A Mined Iraqi Agreement

The Iraqi government has accepted the Status of Forces Agreement [SOFA] with the United States. This agreement, which gives legality to the presence of 150,000 U.S. soldiers and justifies U.S. military bases remaining after the assumed complete withdrawal date of 2011, has been referred to parliament for ratification.

The choices available to the government of Nouri al-Maliki were exceedingly limited. Accepting the SOFA agreement would lead to more political fissures in Iraq and a confrontation with the two neighboring countries, Iran and Syria, which oppose the agreement.

But opposing the agreement would mean confronting the United States and here it is implausible that the Bush administration would lose $700 billion and 2,300 of its best soldiers so that the Iraq government (which the Bush administration brought to power and protected) could reject an agreement which legalizes the presence of U.S. forces on its soil.

Mr. al-Maliki chose to go along with the U.S. administration, especially following the U.S. threat of withdrawing protection and financial backing, but at the same time ignore its exasperation. These threats instantly bore fruit since the withdrawal of these aids to the Iraqi government would mean its collapse, and perhaps the return of most of those living in the Green Zone, from ministers to parliamentarians to politicians, to the exile in which they found themselves before returning to Iraq with the occupation forces.

Chief amongst the dangers that will follow this decision will be the confrontation of the Iranian decision to refute the agreement, particularly since Nouri al-Maliki knows well that Iranian influence pervades government circles and there are militia groups which swear allegiance to Tehran and take orders directly from it.

Perhaps the boldest task facing PM al-Maliki and his aides will firstly be that of selling SOFA to parliament and, secondly, ratifying it before the end of the current year, which sees the end of the United Nations mandate for U.S. forces in Iraq.

The process of selling the agreement to parliament has followed numerous channels. First was the revelation that the highest Shiite authority in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani did not oppose SOFA.

Secondly, the name of the agreement was changed from “Security Agreement” to “The Agreement for U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” in order that the focus of the was shifted to the goal that most Iraqis share: an end to the occupation.

The third was the revelation that the U.S. government accepted adjustments requested by Mr. al-Maliki and his colleagues.

The U.S. administration repeatedly announced that it did not accept any fundamental changes to the agreement. It also said that it will not allow the trial of its off-duty soldiers before an Iraqi judiciary regardless of the situation. Additionally, it will not accept any further adjustment preventing the use of U.S. forces from Iraqi territories for an attack on neighboring countries such as Iran and Syria.

The Iraqi government did not know of the recent American attack on the al-Boukamal region in Syrian territory and instead learned of it through the media. In other words, it was not consulted at all, and even if it was aware of the operation it has no power to prevent it or oppose it effectively.

Mr. al-Maliki has perhaps won the U.S. administration to his side, but he might well find himself in a confrontation with Iraqi powers with a significant presence on the ground, such as the Sadrist movement and Arab nationalist forces which opposed and still fundamentally oppose the American presence, in addition to Islamic resistance movements.

Prime Minister al-Maliki’s coming days will be very difficult. It should be of little surprise if we witness an escalation of violence in Iraq, and Baghdad in particular, with various stabilization and peace initiatives, whose outcomes have long been awaited by Iraqis, being torpedoed.