the wholesale civilianization process in Turkey because they are stuck back in the Cold War years. At the root of the hot “shift of axis” debate lies the bewilderment with and lack of understanding of the shifting of Turkish foreign policy, besides other things, to civilian democratic ground. Yet, there is no doubt that these elites will get accustomed to the new situation and adjust their expectations accordingly. Clearly everybody will have to get used to Turkey, which, unlike before, now revolves 360 degrees around its own interests.
The Turkish Armed Forces has long been a revered institution for the United States because it was a modernizing force and contributed positively to global security. Being a member of NATO has also helped the Turkish army drop its radical elements. Nevertheless, neither the Pentagon nor NATO has gone to great lengths to enable the rather mental modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. It can even be argued that “anti-democratic” means that the Turkish Armed Forces used against internal enemies such as “Islamic fundamentalism” or the Kurdish issue have usually been swept under the carpet. Should the allegations state prosecutors brought in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases get legally evidenced, the U.S. might find itself under criticism as well. The American public and other members of the international community might ask Washington if the U.S. was cognizant of these coup plans and what they did to stop these people if they were aware. Therefore, the weaning of the Turkish military from its bad habits such as coup d’états, human rights violations and partisanship will certainly benefit the interests of the U.S. The fairness and consistency of the legal and political tactics used in the justified struggle against such harmful habits of the Turkish army will further facilitate this process.
A Turkish army that is subservient to the civilian authority, more democratic and more respectful of human rights will suit not only Turkey but also its counterparts elsewhere including the United States. The civilianization of Turkey in general and the consolidation of civilian control and inspection over the Turkish army will definitely buttress Turkey’s overall power and prestige abroad, not undermine the army as some allegedly claim. For being a lackey to democracy is far more honorable than being a master in an autocracy.