Washington’s Hypocrisy

Georgia and the U.S. signed a very vague document in Washington. The document, however, opened up venues for the development of new opportunities in the relations between the two countries. It implies that a bit later they will sign other documents specifying their intentions. In any case, so far Georgia has great political hopes riding on that document. Once again, the U.S. reaffirmed the outdated notion about Georgia’s territorial integrity within the 1992 borders. Tbilisi believes that this will encourage many “serious” countries to abandon the idea of recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The agreement mentions cooperation in all areas. These areas include support in developing a democracy, as well as the development of economic and cultural ties, and new opportunities for interaction among ordinary citizens from both countries. There’s also intent to sign a free-trade agreement. But Tbilisi is primarily interested in the document’s military terms. Georgia needs money to restore its military infrastructure, and preferably, direct assurance from the U.S. that it will protect them. At the end of last year, Georgian press frequently wrote that the document even implies the creation of U.S. military bases on Georgian territory. Also, signing the document should have largely offset Georgia’s failures in connection with its application for NATO membership. But the final version of the document, which was signed in Washington, doesn’t look anything like that. The U.S. still sees NATO as a guarantor of security for its ward-countries’ safety. And the document does not specify the possibility of providing direct military assistance to Georgia. Instead, it deals with the collaboration of the two countries’ defense departments.

The document signed on January 9th in Washington intersects in an interesting way with the Friendship and Cooperation Treaties signed recently in Moscow between Russia on one side, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other. They differ in many ways, but also have a lot in common. The treaties signed by Russia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia have a higher status. They are international agreements. The document signed by the U.S. and Georgia is a charter, and therefore is not binding. Nevertheless, its political significance is difficult to overestimate. Another common element is that both the agreement with the recently-recognized countries and the charter cover a wide range of issues concerning bilateral relations between the signing countries: economy, business, culture, education and freedom of movement. Also, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Georgia, are especially interested in the military aspect of the agreements. Georgia fears Russia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia fear Georgia. And their interest in such documents is due to their desire to get a guarantee of sustainable security.

But the most important element they have in common is something else. The signing of the Georgian-American Charter in Washington finalized the legal process of consolidating the new political reality that arose in the region after Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence. By signing the agreement with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, Russia defined the boundaries of its direct influence in the region. Now the U.S. made the same move. Thus, Russia and the U.S. “registered” clear spheres of influence in the South Caucasus region along Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s borders with Georgia.

It goes without saying that against such backdrop, the U.S.’s acknowledgement of Georgia’s “territorial integrity” looks like forced hypocrisy in front of its Georgian partners. In turn, Georgian politicians see the signing of the charter as some form of guarantee that its territorial integrity will be preserved.

There is also another common trait in the documents signed first in Moscow, and now in Washington. In the case of the latter, the full version of the document was completely closed until its signing. In the case of the Russian draft treaty on friendship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, public institutions had little time to get acquainted with the drafts. Overall, neither Georgian politicians, nor Abkhaz and Ossetian politicians, had a chance to understand the details of the historically significant documents.

Georgia’s Labor Party unexpectedly came out against the signing of the strategic partnership documents with the U.S., stating that the agreement may lead to American military bases in Georgia for a 90-year period. But it seems that most of the more influential political circles in Georgia were not against such possibility, the prospect of which, much like Georgia’s entry into NATO, remains uncertain. In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the signed treaties provide not so much for the collaboration of defense departments, as for the creation of military bases. It will most likely take over a year to accomplish. Creating these bases before the end of the year is unrealistic. But Moscow and Sukhumi say that the military agreement between Abkhazia and Russia about a joint defense policy could be signed as early as the beginning of February.