Obama’s Amateurish Middle East Policy

Obama’s image in Israel is at a low point. He lacks a basic knowledge of American Middle East diplomacy.

In principle, there is no solution to the Middle East conflict. Israelis and Palestinians are as far apart as ever, after hundreds of rounds of negotiations. They know what to expect, in terms of reality.

What do we know for sure? First, there will be two nations; even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu concedes that. Second, the borders will run approximately congruent with the Green Line that separated Israel from the West Bank prior to 1967. Third, the entire West Bank won’t be returned to the Palestinians; Israel will retain several large settlement blocks, in exchange for compensatory territory to be given to the Palestinians. Fourth, the bulk of the remaining West Bank settlements will be vacated. Fifth, Jerusalem will become the capital of both nations, and another division of the city is not implicit. Sixth, the Palestinians will get the right of return, but only in a symbolic sense; Israel insists it must retain its Jewish identity. Seventh, the Palestinians will be compensated monetarily for any lost property. Eighth, a Palestinian state will have only limited control over the institution of its own military force.

Against this backdrop, Barack Obama’s Middle East diplomacy appears startlingly amateurish. It all started out quite well: An experienced emissary, in the person of George Mitchell, was selected as the United States representative; Obama presented himself as a trusted intermediary in his Cairo speech, and he even wrung consent out of Netanyahu for the two-state solution.

But then Obama seemed to lose all political instinct. He sent out the indiscriminate signal that a total ban on settlement expansion was a necessary precondition to a return to the negotiating table. But he left unanswered the question of whether that applied to East Jerusalem, as well as the rest of the West Bank. And, at the same time, he gave Israel a measure of reassurance that he wouldn’t insist on a total settlement expansion ban – significantly referring to Jerusalem’s special importance, a point made only grudgingly by the president.

That caused Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to give up in frustration, while back in Israel, Netanyahu was celebrated as a hero for standing up to the bullying U.S. The British magazine, Economist, was prompted to anxiously ask, “Is Israel too powerful for Barack Obama?” The fact is, the president now stands before a Middle East rubbish heap larger than it was when he first took office. His image in Israel is at an all-time low and, even in the Arab world, his popularity has suffered.

The main criticism: Obama has to remember that not all settlements are equal. If, in fact, a few Israeli settlements are allowed to remain, Obama would have to restrict his demand for a settlement freeze to the West Bank. That sounds like just splitting hairs, but it is, in fact, the basis for U.S. Middle East policy.

That’s still not enough. The fuse is already burning on the region’s second powder keg: Iran has rejected the compromise offered by Germany and those U.N. members who hold veto powers, concerning its nuclear program. Iran will not send its low-enriched uranium out of country for enrichment. Does Obama have a Plan B in his dealings with the mullahs? Two weeks ago, a gigantic arms shipment was on its way from Iran to the Shiite Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. Even that prompted no course correction from Washington.

The signs are increasing: Obama’s Middle East policy of extending a helping hand is turning into a debacle.