The U.S.’s Greatest China Fear

When contemplating its foreign policy strategy, the U.S. is now most preoccupied with balancing China’s global ideological influence in an attempt to reduce China’s negative impact on international ideological discourse.

Early in the spring of 1989, I was sent as a journalist to observe Bush Senior’s first visit to China. Looking back, I can still recall the warmth in U.S.-China relations that was evident then. By visiting China within his first year in office, Bush Senior set a precedent. Twenty years later, Obama adheres to that precedent by also visiting China within his first year in office, but U.S-China relations have changed markedly in depth and breadth since that time.

A new era is underway, one in which the interests of the U.S. and China are inextricably intertwined. But the two nations’ views of their mutual dependence differ widely. The Chinese, as the world’s future leaders, are possibly more aware of what they have to gain from their ascending global status. The Americans, in contrast, as the people of the world’s most powerful nation, are perhaps more inclined to dwell upon what they stand to lose to China’s ceaselessly widening influence.

What does the U.S. stand to lose? Is it military might, or economic primacy? These considerations alone may seem enough to trouble the U.S., but even these issues are not what the U.S. is most concerned about.

As for military power, the Americans are not likely to make a military challenger out of China at the drop of the hat. Those who loudly decry the “China threat” are often using this claim as an excuse to divert funds into military build-up.

At the same time, the shift in economic power is already a reality. This is truly a mixed bag for the U.S. When it comes to economic relations with China, the U.S. still has a great deal of bargaining power. The U.S. obtains from China the tools that enable the U.S. to position itself at the center of the global economy.

My observations indicate that among all of the U.S.’s China fears, the most significant remains China’s ideological influence. The few American scholars I have come into contact with recently are all very concerned that if China hasn’t already influenced the world in some way, then it is bound to soon.

Actually, this kind of concern reflects a fundamentally American logic. According to the American way of thinking, the ascent of a new global power-holder is associated with the ascent of that nation’s political ideology, leading to widespread propagation of that nation’s values. If the U.S. cannot balance China’s political and cultural influence, or alter China’s position on contentious issues, then that could mean the U.S.’s influence is on the decline.

Two years ago, at legislative hearings dedicated to discussing China’s rise and its consequences, one member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs expressed concern that the next generation of Americans would wake up, as if from a dream, to realize that America’s global influence had been completely lost to Asia. This was a bit of an exaggeration, but at the very least it depicts Americans’ concerns.

In Americans’ worldview, China’s ascent feels like a breach of convention. It is completely contrary to the U.S.’s predictions. The predicted events didn’t take place, that which wasn’t predicted did, and the historians, economists, and other scholars are at a loss as to why. With flouted predictions and a dearth of explanations, anxieties mount.

One strange phenomenon that has emerged in the last few years is people who comfort themselves by guessing that the China problem will not make it above a certain threshold. Instead, they predict, China will derail prior to reaching this threshold. But at the same time they worry that if China were to cross this threshold, and then cross another, and still not derail, what will that signify? Proponents of this line of reasoning are beginning to realize that this attitude towards China is gradually losing its appeal, such that eventually they themselves find it excessive.

There are ways of realizing modernization that the American textbooks do not describe, and there are paths to global dominance that deviate from the path the U.S. took. This is enough. It doesn’t matter if there are any countries adhering to China’s methods and ideas. All that matters is that China contains one fifth of the world’s population; that is enough to justify China’s ways. Today’s historians and economists will be forced to write it up. This truth is at the heart of the China’s ideological influence.

Of course, the Chinese understand in their hearts that the China before their eyes is still undergoing development, and that many difficult problems remain to be solved. China’s international influence is still superficial. But this is not the U.S.’s view. A more common thought among concerned Americans is that China has already solved these problems and achieved success, and that the dissemination of Chinese ideas is already underway.

Thus, we can see that his visit to Asia, Obama has emphasized the “return to Asia.” This “return” may not refer to a military build-up, and it will not necessarily mean economic aid. He means more that the U.S. will garner morality and righteousness on its side, a kind of “soft strength,” to participate in Asia’s development, galvanizing a kind of Rally ‘Round the Flag effect. This is the essence of Secretary Clinton’s diplomatic strategy. Thus it is clear that, when contemplating foreign policy strategy, U.S. policy-makers are now most preoccupied with balancing China’s global ideological influence, in an attempt to reduce China’s negative impact on international ideological discourse.