Iran, Europe, and America After the August War

After the war in August, Iran got a chance to settle relations with the U.S. and become a central player in the south of Eurasia. This country is developing very serious interests with respect to the Caucasus, where its strategic collaboration with Georgia appears to have the greatest potential.

The war in August has called into question Georgia’s ability to be a reliable energy corridor. Despite this, the country is so important in terms of transportation of Caspian energy resources to the West, that its complete occupation by Russia should be considered an utterly unrealistic option.

The fact of the matter is that if Moscow gets complete control of Georgia, then based on Moscow’s relations with Armenia (where it has military bases) Azerbaijan will be completely isolated and forced to obey Russian orders.

Iran is the only alternative corridor that Baku would be able to use. But if the relations between Washington and Tehran remain uneasy, the reliability of this route also becomes questionable. Moreover, Turkey itself is entirely dependent on Iran and Russia, and if Russia establishes full control over all of Georgia, Moscow will not allow the use of routes that go through Turkey or Armenia-Turkey. And without a stable partnership with Tehran, the potential for Ankara to function as the Eurasian corridor will not be realized. In that case, Iran could redirect its own and Central-Asian resources in the direction of the Persian Gulf, not to mention its potential future partnership with Iraq and Syria.

Against the backdrop of Tehran’s fairly rational policies, it’s reasonable to assume that Iran won’t decline an opportunity to remove the tension in its relations with the U.S., which means an automatic decrease of Russia’s control over energy resources in Central Asia. But at the same time it means a reduction in the importance of the Caucasus to the West, and a chance for Russia to tighten its control over the Caspian region by strengthening its Caucasian positions. The decisive factor that remains here is Turkey.

As has already been said, it is vital for Turkey to save the Caucasian corridor. If the corridor works, the Turkish route will be the shortest, giving Ankara every reason to talk about the benefits of passing energy through its territory routes. Therefore, it’s in Iran’s interests to control such foundation in the Caucasus, which would make it possible to balance out Turkey’s interests.

Even though during the early days of the war in August Chancellor Merkel considered the admission of Georgia into NATO almost a question of principle, she changed her position quite soon. Now she is even against providing Georgia with the guidelines to join the alliance. The reason for this metamorphosis is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. More precisely, it can’t be completely explained by Germany’s energy-dependence on Russia. Some analysts attribute Berlin’s decision to the strong influence of traditional business. However, in this case, Germany’s strategic calculations are clearly visible.

Berlin is afraid that with the possible weakening of the U.S.’s influence, and the continued expansion of NATO, Russia’s aggression against the Baltic countries will be inevitable, and the alliance will have to stand up for them. In this case, Germany will be the first deterrent bastion. Apart from the fact that this would put Berlin in a difficult economic position, a situation where American influence is weakened will be very risky for Germany. It should be noted that the expansion of NATO, just like united Europe, is primarily an American project. American strength is crucially important in realizing these projects. In a situation where America’s strength becomes a dubious premise, European nations would be forced to revert to the old Eurasian geopolitics, and follow old Eurasian logic.