Obama: Between Libya and Our Arena

It’s highly doubtful whether “doctrine” is the proper classification for the speech President Obama made last week, in which he sketched the outline of American strategy in Libya. Contrary to the clear, structured and unequivocal character of previous presidential doctrines (the doctrines of Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon and Bush Jr., for example), we’re talking about a loose and loaded thesis of lines and courses of actions riddled with restrictions.

Yet in spite of the constraints, two key messages are floating up to the surface, and they have relevance and affinity to other subject matters as well. The first principle is that of limiting [the role of the United States]. The president, who has promised Congress to rely on “soft power” and act only in furtherance of disengagement from the Iraq and Afghanistan battlefields as quickly as possible, will support American ground involvement only in the case where there is an actual or imminent threat to the national security of the United States.

In other cases, the military activity (be it maritime or aerial) of the American units will be an inseparable part of a multi-lateral task force (like NATO), and will be anchored within a broad diplomatic or strategic setting. This is the second principle of the White House’s dogma. The days of direct and unilateral military intervention, typical of the epochs of the Cold War and of the President George W. Bush are gone. It has been replaced by Obama with wide-ranging coalitions, and this is expressed in the Libyan mise en scène, where the operational activity — while narrowing down — of the American military is carried out at the moment under the command of Britain and France and under NATO auspices, with the reluctant blessing of the Arab League.

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As to the objectives of the undertaking, Obama hasn’t left margins for ambiguity when he defined the humanitarian frame of reference and the gross and massive violations of human rights by Gadhafi (which, according to Obama, were likely to escalate in absence of outside interference up to the point of genocide) as the core of the web of factors justifying the concerted action.

And so, in addition to the burdensome shadow of President George W. Bush, the shadow of unilateral ground intervention, from which Obama seeks to distance himself, he strives to detach himself from the dark side of another kind of heritage — standing aloof even in the face of genocide, as had happened in Rwanda during Clinton’s tenure as a president. Although the current president defined the limits of humanitarian intervention only in the case of extreme acts of mass slaughter by oppressive rule, he deviated from Clinton’s passive pattern of conduct in the face of large-scale killings in Rwanda (similarly — Clinton’s response to Bosnia, where he became active through NATO only with a great delay).

The direct result of this scheme (comprised of the need for significant international backup and existence of weighty humanitarian rationale for involvement) is that so far, Washington has taken no notice of systematic violations of human rights in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. It was content to recommend that their rulers exercise restraint and promote reform processes there. There is no doubt that this minor reaction reflected reliably, at least in the Bahraini and Yemeni contexts, the fact that it has something to do with strategic assets important to the administration.

But still, beyond this double standard, according to which concern for human rights depends on the scope of the violation of these rights, as well as on the extent of international support for the intervention, Obama’s speech implies a word to the wise that might reach as far as our province. It’s about the emphasis on his commitment to operate — both at the political and strategic ground level — in joint many-faceted frameworks that provide a casing of agreement and legitimacy for every move.

A derivative from this may already reveal itself in September with respect to the Palestinian state: the White House will waver from taking an antagonistic step in light of the declaration of the establishment of a Palestinian state, which will enjoy extensive international support. It could, indeed, be that Obama will prefer to sit on the fence and let other elements (like the Arab League) lead this initiative to the U.N. Security Council, but it’s hard to assume that he’ll veto it. Obama’s principal opposition to any measure marked with a stamp of unilateralism, in the vein of his predecessor Bush, could also seep into the Middle East in the nearest future. This will require thinking and preparation beforehand.