Americans Should Outline Timetable for Withdrawal
Published in Azzaman
(Iraq) on 10 April 2007
by Fatih Abdulsalam (link to original)
(Iraq) on 10 April 2007
by Fatih Abdulsalam (link to original)
Translated from
by Jenny Oliver.
Edited by .
The controversy both in and out of Iraq revolves around which option is the best: to implement the wishes of the U.S. Congress and set a timetable for the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, or to refuse to set a timetable, according to the wishes of President George W. Bush - which is also a desire supported by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Then there's the third option: To leave the situation on the ground in flames as fate desires, and wait to see what happens after the Democrats rise to the White House to confront the legacy of disaster in Iraq.
By that date, it's likely that the number of American dead will exceed 5,000, which won't include the number of severely wounded. When that happens, the natural decision will be to withdraw American forces from Iraq once and for all within a relatively short period. I don't say it will be an immediate withdrawal, because immediate withdrawal means three months at a minimum, unless the Americans decide to leave most of their equipment and heavy weapons.
Scheduling a timetable for withdrawal would offer hope of a clear end to foreign occupation of the country. Such a schedule will prompt our neighbors to renew their political, security and military ties with Iraq.
Such a deadline would provide a horizon to the forces that have fought the occupation and the political process it put in place. That horizon would then become Zero Hour for the various Iraqi groups, including all resistance factions that would see the deadline as a real victory - the fruit of all of their blood and struggle.
As for the current government - if it still exists at the time, God forbid - it would certainly encounter its political death, both nationally and internationally, especially if it's notion of using extreme repression to further the national reconciliation process remains unchanged.
The problem is not in any of these options, but al-Maliki himself and his delusional promises of building a military force capable of action as an alternative to the Americans, without purging the existing force of sectarian elements.
This is the reason for the weakness of Iraqi forces, and it is why the Iraqi people don't rally around them as they should.
Then there's the third option: To leave the situation on the ground in flames as fate desires, and wait to see what happens after the Democrats rise to the White House to confront the legacy of disaster in Iraq.
By that date, it's likely that the number of American dead will exceed 5,000, which won't include the number of severely wounded. When that happens, the natural decision will be to withdraw American forces from Iraq once and for all within a relatively short period. I don't say it will be an immediate withdrawal, because immediate withdrawal means three months at a minimum, unless the Americans decide to leave most of their equipment and heavy weapons.
Scheduling a timetable for withdrawal would offer hope of a clear end to foreign occupation of the country. Such a schedule will prompt our neighbors to renew their political, security and military ties with Iraq.
Such a deadline would provide a horizon to the forces that have fought the occupation and the political process it put in place. That horizon would then become Zero Hour for the various Iraqi groups, including all resistance factions that would see the deadline as a real victory - the fruit of all of their blood and struggle.
As for the current government - if it still exists at the time, God forbid - it would certainly encounter its political death, both nationally and internationally, especially if it's notion of using extreme repression to further the national reconciliation process remains unchanged.
The problem is not in any of these options, but al-Maliki himself and his delusional promises of building a military force capable of action as an alternative to the Americans, without purging the existing force of sectarian elements.
This is the reason for the weakness of Iraqi forces, and it is why the Iraqi people don't rally around them as they should.