Obama and Latin America

The Cold War is over in a large part of the world and would be difficult to resume: Russia is a dissatisfied, but not a revisionist power, while China continues its global ascent as a moderate and pragmatic power. The only place where the Cold War persists is Latin America. The main challenge Barack Obama faces with regard to Latin America is to end the Cold War in the region.

There are three cases which show the persistence of the logic and dynamics of the Cold War in the area. First of all, Cuba which is no longer a model of communist exportation to the outside world, but now has the hallmarks of a typical popular and authoritarian nationalism. Secondly, Colombia, where the forces of FARC (originally pro-Moscow) persist in one of the most prolonged and degraded armed conflicts in the world. Thirdly, Venezuela and Hugo Chavez’s “Socialism of the 21st century:” a particular mix of orthodox anti-imperialism, Caribbean populism, Bolivarian nationalism and Latin American caudillismo.

Obama’s incoming government could design practical and responsible initiatives for each of those cases. It could also identify domestic interests in the United States to support its strategy. Obama’s clear victory, his momentous triumph in Florida, as well as the fact that the Democrats are taking control of the House of Representatives and the Senate, may let him promote a gradual end of the embargo, initiate talks with Raul Castro and commit to a peaceful and progressive democratic transition on the island.

Regarding Colombia, Obama has at his disposal positive and negative incentives to influence the course of the armed conflict and to strengthen the democracy. The FARC has been debilitated and a coherent security policy no longer requires a controversial third term of Uribe [the Colombian president]. If Washington wants to limit the drug trade between the Andean countries and the Unites States, it needs peace in Colombia. The incoming president can simultaneously use the issues of commerce and of human rights so that Colombia receives its desired Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and initiates a political, negotiated solution of the internal armed conflict.

When it comes to Venezuela, the context seems to favor the establishment of a modus vivendi between Washington and Caracas. With regard to oil and commerce, there is almost a de facto Free Trade Agreement, although in the sphere of politics and military, the disagreements are enormous. Of main importance is the fact that the usual arsenal Washington used to use against the “problematic countries” – a coup d’état, aggressive containment, diplomatic asphyxia and a low-intensity conflict – is not usable in the Venezuelan case. This would therefore be a question of building a discreet political bridge, an open dialogue in which concerns regarding security of both countries could be considered and specific compromises agreed on to avoid tensions.

Obama can lead the conclusion of the Cold War in Latin America with a few gestures. He could count on a number of countries to support that task through good offices and other modes of diplomatic cooperation: Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Panama, Chile, and Argentina could contribute decisively. Individual approaches to each of the aforementioned cases will be able to reinforce the collective credibility in the politics aimed at bringing the Cold War in the area to a close. If achieved, this substantial and symbolic success would help improve the credibility of Washington and the trust towards the United States, something that the government of President Bush has completely ruined.