WikiLeaks: American Embassy’s Image of Hosni Mubarak
Published in Le Monde
(France) on 29 January 2011
by (link to original)
(France) on 29 January 2011
by (link to original)
Translated from
by Daniel Pick .
Edited by Heidi Kaufmann.
On May 19, 2009, the United States embassy in Cairo composed a portrait of Hosni Mubarak, on the eve of the Egyptian leader’s visit to Washington. The description is found in a private diplomatic telegram, made public by WikiLeaks. The visit, which was scheduled for late May, would not take place until August, due to the sudden death of Mubarak’s grandson. President Mubarak hoped to turn the page in delicate relations between Egypt and America; the election of Barack Obama to the White House offered such an opportunity. These hopes would be realized when Obama came to Cairo on June 4, 2009, and gave a speech to the listening Arab-Muslim world. What follow are excerpts from the leaked cable about Mubarak.
“He is a tried and true realist, innately cautious and conservative, and has little time for idealistic goals. Mubarak viewed President Bush (43) as naive, controlled by subordinates, and totally unprepared for dealing with post-Saddam Iraq, especially the rise of Iran’s regional influence,” the report says.
“Mubarak continues to state that in his view Iraq needs a ‘tough, strong military officer who is fair’ as leader. This telling observation, we believe, describes Mubarak's own view of himself as someone who is tough but fair, who ensures the basic needs of his people.”
“No issue demonstrates Mubarak’s worldview more than his reaction to demands that he open Egypt to genuine political competition and loosen the pervasive control of the security services. ... His basic understanding of his country and the region predisposes him toward extreme caution. ... Wherever he has seen these U.S. efforts [to encourage reform], he can point to the chaos and loss of stability that ensued.”
“Mubarak Will … Resist Further … Reform”
This precaution likewise applies to his mode of operation. “Mubarak has no single confidante or advisor who can truly speak for him, and he has prevented any of his main advisors from operating outside their strictly circumscribed spheres of power.”
“Defense Minister Tantawi,” the diplomatic telegram continues, “keeps the Armed Forces appearing reasonably sharp and the officers satisfied with their perks and privileges, and Mubarak does not appear concerned that these forces are not well prepared to face 21st century external threats. EGIS [Egyptian Intelligence Agency] Chief Omar Soliman and Interior Minister al-Adly keep the domestic beasts [terrorism] at bay, and Mubarak is not one to lose sleep over their tactics.”
“Gamal Mubarak and a handful of economic ministers have input on economic and trade matters,” supposes the American diplomat who writes this cable, “but Mubarak will likely resist further economic reform if he views it as potentially harmful to public order and stability.”
“Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates religious extremism and interference in politics. [He] seeks to ... spare his people from the violence he predicts would emerge from unleashed personal and civil liberties. In Mubarak’s mind, it is far better to let a few individuals suffer than risk chaos for society as a whole,” concludes the diplomatic telegram.
“He is a tried and true realist, innately cautious and conservative, and has little time for idealistic goals. Mubarak viewed President Bush (43) as naive, controlled by subordinates, and totally unprepared for dealing with post-Saddam Iraq, especially the rise of Iran’s regional influence,” the report says.
“Mubarak continues to state that in his view Iraq needs a ‘tough, strong military officer who is fair’ as leader. This telling observation, we believe, describes Mubarak's own view of himself as someone who is tough but fair, who ensures the basic needs of his people.”
“No issue demonstrates Mubarak’s worldview more than his reaction to demands that he open Egypt to genuine political competition and loosen the pervasive control of the security services. ... His basic understanding of his country and the region predisposes him toward extreme caution. ... Wherever he has seen these U.S. efforts [to encourage reform], he can point to the chaos and loss of stability that ensued.”
“Mubarak Will … Resist Further … Reform”
This precaution likewise applies to his mode of operation. “Mubarak has no single confidante or advisor who can truly speak for him, and he has prevented any of his main advisors from operating outside their strictly circumscribed spheres of power.”
“Defense Minister Tantawi,” the diplomatic telegram continues, “keeps the Armed Forces appearing reasonably sharp and the officers satisfied with their perks and privileges, and Mubarak does not appear concerned that these forces are not well prepared to face 21st century external threats. EGIS [Egyptian Intelligence Agency] Chief Omar Soliman and Interior Minister al-Adly keep the domestic beasts [terrorism] at bay, and Mubarak is not one to lose sleep over their tactics.”
“Gamal Mubarak and a handful of economic ministers have input on economic and trade matters,” supposes the American diplomat who writes this cable, “but Mubarak will likely resist further economic reform if he views it as potentially harmful to public order and stability.”
“Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates religious extremism and interference in politics. [He] seeks to ... spare his people from the violence he predicts would emerge from unleashed personal and civil liberties. In Mubarak’s mind, it is far better to let a few individuals suffer than risk chaos for society as a whole,” concludes the diplomatic telegram.