Talks with Tokyo: Deja vu all over again?

This is the 11th in a series of articles on Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s summits with U.S. President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda from April 15-21. – Ed.

At their recent summit talks in Tokyo, President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda proclaimed a new era of “future-oriented” relations. The two leaders, while affirming not to forget the past, resolved to forge a “mature partnership” and work together for the betterment of the international society. After several years of strife and discord, the two countries now seem ready to pursue a course of peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

Lee’s election to the presidency bodes well for relations. Lee has consistently stressed a firm alliance with the United States and stronger ties with Japan as the basic direction of his government’s foreign relations. He has set the tone early in his term by vowing to cooperate closely with Japan on economic, cultural, environmental and security issues. The recent rush of mutual visits by prominent political and business figures also added to the auspicious atmosphere.

Japan’s politicians and business leaders were quick to roll out the red carpet for Lee, hoping for an amicable relationship with South Korea. They see Lee, a seasoned businessman, as a pragmatist who will take a down-to-earth approach to various problems still pending between the two countries. The formation of a new cabinet with Yasuo Fukuda at the helm, replacing relatively brusque predecessors who frequently offended Japan’s neighbors, has also raised hopes for better relations.

Korean-Japanese relations suffered in recent years. Tensions mounted, especially since spring 2005, on a set of thorny issues, ranging from the Yasukuni Shrine to the Dokdo dispute, even leading to the suspension of top-level “shuttle diplomacy.” Wrangling between South Korea and Japan has often been triggered and escalated by several factors embedded in the East Asian context. Those factors, conspiring with sudden changes in the international environment, considerably undermined the very foundation of bilateral relations.

First, with the end of the Cold War, the sense of common purpose that had suppressed nationalistic animosities within the anticommunist camp became increasingly weak. Second, the rise of China in the region came to eclipse, in the eyes of South Koreans, the importance of Japan as a diplomatic partner and vice versa. Third, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and abduction of Japanese citizens elicited fundamentally different responses from South Korea and Japan.

Moreover, changes in domestic politics have been just as destabilizing. In South Korea, as authoritarian regimes gave way to more democratic administrations in the late 1980s, the government could no longer brush aside in the name of “national interest” the people’s demand for a more assertive stance toward Japan. At times, the government even actively politicized such demands to its own advantage.

Japan’s domestic situation, too, was becoming more erratic. Muddling through the so-called “lost decade,” many segments of Japanese society in the 1990s sought to vent frustrations through conservative politics. In the realm of foreign relations, it meant an “assertive diplomacy” befitting Japan’s national stature. In particular, Japan’s postwar generation of young politicians felt uninhibited by its past history of aggressions, and strove for a Japan that could proudly stress its presence with authority.

It wouldn’t suffice, however, to attribute the Korean-Japanese cacophony of recent years to regional settings and domestic politics. Equally important was the human factor: the Japanese politicians and commentators who made volatile remarks. And yes, it takes two to tango: the Korean audience, for their part, overreacted. Leaders on both sides failed to recognize the importance of bilateral relations and also failed to manage thorny issues strategically. The Japanese leaders’ callousness to Koreans’ historical wounds – along with their Korean counterparts’ challenge each circumstance – ultimately strained bilateral relations, for little purpose.

Taking place against a backdrop of such instabilities, the Lee-Fukuda summit meeting can be seen as a positive improvement in and of itself. Contentious issues were sidelined in favor of vague references to historical reflection and reconciliation.

In the end, the two leaders managed to pull off a rather concrete agreement on bilateral cooperation: (1) resume shuttle diplomacy (scheduled to take place five times this year) and foster candid dialogues between the two countries; (2) broaden cultural and academic exchanges; (3) strengthen economic ties by holding working-level talks to resume negotiations on a free trade agreement, while redressing the trade imbalance between the two countries through, among other things, relocation of Japanese parts and materials manufacturers to Korea; (4) coordinate systematically in reaching peaceful denuclearization of North Korea, and; (5) make joint efforts to deal with such global issues as environmental protection and energy use.

Reaching an agreement to work together is one thing; actually working together constructively is another. Since the 1990s, top-level talks between South Korea and Japan have yielded quite a few substantive agreements, only to be shelved when disagreements on old issues were let loose. Each of the South Korean governments since the 1990s went through a pendulum-like motion in dealing with Japan: perhaps in a state of euphoria, newly inaugurated administrations celebrated the beginning of a “new era of forward-looking relations with Japan” which, when disturbed by Japanese remarks on familiar historical and territorial issues, would swiftly ascend an upward spiral of acrimonious denouncements.

It will be recalled that former President Kim Young-sam, despite his initial pledge to work closely with Japan, became so restless at one point as to vow to “fix their bad habits.” His successor Kim Dae-jung set a milestone in bilateral relations by announcing a “21st-century partnership with Japan” but, in the midst of the history textbook imbroglio, eventually took a hard-line measure of recalling his ambassador to Japan in protest. As for his successor Roh Moo-hyun, we all know how his declaration not to dwell on the past deteriorated into the declaration of “diplomatic war” on Japan.

Why does such pendulum motion recur? Once in power, Korea’s new leader takes an overly optimistic attitude toward Japan, expecting Japan to reciprocate with an equal gesture. Given the conservative tendencies of Japan’s domestic politics since the 1990s, however, there is every likelihood of disputes reemerging over long-standing historical and territorial issues.

In addition, Korean public opinion on Japan-related issues is bound to be emotionally charged. When the new leader’s approval ratings fall, usually in the second half of his presidency, the pendulum swings and he chooses to pander to anti-Japanese public opinion.

In order to develop and sustain a future-oriented Korean-Japanese relationship, then, the two governments need to go beyond merely signing agreements and adhere steadfastly to the substance of those agreements. They need to be bold and yet prudent. Responsible leaders on both sides ought to do their utmost not to politicize historical and territorial issues, because careful management of contentious issues, after all, is the key to “forward-looking” and, for that matter, any relations.