U.S. Exit From Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki expressed his toughest stance regarding the U.S. military presence in his country this week when he said that all foreign forces should leave Iraq by the end of 2011. He rejected President Bush’s ambiguous “general time horizon” of around 2011, and clarified that no U.S. training personnel or logistics troops would be allowed to stay in Iraq after the fixed date. Moreover, he offered a status-of-forces agreement to allow U.S. soldiers, as well as military contractors, to be tried in Iraqi courts.

This comes as a surprise to all foreign governments that have their forces in Iraqi territory, as negotiations were still ongoing between al-Maliki’s officials and U.S. military authorities to set up a timetable for foreign force’s withdrawal. The talks were supposed to end by July 31, but the deal had been delayed while the expiration of the U.N. mandate approached.

We can interpret al-Maliki’s assertions as being directed to his own people, and, more precisely, the members of the various parties and factions in Baghdad and elsewhere in the divided country, where provincial elections are scheduled for late this year, and general elections in 2009. His insistence on “no immunity” for foreign forces and “the sanctity of Iraqi blood” indicates who the intended audience of his remarks is.

We know al-Maliki is very much Washington’s man, and owes his power to American support from the formation of his government more than two years ago. Perhaps his desire not to be seen as an agent of the Americans among his own people must be stronger than his desire to secure U.S. help in protecting his still-fragile government.

Whatever the Iraqi leader has in mind, Washington will want to pull its troops out of Iraq when its war objectives have been achieved. With the war that started in March 2003, a dictator has been removed, the weapons of mass destruction were found to have never existed, and American access to natural resources has been secured. What remains is Bush’s lofty vision of establishing a beachhead of democracy in the Middle East, which is a risky objective for a time frame of little more than three years.

A premature U.S. withdrawal could lead to political chaos, economic paralysis and a possible civil war, during which neighboring Iran will be able to strengthen its hegemony in the region, with a greater threat of nuclear proliferation. Not only Americans but Iraqi leaders themselves must see this grim prospect, but politicians are trying to fix a date, regardless of its consequences. From the beginning of the war, many recalled Vietnam in the 1970s, and the similarities are increasingly apparent.