The Persistent Shadow of al-Qaida
Published in Sankei Shimbun
(Japan) on 3 May 2011
by Daisuke Murakami (link to original)
(Japan) on 3 May 2011
by Daisuke Murakami (link to original)
Translated from
by Ryo Christopher Kato.
Edited by Sam Carter.
News that the United States had apprehended Osama bin Laden, leader of the international terrorist group al-Qaida, came abruptly after nearly 10 years had passed since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By killing Osama bin Laden — the symbol of “jihadism,” which declared war on the Christian world and targeted Arab-Islamic nations that were identified as Western puppets — it can be said that we have passed a historic turning point.
Although voices of jubilation ring out from America, and although the extremism espoused by bin Laden has failed to work its way into the mainstream in the Islamic world, the past 10 years have witnessed the geographical diffusion of new terrorist organizations. This phenomenon has the potential to continue — regardless of bin Laden’s death.
A rough summary of bin Laden’s ideology may read: “There needs to be protection of the Islamic world from the invading crusaders consisting of the Western Christian (U.S.-European) states and the Jewish state of Israel. Because of this, it is the obligation of all Muslims to attack and kill Americans and their allies, without discrimination between soldiers and civilians.”
Following the ‘80s victory in Afghanistan during the ‘Anti-Soviet Holy War,’ bin Laden supporters had shifted to a holy war against a United States that “militarily reigned over the Arabic-Middle Eastern world.” Repeated suicide bombings on U.S. embassies and U.S. Navy vessels culminated in the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland.
Another trait of al-Qaida is its network system, which shares similarities with the globalized Internet society of the post-Cold War era.
The Islamic extremists who assassinated Egypt’s President Sadat sought to topple corrupt statesmen in order to establish societies based on Islamic law; in a word, this movement was a “national revolution.” Al-Qaida, on the other hand, waged a “world revolution” that sought to attack enemies anywhere in the world. For this purpose, al-Qaida utilized satellite television and the Internet to reach people.
Because of the vast ideological resonance and elaborate network, terrorist organizations spring up without central leadership like amoebas. The structure is beginning to include Muslims in Western countries, Central Asia and Africa.
This diffusion without leadership is the reason why terrorism in the vein of al-Qaida is difficult to combat.
Of course, Muslim émigrés to the West denounce al-Qaida. The real danger is the potential social alienation that this demographic may face as a result of profiling. Delicate interreligious dialogue is a must.
There is hope, however, in the democratic revolutions sweeping the Arab world. The events in Tunisia and Egypt were not spurred by religion but by secularist youths. Even when religion was involved, it was a moderate and realistic Islam. The extreme utterances, like those of al-Qaida, seem to carry little clout in the ”Arab Spring”. Al-Qaida is clearly waning.
At the same time, the spread of blind extremism cannot be underestimated. To finally sweep away and rid ourselves of the shadow of al-Qaida will still take some time.
Although voices of jubilation ring out from America, and although the extremism espoused by bin Laden has failed to work its way into the mainstream in the Islamic world, the past 10 years have witnessed the geographical diffusion of new terrorist organizations. This phenomenon has the potential to continue — regardless of bin Laden’s death.
A rough summary of bin Laden’s ideology may read: “There needs to be protection of the Islamic world from the invading crusaders consisting of the Western Christian (U.S.-European) states and the Jewish state of Israel. Because of this, it is the obligation of all Muslims to attack and kill Americans and their allies, without discrimination between soldiers and civilians.”
Following the ‘80s victory in Afghanistan during the ‘Anti-Soviet Holy War,’ bin Laden supporters had shifted to a holy war against a United States that “militarily reigned over the Arabic-Middle Eastern world.” Repeated suicide bombings on U.S. embassies and U.S. Navy vessels culminated in the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland.
Another trait of al-Qaida is its network system, which shares similarities with the globalized Internet society of the post-Cold War era.
The Islamic extremists who assassinated Egypt’s President Sadat sought to topple corrupt statesmen in order to establish societies based on Islamic law; in a word, this movement was a “national revolution.” Al-Qaida, on the other hand, waged a “world revolution” that sought to attack enemies anywhere in the world. For this purpose, al-Qaida utilized satellite television and the Internet to reach people.
Because of the vast ideological resonance and elaborate network, terrorist organizations spring up without central leadership like amoebas. The structure is beginning to include Muslims in Western countries, Central Asia and Africa.
This diffusion without leadership is the reason why terrorism in the vein of al-Qaida is difficult to combat.
Of course, Muslim émigrés to the West denounce al-Qaida. The real danger is the potential social alienation that this demographic may face as a result of profiling. Delicate interreligious dialogue is a must.
There is hope, however, in the democratic revolutions sweeping the Arab world. The events in Tunisia and Egypt were not spurred by religion but by secularist youths. Even when religion was involved, it was a moderate and realistic Islam. The extreme utterances, like those of al-Qaida, seem to carry little clout in the ”Arab Spring”. Al-Qaida is clearly waning.
At the same time, the spread of blind extremism cannot be underestimated. To finally sweep away and rid ourselves of the shadow of al-Qaida will still take some time.