American Cables Scandal
It is clearly true that the scandal about the WikiLeaks cables is an American crisis, and it has been described best by the Italian foreign minister who called it "the September 11 of world diplomacy." It is a scandal as big as the U.S. failure to maintain the confidentiality of meetings. It is reasonable that this scandal calls into question American diplomacy, especially as it has become apparent that American diplomats spied on U.N. delegates. The question is: How will it affect diplomacy and international relations today? Is it possible for all world leaders to trust American diplomats, as long as the national security of some of these countries may be jeopardized? Not to mention the point raised by the spokesman for the British prime minister who said: “The leaks and their publication are damaging to national security in the United States and in Britain, and elsewhere. It's important that governments are able to operate on the basis of confidentiality of information.”
However, we must be mindful here that it is not possible to say that everything typed in the U.S. embassies is a fact, for reports are taken out of context sometimes. Some of them are impressions and analysis, and some of the others only give opinions on policy. Negotiation between nations is usually characterized by frankness, especially behind closed doors before they make any influential policy decisions. How is it possible for us to imagine, for example, how the Americans negotiate the issue of Russian spies or their negotiations with Iraq on some of the detainees belonging to Iran?
The simplest example of this was mentioned in the cables, if it is accurate. The Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz told the Iranian foreign minister that “Iranians should not interfere with the affairs of Arabs.” He added even more clearly: “We have had enough of your wickedness.” All of this means that policy is occasionally discussed clearly and frankly, and the Saudi Arabian ruler did not say it to the Western visitor, but directly to the Iranian foreign minister, face to face. However, the King of Saudi Arabia, despite all of this, did not decide to cut ties with Iran. Dialogue is one thing, and attitudes are something else.
Thus, whatever has been said about the leaked U.S. cables and the extent of their accuracy, they do not reveal anything new, except to the extent that it means that there is something going on inside America, maybe a scandal similar to Watergate, which took down President Nixon.
It goes without saying that the Middle East does not need cables to confirm or deny that Iran is a source of concern. In the same way, Iran’s response to the WikiLeaks cables seemed reasonable, and not because they have nothing to hide, but because the cables themselves confirm that they do. Tehran condemns the serious security issues. The observer cannot but evoke what was attributed to the Qatari prime minister in the cables, saying that the relationship with Iran is moving as follows: “They lie to us, we lie to them.” This statement, although not accurate, deserves to be the saying of the year; it summed up the region’s position on Iran with intelligence and clarity. Even without the cables, Tehran is aware of this, but cannot renounce its decision or its sovereignty.
However, we must be mindful here that it is not possible to say that everything typed in the U.S. embassies is a fact, for reports are taken out of context sometimes. Some of them are impressions and analysis, and some of the others only give opinions on policy. Negotiation between nations is usually characterized by frankness, especially behind closed doors before they make any influential policy decisions. How is it possible for us to imagine, for example, how the Americans negotiate the issue of Russian spies or their negotiations with Iraq on some of the detainees belonging to Iran?
The simplest example of this was mentioned in the cables, if it is accurate. The Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz told the Iranian foreign minister that “Iranians should not interfere with the affairs of Arabs.” He added even more clearly: “We have had enough of your wickedness.” All of this means that policy is occasionally discussed clearly and frankly, and the Saudi Arabian ruler did not say it to the Western visitor, but directly to the Iranian foreign minister, face to face. However, the King of Saudi Arabia, despite all of this, did not decide to cut ties with Iran. Dialogue is one thing, and attitudes are something else.
Thus, whatever has been said about the leaked U.S. cables and the extent of their accuracy, they do not reveal anything new, except to the extent that it means that there is something going on inside America, maybe a scandal similar to Watergate, which took down President Nixon.
It goes without saying that the Middle East does not need cables to confirm or deny that Iran is a source of concern. In the same way, Iran’s response to the WikiLeaks cables seemed reasonable, and not because they have nothing to hide, but because the cables themselves confirm that they do. Tehran condemns the serious security issues. The observer cannot but evoke what was attributed to the Qatari prime minister in the cables, saying that the relationship with Iran is moving as follows: “They lie to us, we lie to them.” This statement, although not accurate, deserves to be the saying of the year; it summed up the region’s position on Iran with intelligence and clarity. Even without the cables, Tehran is aware of this, but cannot renounce its decision or its sovereignty.