Democracy Will Not “Westernize” the World

Gradually, through various forms, the world is on an unstoppable trend toward democracy. However, the result of democracy is globalization, and becoming more and more like a Russian doll: You will always only see the outermost doll, but inside is a hidden one and even more dolls.

The West has led the world for the last several hundred years, during which time it has created a monopoly on Earth’s resources and materials and is clearly centered on Western interests. From a historical big-picture point of view, the current wave of democratic transformation in the world is moving away from Western-centered interests.

The beginning of the Egyptian Revolution looks very much like the beginning of a constitutional government revolution. Egypt and Western culture are separated by a big screen, but while Western influence is obstructed by a portion, even more seeps through [the screen]. Perhaps in the future there will exist a joint U.S.-Egypt military society, but now democracy is playing a game with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Egypt and the Middle East now walk prematurely down a road toward American opposition.

But since the revolution in Egypt is a victory for the West, hasty conclusions are being drawn. Democratization brings political power and liberation to all people, increases welfare and well being, adjusts internal development and eliminates unfair comparison with external forces. The current world social order is chock full of injustice, such as how it seems that a country’s best city is occupied by the West, but the Third World lives in poor rural areas. They will ask: why?

The late, well-known American scholar Samuel P. Huntington wrote in “The Third Wave of Democratization” that in non-Western countries’ elections, politicians are often persuaded by others to put forward certain demands and votes, and often these demands are racist, tinted religious doctrines and nationalist agendas. These demands can aggravate a country’s division and lead to anti-Western political leaders and policies.

Huntington in particular mentions that in some Muslim countries, people can only choose between either anti-democratic secularism (referring to authoritarianism) or anti-Western democracy.

Over the past few years, Western-style democracy in Latin America managed to elect leftist leaders: Chavez, Morales and others. All were more anti-American, anti-Western than the previous military government. When Hamas came to power in Palestine, it was only because the United States held a democratic election in Palestine.

However, democratization brought about pro-Western regimes in the former Soviet Union, for example, in countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic states. The spread of democracy in East Asia also did not bring the fierce anti-American regime as it did elsewhere in the world. The rise of India and China seems to have eased some of that anti-Western pressure.

The more democracy there is in the world, the more complex the world becomes. It is more difficult to distinguish between the benefits and drawbacks. But one final conclusion can be drawn from this: The world’s change to democracy will not “Westernize” the world. The attractiveness of the West is not its political program but rather its extravagant welfare and natural resources and way of life. However, the world cannot afford to have more “Western” countries.

After the Egyptian Revolution, the Western countries were cheering, and so were Iran and Hamas, as the phenomenon seen in Egypt is one rarely seen for decades. History will soon prove that there is always one with a bitter laugh.