The Perceived War Between the United States and Iran

LONDON (The Middle East London) — Amir Tahiri writes :

The way to waging war and its results depend to some extent on its perceived liability before its beginning. Thus the question we should be asking with the escalation of tensions between the Islamic Republic and its potential opponents, led by the United States, is: What are the perceptions of the parties about the expected war between them? And must we hope that this war doesn’t occur?

The apparent exclusion of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in decision making means that the Islamic Republic has become, for the first time since 1989, under the control of a single commander symbolized by the “Supreme Leader” Ali Khameini.

Despite that, Khameini — who now likes to call himself “Imam” — could very well be a puppet in the hands of the military security. What concerns us now is that the time where different voices could be heard within the ruling establishment has ended. The institution of the presidency has been reduced by making it a source of embarrassment. There has been a transformation of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, which is supposed to be a legislative council, into a club whose purpose is to flatter “Imam” Khameini. He and his entourage believe that a war with the United States has become inevitable, but what form exactly do they perceive such a war will take?

Khameini hinted in a speech last month that Tehran was ready to give up 32 years of low-intensity war against the United States for the benefit of high-intensity strategy. Khameini continued, “We are not the type of country that sits and does nothing while watching our forces become weak and corrupt, until our well-established, strong as steal core is threatened with rot. We know how to attack in the case that we are attacked.”

General Mohammad Bagheri, deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said four days later to the Islamic Consultative Assembly that Khameini’s speech referred to a “change in Iran’s defense policy.”

Bagheri noted that strategists in Tehran believe that the United States will launch a series of air strikes against the Islamic Republic before launching a ground offensive, and that when the land war begins the size of Iran’s vast and difficult terrain will lead to the defeat of the “invaders.”

The general added, “the fighting, which will center on the ground, will determine the outcome of the war, because the land of Iran belongs to the Iranian people.”

When we put the two speeches next to each other we see how Tehran perceives this war, which can be summarized with the Americans bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, or rather the facilities they believe to be nuclear. At the same time, it will collect its forces in preparation for a ground invasion. Iran will retaliate by attacking American forces in the region and ordering the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to launch rockets against Israel. The struggle will continue for a few weeks after that with increased losses in the ranks of U.S. and Israeli forces which will be accompanied by by anti-war demonstrations around the world which will force Washington to halt its “aggression.” The “Leader” will come out of this battle wounded but alive and able to maintain his prestige and the safety of his nuclear program.

But what will the situation be if the war does not occur as Khameini envisioned?

First, it may be that U.S. air strikes are more powerful and influential the than perceived by Tehran, as the United States has doubled its firepower by four times since the Iraq war. It also manufactures bombs, “bunker-busters,” capable of destroying even the deepest bunkers in places like Mt. Vardo. These are considered one of the most powerful weapons in the world; they occupy second place after nuclear warheads in terms of destructive power. According to the Center for Strategic Studies, about 400 of these bombs have already been processed and directed toward Iran.

Secondly, it is not certain that the air strikes will only be against Iran’s nuclear sites. Strategists in the United States may choose to eliminate Iran’s air and missile assets that would otherwise be freely used to defend its nuclear sites. It may also be required to attempt destroying targets that would dismantle Iran’s command and control centers first.

According to Dan Plesch of the University of London, the United States “has fully prepared its abilities for the destruction of Iran.” The U.S. plans to destroy 10,000 targets in Iran in just a few hours because the suspected Iranian nuclear sites exist in no more than a dozen locations. It is clear that the Iranian military assets and the traditional economic and industrial centers represent the vast majority of these targets.

There will not be any retaliation against U.S. forces, “in the region,” relevant to the conflict. There will only be a small number of U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the year, but Iran will order the Mahdi Army and other groups funded by Iran to torment them. Any attack against forces in Afghanistan will be considered a declaration of war against NATO.

In any event the U.S. air strikes will be implemented by the U.S. Air Force, operating from the island of Diego Garcia located in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the U.S. will be far from any attempts by Iran to avenge the attacks.

If the U.S. were to completely destroy Iran’s military, nuclear assets, and economic interests it won’t have any interest in invading a failed state.

Khameini and his threat to close the strait of Hormuz is also of questionable usefulness since it will take many months for them to actually close this corridor and significantly impact global oil supplies. Moreover, opening the Fujairah pipeline will limit the impact of any attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, and that by closing the Strait of Hormuz Iran will be taking itself out of the oil market.

But how does the United States perceive the potential war with Iran?

The United States has returned, under the Barack Obama administration, to the principle of war from a distance, which was abandoned by former U.S. President George W. Bush when he invaded Iraq and Afghanistan.

Washington envisions, for the time being, its short war from the air enabling opponents within the Khomeinist establishment to overthrow Khameini, as happened to Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia.

But the Khomeinist regime, despite being injured but still alive in this scenario, may accept stopping the Iranian nuclear project in order to gain time in suppressing dissent at home. The same system may possibly resume its nuclear program at a later period, such as after a year to five years.

In any case the Khameini regime will remain a thorn in the side of the United States and its allies. While Khameini directs the system it will not change because what he does is dictated by his own political DNA. Therefore, the question that Obama must ask himself is whether beginning a war and igniting military action will change the composition of this DNA or not.