To Leave in Order to Stay

Last week’s highest profile event on the international agenda was U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement about beginning the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. Fulfilling his election promises, Obama has officially launched the completion of the military operation of the U.S. and its allies in the Afghan territory, which has lasted over 10 years.

The formal plans of the White House are completely clear. Starting in 2011, the process of troop withdrawal should be completed by 2014. However, in reality, the situation regarding the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan may prove more complicated.

Washington’s current policy in Afghanistan shows that Washington obeys the formula “leaving in order to stay.” A considerable part of the American contingent will leave the republic, in compliance with terms set by Obama. This will allow the Democrats to demonstrate their effectiveness in solving difficult problems caused by George W. Bush’s Republican administration, but complete withdrawal of troops is unlikely to happen. U.S. Armed Forces will stay in the country, regardless of who will be in power in Kabul.

The development of the U.S. military infrastructure tells of their wish to stay beyond 2014. Since 2010, a series of military bases has been constructed in different areas of Afghanistan. The Americans have built absolutely new objects besides reconstructing existing ones, including those remaining from the limited contingent of the Soviet Armed Forces. The country takes one of the leading positions in the world in terms of the amount of cement it imports. It is hardly believable that the U.S. began to expand the network of their military bases just to transfer them to Afghan authorities. This large-scale military construction shows that Americans count on staying in the country for an indefinite time.

The potential of Afghan natural resource reserves is not the least of things that impact Washington’s motives. A few American geological missions were working in the country from 2004 to 2010. The Pentagon covered their activity. In the course of the research, it turned out that Afghanistan has large reserves of natural resources. It was made publicly known that there is iron, cobalt, gold, copper, niobium, molybdenum and lithium. Uranium and emeralds were left behind the scenes. The lithium reserves are most impressive, and because of them, Afghanistan has been called “lithium Saudi Arabia.” The preliminary estimated worth of the reserves is in the range of $900 to $910 billion. Naturally, these figures are a weighty reason to stay.

However, this explanation for maintaining an American presence in Afghanistan can hardly be decisive. The industrial extraction of natural resources, located in the territory of the country, is difficult from a technological point of view as well as from military and political ones. U.S. companies cannot begin to operate in Afghanistan until the cessation of hostilities. Still, the White House has no guarantee of qualitative improvement of the situation in the case of a successful compromise with the Taliban. It is impossible to reach reconciliation in a country in which people have been at war for over 30 years. This bodes poorly for any medium-term projects tied to the usage of Afghan resources.

It is much more probable that Americans are driven by the intention of establishing a foothold in the strategically important region of Eurasia in Afghanistan. It occupies a central position in Asia. A military presence in this region allows America to influence situations in practically all adjacent countries, including Pakistan, Iran, India and China. The country opens up the corridor for direct influence on the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. In short, Afghanistan, as in the 19th century, remains a key for “the Great Game.”

The formula guiding America’s presence in the territory, implying adherence to geopolitical principles, seems to be hopelessly outdated. You should no longer place military bases in this or that region of the world in order to control politics and economics. The development of technologies and communications allows America to do this from a distance. Nevertheless, the U.S. does not disregard political and spatial methods of doing business when conditions are appropriate.

For instance, such an approach was successfully applied in Kosovo. In the territory of Kosovo, a number of signs indicate the presence of U.S. Armed Forces, including military bases Camp Bondsteel (one of the largest U.S. bases in Europe) and Film City. Kosovo does not represent any serious value with respect to natural resources, but a military presence there helps to control the situation in the Western Balkans. This territory, like Afghanistan, occupies a central position in its region. It would not be surprising if the American contingents’ presence in the Afghan territory is established in conformity with the example in Kosovo.

By the way, Afghanistan and Kosovo are not only linked by the political and spatial orientation of U.S. military policy in Eurasia. Both subjects are integrated in an invisible drug trafficking system. Afghanistan is the world leader in the production of heroin. The materials needed are delivered south from Europe primarily via transportation corridors in Pakistan. Kosovo is the main southern gateway for heroin export from Afghanistan to the EU. According to certain facts, American bases situated in the region are one of the sources of production supply for local Albanian organized criminal groups.