Bin Laden: The Long Journey and the Expected Conclusion

Though it’s not the most important detail in the discussion about the death of Osama bin Laden — God have mercy on his soul — it is worth noting that his discovery in Abbottabad, 60 kilometers from Islamabad, is not an accomplishment America should be particularly proud of, even if the American propaganda machine is sparing no effort to describe it as such.

That for more than 10 years of feverish chase the most powerful nation in the world was incapable of finding someone — regardless of who that person happened to be — could lead one to believe that the circumstances of bin Laden’s discovery were nothing less than miraculous. However, the reality is less than such.

Most likely, the assassination was carried out with full coordination with the military and security organizations in Pakistan. Certain elements within these institutions almost certainly had prior knowledge of his location but saw no benefit in capturing him, just as is the case with the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar, and a number of other leaders within the movement.

Perhaps this operation serves as an indicator of change in relations between Pakistan and the U.S. From another perspective, perhaps it is an indication of a political deal struck between the two sides, one that could be related to the situation in Afghanistan, which is of great concern to Pakistan.

As it happened, Pakistan allowed the U.S. to carry out this operation despite the fact that it was perfectly capable of doing it itself without any difficulties. Most likely, this was part of a clause in the deal that was agreed upon that necessitated American implementation of the assassination for propaganda purposes and to satisfy the American public. If not for these demands, Pakistan itself would have carried out the operation, just as it has done in the past when it has previously captured other leaders in al-Qaida and the Taliban.

Also likely is that the U.S. made a conscious decision to kill bin Laden in spite of their near-certain ability to capture him through disabling those in the compound with gas beforehand, for example. However, killing him was decided to be the best means to snuff out the example he has set, rather than keeping him alive in captivity.

Osama bin Laden was dedicated to avoiding capture, and there has been much information circulated regarding precautions he had taken to ensure this end. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that it would have been impossible to capture him alive, and in general, one could say that bin Laden’s death in battle strengthens his symbolism and that of his followers, especially if it can be confirmed that one of the helicopters that was used in the operation did indeed crash, killing all of its occupants in the process.

And here we arrive at bin Laden’s life itself. One could say that the details of his life, from beginning to end, will bestow on him a strong sense of symbolism, comparable to that of Che Guevara for many throughout the world. Here we have a man who left a life in which he was born into luxury to wage jihad in Afghanistan during the days of the Soviet occupation and then went on to fight the lone remaining superpower that won the Cold War.

Of course, it is difficult to separate the latter events of his life from the political dealings that concern the U.S. and its need for a new enemy after the fall of the Soviet Union. Evidence of the U.S. pinpointing bin Laden as this new enemy lies in their pursuit of bin Laden while he was in Sudan, pushing him to change his path and begin fighting America itself. He began by targeting the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and went on to attack the U.S. destroyer, “USS Cole,” in 2000 on the coast of Aden in Yemen. Finally, his attacks culminated on Sept. 11, 2001.

Before going any further, it must be stated that Osama bin Laden didn’t establish al-Qaida in order to attack Arab governments. In reality, al-Qaida found its roots after the defeat of the Soviet occupation under the pretense of specifically fighting what he saw as the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims — the United States. He confirmed this notion by establishing the World Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders at the beginning of 1998, in cooperation with other related groups. From there, it didn’t take long for al-Qaida to take shape, joining followers of Osama bin Laden with members of the Egyptian Jihad group, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri.

In the doctrine of al-Qaida there is important discussion of attracting the U.S. to Afghanistan in order to drain them militarily and economically, just as they did with the Soviet Union, and as it turned out, this theory of attracting America to wars abroad was realized in a way that not even bin Laden could have imagined. George Bush’s insanity and his reliance on Israeli interests and Toranic legends pushed him to occupy Iraq, and it was there that the Iraqi branch of al-Qaida became a new asset for bin Laden, and al-Qaida’s role in thwarting the American invasion of Iraq can’t be reasonably denied. It’s true that the organization that initially began fighting the American forces only later joined the ranks of al-Qaida, and here I am referring to al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad Organization, but this in and of itself doesn’t refute the fact that this organization’s SOP was initially inspired by al-Qaida itself and its attacks in Sept. 2001.

What I’m trying to convey here is that a large portion of al-Qaida’s primary goals, according to its leaders and followers themselves, have been achieved — as bin Laden himself confirmed in a number of recordings in which he spoke of America’s financial and human losses in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As for al-Qaida’s clash with the Arab governments, this wasn’t the original intent of the organization’s founding, which was transformed from “Jihad against the far enemy (the U.S.)” to “Jihad against the near enemy (the Arab governments).” This clash was deemed no longer acceptable by the Arab masses — regardless of whether bin Laden was alive or not — who found that it was in their own ability to overthrow their governments through peaceful opposition. This was something that these militant organizations, in all their might, were incapable of, and in fact al-Zawahiri’s Jihad Organization admitted this deficiency when it relinquished its confrontation with the Egyptian government in the mid-‘90s after a cease-fire that was agreed upon. In his last recording, al-Zawahiri welcomed the Egyptian revolution and its great victory, offering advice so that its accomplishments might not be stolen away.

The reality is that Osama bin Laden hasn’t been the leader of al-Qaida since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, using the true definition of the word. Rather, he has been a source of inspiration and mobilization, and in this respect, it can be said that his death as a martyr, rather than being captured, will not erase his memory from the minds of his organization’s members and followers. In fact, it could even serve to further his notoriety, with the knowledge that some members of al-Qaida currently located in a number of Arab countries — constituting the organization’s third generation — have never met the man, only knowing him through speeches and recordings. Most of them are former members of other organizations that only later affiliated themselves with al-Qaida and pledged allegiance to its leader, as is the case with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, in Somalia, and some organizations in the Gaza Strip. There are also the like-minded organizations in Libya that relinquished violence after an ideological review, only to later join in the Libyan revolution.

These groups no longer have strong popular support, and the public’s confidence in their ability to confront the Arab governments diminished over time, especially after the success of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. The point is that the jihad against the external enemy met with respectable success, whereas al-Qaida’s fight against government did not see the same positive results.

In this regard, it is said that Osama bin Laden himself ordered members of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia to cease operations there after he became convinced of their futility and of the popular backlash they provoked, especially from Islamic groups in the country. In my opinion, if bin Laden truly held power over all those that have been inspired by him, then it would be in his ability to instantly command his followers elsewhere. It is difficult to attribute his recent silence toward some of these followers to political considerations, for what is the benefit of targeting tourism sites in Morocco and Jordan, attacking Algerian soldiers and targeting Yemen, where al-Qaida has recently drawn down its presence in favor of the revolting masses?!

This means that the domestic portion of al-Qaida’s jihadist endeavors was already in recession before the Arab masses decided to use peaceful resistance against their governments (and some Salafist Jihad groups have joined in the peaceful demonstrations in Jordan and Egypt, and in Libya until the peaceful revolution became an armed one).

Even the role of the external jihad against foreign occupation has diminished as a result of the Taliban taking over the role of waging jihad and gradually draining American forces in Afghanistan, in addition to the narrowing opportunities for attacks in Iraq because of the relative stability of security and the lack of popular local support for al-Qaida after their clash with the Sunni Awakening. Conducting operations in Palestine, too, has been difficult for obvious reasons, and even in the Gaza Strip (where there are groups that are affiliated with al-Qaida), it is nearly impossible for the organization to do anything against the occupation because of the withdrawal of the Israeli army and the presence of the security wall. All that’s left is confronting raiding Israeli forces, which Hamas and Islamic Jihad devote themselves to (such groups don’t exist at all in the West Bank).

External operations have remained in the U.S. and Western nations, but these too are difficult to conduct due to intense preventative security measures, as well as local Islamic condemnation of such actions because of the effect they have on local Muslim communities and the West’s perception of Islam in general.

Concerning Osama bin Laden, it can be said that he chose the ending that he wanted (martyrdom), as he was willing to do anything to avoid capture by his enemy, as had happened to a number of his associates. If there is to be much written in the analysis of his life, then it is certain he will remain a source of inspiration to those all over the world who refuse American and Western arrogance, even if they don’t agree with the operations that are attributed to his organization, al-Qaida (and regardless of whether he was buried at sea or in the earth!).