Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy after His Defeat in the Midterm Elections

The defeat of the Democrats in the midterm elections has spilled a lot of ink, with the victory of the Republicans and the Tea Party being announced with much fanfare. With only a few weeks of hindsight, what conclusions, necessarily tentative, can be drawn on the future of Barack Obama’s foreign policy?

First, we must avoid a mistake that has too often been made about the Obama presidency: an overreaction. To predict the end of the American president is as ridiculous as to have expected miracles from him. Obama is not a messiah, nor is his defeat in the midterm elections his crucifixion.

Indeed, the American political system is accustomed to the presence of a dichotomy between Congress and the government [sic]. It is, incidentally, the foundation of the American system of “checks and balances”: In the United States, the separation of powers is based on the requirement for legislative and executive branches to cooperate. We are therefore far from the cohabitation “à la française,” which is rather synonymous with restriction and blockage.

That being said, the life of Barack Obama will almost certainly become more complicated. Though he may retain the totality of his powers in foreign policy — for certain big decisions, such as the ratification of treaties or the vote on defense spending — the congressional restraint will force the president to negotiate with his Republican opposition.

Republicans’ attempts at sabotage are not to be excluded. A first example is their refusal to ratify the “new START’’ treaty signed in Russia last spring. A second example will concern negotiations on climate change, where it is more than probable that the United States will not engage before 2012 in a process of curbing greenhouse gas emissions.

Regardless of these constitutional games — essentially classic — the most important lesson to draw from these elections is that Barack Obama will, more than ever before, focus on the domestic policy and on re-igniting the American economy. Following the first part of his term, in which he was reproached, mezzo voce, for devoting too much time to the world, he must imperatively “deliver,” (to use a significant Americanized term) on the job front. Barack Obama, shouldered by Hillary Clinton, is well-acquainted with the slogan — “It’s the economy, stupid” — one which permitted Bill Clinton to win against George Bush, an opponent crowned for his victorious “Desert Storm” campaign against Saddam Hussein and his peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians.

For quick economic results and to reduce unemployment, Barack Obama will not hesitate to get tough on international economic relations. We have already seen him before the G-20 in Seoul, where the U.S. decided, in a unilateral manner, to inject $600 billion in the American and global monetary systems in a bid to boost U.S. growth — that’s the official reason — and more importantly, to devaluate the dollar against overvalued currencies, primarily the Chinese yuan — that’s the unofficial reason. Similarly, it is almost certain that the U.S. will increase protectionist measures in order to protect their internal market and to allow a restart of industrial employment while seeking even more aggressively to open other markets.

A Political Survival Instinct

The economy must be the first priority then. It would be nonetheless erroneous to consider that the strategic imperatives will be totally absent. But even there, regardless of the personal conviction of the American president, his future positions will be inspired more than ever by his instinct for political survival. From this point of view, two issues are particularly scorching.

The first one is Afghanistan, where the American contingent will soon reach 100,000 soldiers. Admittedly, this is not Vietnam, but times have changed, and the acceptance-level of losses by the American people is no longer the same. It is especially true, that with time and change in strategies — three to four times in two years — even the best experts become baffled as to the nature and the direction of the American and Western engagement in Afghanistan. The first priority of Barack Obama will then be the repatriation of the “boys” and to offer a credible prospect out of the conflict. This, and only this, explains the decision taken by NATO at the Lisbon summit to initiate the withdrawal in 2011 and to finish it in 2014.

The second important issue for Barack Obama is Iraq. We must never forget that he has built his presidential legitimacy on Iraq, having been one of the few national figures from the U.S. to challenge from the outset the invasion and the occupation [of Iraq]. Admittedly, the retreat was already envisaged under George W. Bush, but Barack Obama has stood firm against those who wanted to delay it; he even accelerated [the retreat]. Since August, American forces have officially put an end to their combat operations, and by late 2011 they will have completely left the country. If the situation in Baghdad stays under control, then it will be a real token of credibility for Barack Obama, in particular regarding his future commitments toward the American people concerning Afghanistan. However, if the situation deteriorates, if al-Qaida regains strength against a fractured political class, then Barack Obama will be in very bad shape.

Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, we must certainly count on the unexpected events that are beyond prediction. Let us not forget that the first presidency of George W. Bush, who had started under rather isolationist days, had radically changed after Sept. 11, 2001. From this perspective, Barack Obama is not immune from a major terrorist attack, from a regional conflict that may degenerate, from new provocations in Iran on the nuclear issue — despite the open hand extended by the American president, and so on and so forth.

The final issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I think that our great desire to see this unending conflict find some sort of closure prevents us from grasping a very simple fact: In the current state of affairs, Barack Obama has no interest in damaging his political reputation on this issue. With no guarantee of success — with the key to it residing in the strength of Netanyahu’s government — the American president will most certainly alienate the Jewish electorate, a decisive force in the next presidential election.

We cannot, nonetheless, exclude a breakthrough. Barack Obama has shown that he was sincere in seeking a just peace. From this point of view, his commitment cannot be questioned. But we must be realistic: It is more probable that he puts on mute the resolution of this conflict until the next presidential election and that he reclaims it after having been re-elected.

Of course, if the situation on the ground were to deteriorate substantially, either through a provocation by one or the other, or by the fall of the Israeli government, then a window of opportunity could present itself once again.

In conclusion, the defeat of Barack Obama in the midterm elections will lead the president to more realistically assess the advantages and the inconveniences that he may withdraw from his standpoint on the international stage. Since 2008, we have grown accustomed to great speeches by Barack Obama that are generous and visionary and that have seduced public opinion around the world. The results were not up to these promises. With his reappointment in 2012 in sight, one might think that Barack Obama will do less rhetoric and will seek more efficiency to get re-elected. There is no reason to regret it if, ultimately, it provides tangible results.

Hervé de Charette, former minister of Foreign Affairs, deputy of Maine-et-Loire.