Bin Laden's Death Will Have no Direct Impact on the Afghan Revolt

Charlotte: What is the main element that allowed this operation to succeed, while all previous ones have failed?

Jacques Follorou: There is a political given in the region that unquestionably played a role in the operation’s success. It was Pakistan’s significant participation in resolving the Afghan conflict, especially in the ongoing peace process with the Taliban.

The integration of Pakistan in the international community and with the Afghans in search of a peaceful and political solution in Afghanistan ensures a type of control on the region’s future.

Two events have symbolized this change. First of all, there was the arrest of Mullah Baradar (closely connected to Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban) in January 2010 in Karachi, who had engaged in dialogue with the U.N. and with the Afghan authorities. Baradar had taken notice of Pakistan’s wish not to be pushed aside from a political solution in Afghanistan.

This message had been received by the Americans and the Afghans: Nothing can be done in this region without realizing fully and completely the interests of Islamabad. The result: Kabul sent an initial message, which was to oust the Afghan head of the secret services, the very anti-Pakistani Amrullah Saleh.

Next is the return of friendly relations between President Hamid Karzai and the Pakistani authorities. This new role for Pakistan in the resolution of the Afghan conflict probably put some diplomatic lines in motion. These lines upset the relationships among Pakistani security forces and lifted an obstacle that was protecting Osama bin Laden until now.

PhilThib: How can the Pakistanis justify the presence of a terrorist group on their land (50 km from their capital)?

And how is it possible that the ISI (Pakistani military intelligence) was not infiltrated by sympathizers of extremist theories if this compound has been in existence for over five years? Did the ISI not have it under surveillance? It seems that the resources enabling bin Laden to be located in this residence were purely based on the work of American intelligence.

We should remember that Pakistan was the first victim of terrorism. In terms of the number of victims among civilians and in terms of the losses among soldiers.

Pakistan is a very complex country. It is where the armed forces plays a central role and are themselves crossed over by differences in viewpoints on what the future of Pakistan should be.

History has shown that Pakistani military intelligence, the ISI, as did American intelligence elsewhere, maintained very close ties during the anti-Soviet jihad with not only mujahedeen but all Islamic combatants, who wanted to chase the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.

Having this historic memory, one could not still say that, during these last few years, Pakistan officially supported terrorist groups on its territory or abroad.

Nevertheless, it so happens as well that, within Pakistani services, whether by conviction or by interest, certain networks have maintained contact with the Taliban as well as with extremists tied to the conflict with India regarding Kashmir.

Concerning al-Qaida, … nobody in the West has maintained that Pakistan kept up ties with this jihadist group.

This being said, I find it clear that the operation executed against Osama bin Laden’s hideout could not have been conducted without the help of Pakistani military intelligence.

Today however, for domestic political reasons, especially because of anti-American sentiments in this country, Islamabad cannot allow itself to take responsibility openly for its technical assistance and for its role in the death of the head of al-Qaida.

To finish, according to a certain number of specialists today, it appears likely that Osama bin Laden benefited from protection provided by certain elements in the Pakistani military establishment.

Luba: In your opinion, should we be anxious about reprisals from the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Pakistan in the following hours and days?

We must make a distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaida. The Taliban revolt in Afghanistan is not jihadist in its main activity. It is a nationalist movement, simply preoccupied with retaking power in Kabul.

If history drove this regime, when it was in power, to establish and maintain ties with al-Qaida, this partnership has since fizzled. The only Taliban network, including ties with the Arabs of al-Qaida, is the Haqqani family network, which has been revealed by both the American and Afghan authorities.

This has to do with Afghan insurgents who live by straddling eastern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.

According to Mike Mullen, chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ISI has maintained ties for a long time with the Haqqani network. For their part, certain Pakistani military officials take responsibility for not openly being at war with the Haqqani network because they say that this network is not at war against Pakistan.

So the death of the symbolic leader of al-Qaida will have no direct impact on the Afghan revolt. From 70 percent to 80 percent of Taliban troops now certainly come from Afghanistan.

Hélène: What concrete consequences can Bin Laden’s death have for the near future on the West’s engagement in Afghanistan?

For the consequences on the ground, there will be very little to see, since most of the insurgent combatants are not part of al-Qaida.

On the other hand, it seems obvious that, at the end of June to the beginning of July, when Barack Obama will explain his plan on initial withdrawals of American reinforcements sent to Afghanistan, the death of Osama Bin Laden will enable him to justify this disengagement, especially with regards to American military forces.

XYZ: Don’t you think that the ISI or others in Pakistan were protecting Bin Laden, and somebody among them gave him up?

To explain more clearly, there is a certain number of lines that have moved in the region. First, the diplomatic cursor has moved with a greater realization of Pakistani interests in resolving the Afghan conflict. For Islamabad, this point was, until that day, still up for grabs, and the recognition of Kabul and the U.S. of the unavoidable role of Pakistan has probably allowed those within the Pakistani military establishment who wanted to find the head of al-Qaida to go forward with their moves.

In the economic area, Pakistan experienced serious problems, especially since their serious floods. For a year and a half, the U.S. has injected into the Pakistani economy funds never [before] attained by a foreign country.

This has created a still more significant dependence never before reached, especially in the military area. This second point has also, probably, enabled Pakistan to heighten their search for the head of al-Qaida.

Finally, concerning the hunt for Osama bin Laden, given the omnipresence of the ISI in this country, its power, it seems hard to imagine that the Americans could have acted alone. This is because the general context has changed, that the relationship among the forces within the Pakistani services has probably changed in favor of those who supported this hunt.

Marko: Why didn’t the American authorities attempt to capture and put bin Laden on trial, as they did with Saddam Hussein?

Whatever the case may be, one thing appears obvious, and it will probably appear when the emotions piqued by his death will draw down, and that is the legal framework in which this operation took place.

To wit, could a nation of laws use the same methods that it disputes in those it is fighting? When the U.S. says “justice has been done,” I am not sure that so many nations in the world share this idea of summary justice, despite the trauma caused by al-Qaida attacks.

Chat moderated by Emmanuelle Chevallereau