Who Does Iran’s Nuclear Program Worry?

One of the decisions the American administration made under President Bush was to appoint a special representative to the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The appointee was Sada Cumber, who was a friend of George W. Bush’s from Texas. It was certainly not a bad idea for the former American president to take that step, though symbolic, following a few disasters, such as the invasion of Iraq, the Abu Ghraib scandal and the Guantanamo prison controversy. However, it was odd that the person selected to improve relations with the Islamic world, of which 85 percent belongs to the Sunni sect, was someone from the Ismailiyya sect, a minor sect in Islam.

During her time in office, Cumber visited Muslim countries, listened to problems and actually helped to solve some of them. For example, she put the problems people have had with U.S. customs on the agenda.

Turkey was one of her destinations. When she visited Turkey, she came together with a group of Turkish journalists. She wanted to see how Turkey approached the Middle East, how it saw the role the United States plays in that region, and Turkey’s stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis and the Palestinian issue. Conceivably, Turkey’s increasing prestige in the Middle East and the fact that the secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference was a Turk encouraged her to come to Turkey. She said she believed that, like many other countries in the region, Turkey should have been more worried about the Iranian nuclear program. She reasoned that, should Iran attain nuclear capability, it would change the balance of power in the region, and Iran would come to constitute a threat to its neighboring countries.

When she was reminded that, because of the backlash against the United States and Israel at the public level, the Iranian nuclear program is not perceived as a threat, she said that how the administrations of the countries in the region saw the issue was totally different from how it was perceived by their people. Perhaps the ruling elite would convey messages similar to those of their people in public, but behind the closed doors, regional countries all thought Iran would pose a grave threat to regional peace if it had nuclear weapons.

There is no doubt that there is a huge gap between the ruling elite and their people in Middle Eastern countries. Indeed, what the elites say in public and what they say behind closed doors are totally different things. Yet, there was no research to demonstrate such a gap on the issue of the Iranian nuclear program until now. This is why the 2010 Arab Public Opinion Survey, conducted by the University of Maryland in cooperation with Zogby International, is very striking in terms of its results.

This survey found resonance in Turkey mostly because it indicated that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has become the most popular leader in the Arab world. As he undertook the mission of defending the Palestinian case, Erdogan’s popularity passed Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, who was the most popular leader according to a 2008 survey. The Shiite leader is now the fifth most popular leader. According to the survey, in which Erdogan ranked at the top with 20 points, Iranian President Ahmadinejad received 12 points and Egyptian President Mubarak got only four points from the Arab streets. Turkey is still not among the countries the Arabs would like to see as a superpower. Yet, they see Turkey as a country that, after France, follows the most constructive policy in the region.

According to the survey, which was conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, the public is receptive to Iran’s nuclear program. In Egypt, for example, which is thought to be one of the most wary countries on this issue, 82 percent of Egyptians describe Iran’s nuclear program as a positive development. Only six percent in Egypt see it as a negative, while positive opinion is 57 percent in Lebanon and 61 percent in Jordan. In Saudi Arabia, which is the least receptive to the idea of a nuclear Iran, only 29 percent see it as negative. How will these different views be eliminated, and which side will convince the other? After all, are the Arab governments not the weakest with respect to the wide gap that exists between them and their own people?