Clinton’s Visit to North Korea More Than About Freeing Journalists

I do not know why the American administration declared that Bill Clinton’s visit to North Korea had nothing to do with the North Korean nuclear issue. Even more, it was assured that such a “humane” visit was only to free the two American journalists held by Pyongyang. As for the humane aspect of the issue, it is worth the utmost appreciation. However, how is it that Washington did not ponder the North Korean detention and blackmailing of the two journalists? Wouldn’t this cause Americans abroad to face further danger and see the North Korean nuclear program as a tool of pressure and terror? Won’t this scenario encourage North Korea’s disciples, as well as Iran’s, to do the same?

Actually, no one can dispute the fact that this high-level visit had a political aim that was smartly and secretly calculated so that the goals of both sides could be achieved. Yet, the American administration did not have to conceal the role it played in this mission. It helped Clinton make use of his vast political and financial network of communications to finance and secure his journey. The American administration also issued a special federal license for Clinton’s plane to head for North Korea. Moreover, it submitted to Pyongyang’s demands to send Clinton instead of former vice-President Al Gore.

For its part, North Korea did not veil its intentions to exploit the situation. The North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, considered the two journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, two “chess pieces” in the game, which he could use to claim both legitimacy and direct contacts with prominent American personalities. Evidently, Clinton was received by a senior team of Jong Il’s advisors on the nuclear program. And Clinton, for his part, tried to persuade the North Korean leader that his country’s nuclear program will not make the country any more secure. On the contrary, it will isolate it even more. Perhaps Clinton’s mission grew more complicated amid indications that North Korea is transferring nuclear technologies to Myanmar (formerly Burma).

Finally, after the visit had ended, Jong Il openly expressed his wish to meet with President Obama. Meanwhile, Washington abashedly hoped the visit would bear favorable fruits, assuring at the same time that its policies toward North Korea will not change. But why wouldn’t American policies change if Washington took such a momentous step to open high-level lines of communication with Pyongyang? Can’t America make use of them to save face?

Nevertheless, America, before making one more step forward, will have to confront the status quo, namely that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear program at any price or under any threat, at least while under the rule of its current head of state. Washington will have to adapt its strategies towards a moderate policy and take the initiative to realize the dream of the North Korean leader to hold talks with Obama and end North Korea’s international isolation.