Nuclear Poker Invitation

The presence of the American antimissile cruiser USS Monterey (which is equipped with Aegis antimissile weaponry) in the Black Sea caused another diplomatic squabble between the United States and Russia. Officially, the cruiser arrived in the Black Sea to participate in the U.S.-Ukrainian war exercises, Sea Breeze 2011. But, in fact, its participation in these exercises is nothing short of a strategic provocation by the United States.

The Russian side considers the missile defense cruiser’s visit to the Black Sea a part of the American administration’s implementation of the “phased adaptive approach” to forming a missile defense system in Europe. The plan for developing a missile defense system involves the deployment of more than 400 interceptor missiles at more than 40 ships and two land sites in Europe (apparently, in Romania and Poland) by the end of the decade. The initial stage of this plan involves placing a group of American ships in the Adriatic, Aegean and Mediterranean seas, to protect Europe from hypothetical missile threats. These ships would also be able to enter the Black Sea at times when Washington deems the situation in the region to be getting tenser.

Russia was particularly perturbed that the basic strike unit of NATO’s territorial missile defense was moved not due to the aggravation of the situation in the region, but as part of standard military exercises in the Black Sea. That is, the presence of American military and strategic infrastructure in the Black Sea has the potential to become regular, and then perhaps permanent, as is usually the case with the American military presence.

Thus, we have another piece of evidence that all United States assurances about missile defense in Europe not being directed against Russia are not worth a single cent. That’s because intentions can change quickly, while military infrastructure is a serious matter. Moreover, frequently intentions are formed by the presence of military infrastructure in one region or another. Adequate infrastructure can create intent, while the absence of infrastructure can deter it.

How could Russia have adequately responded to such a move by the United States? It seems that the least appropriate actions were to make strongly worded statements about developing new means of overcoming missile defense. Russia has already said quite a lot on this subject, but without results; the United States its own agenda. Therefore, it would be useful, for example, to silently cease any kind of formal and informal consultations with the Americans on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. After all, tactical nuclear weapons are the most effective (and cheapest) tool to suppress the land and sea antimissile infrastructure placed at our borders.

But such consultations (proposed by the United States) have already started, and are actively offered by the American side. It should be understood that the loud threats of an arms race, and simultaneous creeping involvement in negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons (which Russia has overwhelmingly more of than the United States), make an ambiguous impression (to put it mildly) on our overseas partners. So what do we want: to fight with the American missile defense system, or reduce the means to suppress it?

If Americans do not want to talk to us about missile defense, then we will not discuss tactical nuclear weapons with them. That’s quite easy to understand. Other options would only push the Americans to put more pressure on Russia, because those options create the impression that Russia is not serious about the topic, and that drawing it into negotiations from a position of strength will sway it. The Russian side often falls for this.

Perhaps those skeptics who say that, under the right circumstances, even a fully “phased adaptive” deployed missile defense system would not guarantee the United States would be protected from a nuclear missile attack from Russia, are partially right. Yet, at least for now, Russia’s nuclear potential is too great. However, it is clear that in the worst-case scenarios of the Russian strategic nuclear development, the missile defense’s potential could significantly neutralize our potential. This is especially true in the event that the missile defense’s marine components are deployed in the Baltic Sea and the Barents Sea.

It is much more important to prevent the escalation of assumptions. The presence of even not-very-effective missile defense near Russia’s borders will make the Russian military conduct strategic planning based on the fact that at some point this can be an effective missile defense (as a result of technological improvement, gradual increase of the critical groups, or reduction of Russian strategic nuclear forces). On the other hand, the U.S. military will base their plans on the assumption that the missile defense system is either necessary, or may become so in the near future. If Russian-American relations deteriorate, such “collision course” planning, especially considering the apparent disparity between Russian and American military, could lead to a serious crisis.

On the one hand, Russia’s weakness (real or perceived) can cause excessive aggression by the United States. On the other hand, the overwhelming superiority of the United States (real or perceived) may also provoke Russia into excessively tough action. Do we really want to play nuclear poker once again?

It is not only essential not to be weak, but also not to seem weak. It’s no less important for the partner not to consider itself too strong. That is why nowadays the United States should not be provoked to further deploy its missile defense via illusions about substantial reductions of Russian nuclear weapons. Negotiations on this topic create the impression among Americans that they can still achieve decisive superiority using missile defense. Instead of negotiations, Russia should simply state that Russian tactical nuclear weapons do not threaten the United States, and steadily develop a system to suppress U.S. missile defense.