The START Trap

When, slightly more than a year ago, the American administration (via Vice President Biden) announced that it intended to reset relations with Russia, it was clear that the starting point should be the negotiations on reducing strategic offensive arms. The prerequisites for this seemed obvious.

First, although Moscow was interested in doing so for a long time, the previous U.S. administration was not. Second, both countries had extensive experience of engaging in dialogue in this area. There are plenty of specialists in Moscow and Washington who, for quite a while, have loved and been able to find clever resolutions to bilateral nuclear issues. Third, Barack Obama has decided to revive the general subject of nuclear disarmament in order to strengthen America’s international image. Finally, there was an assumption that succeeding in this area would provide a positive impulse to the overall relationship, and would enable the countries to move on to more complicated issues.

For now, it seems that returning to nuclear talks has had a different effect. No doubt, the experience of both countries has been truly unique, but therein lays the hidden trap.

Negotiations on a familiar topic have revived the Cold War era discussion, although today, no one (including the most aggressive people) in Moscow or Washington believes in the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between the two countries.

But the logic of strategic stability (which has been the basis of Russian-American relations since the middle of the last century) has its own laws. And when this logic is applied, it inevitably leads to a dialogue that obviously implies a confrontation. Then, it’s impossible not to stumble on the main sticking point, which is the missile defense system issue.

If Russia and the U.S. discuss reducing the mutual threat posed by the nuclear arsenals (and this is, in fact, the topic that’s being discussed), then Moscow rightly raises the question of linking the components of offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Although this is still hypothetical, the creation of a nuclear shield would give one party an advantage, which will destroy the principle of inevitable retribution. Meanwhile, the guarantee of not using force is based on this principle. It’s no accident that the ABM Treaty of 1972, from which the U.S. withdrew under President Bush, was a cornerstone and an integral part of the Cold War agreements.

Washington keeps repeating: Russia has not been our enemy for a long time; missile defense is not aimed against it; missile defense’s purpose is to protect the United States and its allies from other countries (notably Iran and North Korea), and Moscow can participate in the project. It sounds reasonable, especially considering that nuclear multi-polarity (that is, the spread of nuclear threat beyond the usual players) is a 21st century reality.

But then what’s the purpose of the START (Strategic ARMS Reduction Treaty) negotiations? How can the two countries simultaneously discuss (very slightly) reducing their arsenals aimed at each other and creating universal protection against them?

After all, the first process, which continues the tradition of many decades, comes from the fact that Moscow and Washington are in a state of confrontation. But, being responsible players, they reduce the level of bilateral tension. The second is possible only if Russia and the United States do not consider each other their main threats, but similarly assess the threat from the outside.

An understanding in the area of missile defense would have been much more important than the parameters of the reduction and verification methods (which created disagreements among experts). Actually, missile defense should have been the starting point: threat assessment, consideration of opportunities and coverage options, confidence-building measures and the participants’ circle. If an agreement on missile defense could have been reached, then in many respects START would have actually been a matter of technique. But this is impossible under the current negotiation paradigm, which in itself is programmed to recreate the approaches of the past, rather than looking for answers to the challenges of the future.

In fairness, it should be noted that, three years ago, Russia’s side made proposals for joint work on missile defense, without linking it to START. Many American officials now recognize that the Bush administration shouldn’t have ignored the ideas voiced by Vladimir Putin in the summer and autumn of 2007.

Moscow expected at least a serious discussion about the goals and objectives of its initiative of using structures in Gabala and Armavir. But at the time, Washington’s focus was exclusively on the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Now, it’s no longer being looked into, but it changed the entire atmosphere. Paradoxically, the negotiations on reducing strategic offensive weapons only complicate matters.

It’s likely that the agreement will soon be signed. Failure to do so would have a much-too-demoralizing effect on both sides. Also, it would be simply embarrassing for Moscow and Washington to go to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May without a signed document. However, any hope that the success in reaching this agreement would stimulate progress in other areas is hardly justified. First, the agreement is valuable in and of itself. It’s a complex system of built-in exchanges and the compromise reached inside it will not spread to adjacent areas. Second, instead of reducing the level of mutual suspicion, the talks have likely increased it. Finally, the ratification is fraught with trouble, at least in the U.S. Congress.

Although Russia and the U.S. have said many times that the Cold War is over, and everything is different now, they remain hostages to the old perceptions of each other. They can’t escape the START trap.