Harmful Warmongering

One can legitimately wonder what has changed between October 2009 and May 2010. The two accords that have been signed, the first one between Iran and the “5+1” last October and the second one between Iran on one side and Brazil and Turkey, on the other side, are practically identical. The one slight problem, in a manner of speaking, is that after the signing of the first accord, Iran changed its mind and retracted, and after signing of the second accord, the United States retracted, refusing to take into account the substantial diplomatic efforts expended by Brazil and Turkey, and submitting to the U.N. Security Council a program of sanctions, yet another one, against Iran.

The two accords are practically identical because, in October 2009 just like in May 2010, Iran agreed to send abroad the same quantity of depleted uranium (1,200 kilos) and to receive the same quantity of uranium enriched to 20 percent (120 kilos) for its experimental reactor.

To be sure, Iran made a mistake in retracting it and their regret is implicit in their move to try getting back to the initial accord, with the help of Brazil and Turkey. But the disconcerting thing is the sudden toughening of the U.S. position for no apparent motive.

We can detect two major changes in the American position. First, in October 2009, the United States was not posing as a precondition a complete cessation of uranium enrichment processes in Iran, which they are now demanding. Second, in October 2009, they were interested in [establishing] an atmosphere of trust with Iran and regarded the accord as a “first step” towards a global discussion on complex issues that have been spoiling relations between Iran and the United States for a third of a century. Today the Americans seem to be interested by one thing only: the complete halt of uranium enrichment processes by the Iranians, full stop.

In other words, the American position of last fall was rather consistent with Obama’s Cairo speech of June 4, when he praised the Iranian civilization and reached out his hand to Iran. What we are witnessing today is more consistent with the policy of the Bush-Cheney administration, when the language of force, systematic resort to sanctions and threats of bombing were the rule.

This substantial change in the American position in the space of a few months is neither gratuitous nor fortuitous. It is the reflection of a struggle within the Obama administration between two radically opposed lines of thought: one that wants a rapprochement with Iran on the basis of the resolution of the major disputes between the two countries, and one that does not want to hear about normalization [of relations]. Advocates of the latter seem to be on the roll at the moment and have managed to rally President Obama to their cause, judging by the striking contrast between the conciliating tone of his speech on June 4, 2009 and his current intransigence.

Brazil and Turkey find themselves in an embarrassing position. After so much diplomatic effort, for which the Brazilian president and the Turkish prime minister traveled to Tehran, Washington is acting as if nothing had happened and continues unperturbed to push for a Security Council vote in favor of new sanctions.

Turkey’s “anger” is all the more justified by the fact that, according to the International Herald Tribune, it was in fact the United States who asked Ankara earlier this year to try and revive the accord of October 2009. “What they [the U.S.] wanted us to do was give the confidence to Iran to do the swap. We have done our duty,” said the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, as quoted in the American newspaper.

This is turning into a tragi-comedy. Far from receiving thanks, Turkey and Brazil are being attacked by Nicholas Burns, former undersecretary of state for political affairs. “I do think the Turkey-Brazil deal was very unfortunate,” said Burns. “However well-intentioned Turkey and Brazil may have been, the result of their announcement with President Ahmadinejad was to lessen the pressure on the Iranian regime and to give some members of the Security Council an excuse not to vote for sanctions,” Mr. Burns declared to the publication, Voice of America.

Objectively, the Iran-Turkey-Brazil accord was a missed opportunity for the United States to reduce the tension within the region and to engage in a process of normalization of relations with Iran. This opportunity was all the more crucial since the political and military difficulties encountered by Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly restrict the White House’s leeway.

And yet, President Obama could very well have jumped on the opportunity and turned the accord that was criticized by Burns into a victory for American diplomacy. He could very credibly have said that if the Iranians had returned to the deal they were refusing a few months ago, it was thanks to constant pressure from the United States. Everybody would have believed it and everybody would have applauded.

Such a reaction would have certainly been possible if Obama had kept to the fundamental principles which got him elected and which he affirmed and reaffirmed in his pre- and post-electoral speeches. But this has not been the case. The American attitude towards the Iranian issue is still tainted by a warmongering that greatly harms not only the image of the U.S. but also their strategic interests. The reason for this is very simple: Bush may be retired in Texas, but his ideas are still at work in Washington.