America and the Middle East: One Goal, Many Approaches

Does the essence of American foreign policy change when the administration changes? Does the transfer of the White House between a Republican president and a Democratic one significantly impact this policy? Or are there “higher American interests” that continue to be defended and pursued by institutions and structures that aren’t subject to incidental changes in the White House? Naturally, both evidence and experience demonstrate that there are American goals, interests and institutions that are immune from influence by the local electoral developments and conflicts in American political life.

As of the start of the new century, perhaps the most prominent part of America’s vision for the Middle East is the securing of future control over oil reserves, one of the most important sources of international power. This is especially true for the new competitors for the role of great international power, given that their economic development depends on Middle Eastern oil. This is, of course, in addition to the history of international competition over strategic geographic areas in the region.

Indeed, the Afghanistan War at the end of 2001 and then the Iraq War at the start of 2003 were accompanied by the spread the American military throughout the countries of the Middle East, and in some, the construction of bases. These wars were and are still military acts aimed at serving a political vision based on economic and security concerns.

Washington learned that the “thread of oil” couldn’t be grasped by just one end in the Gulf region, which is the exporter and reservoir for the most important sources of global power.

Thus an imbalance in the hold over this “thread of oil,” after the fall of the Shah in Iran, lead to the ideological innovation known as “dual containment” and to the policy of supporting Saddam Hussein in the destructive war with Iran in the 1980s, which resulted in substantial Iranian policy errors toward its Arab neighbors. If the ‘80s were characterized by Washington’s support — direct and indirect — for both sides of the armed conflict in the Gulf, despite American resistance to the nature of the ruling regimes in Baghdad and Tehran, then the ‘90s were marked by the “dual isolation” of these two regimes, without the toppling of either or the defeat of one in favor of the other.

Given this, it was inevitable that in recent years America would focus on Iran, because Washington toppled Saddam Hussein and America is now disappointed that the Iraqi political system has not reflected the presence of its huge military occupation, especially along Iraq’s border with Iran.

Indeed, as a result of Saddam’s fall, Iran has benefited rather than become weakened. It (as well as Turkey) gained political and security influence in Iraq, even while the U.S. was betting that the earthquake that was the Baghdad invasion would shake the ground beneath Tehran. In his second term, Bush and his administration strove to invest in Iraq politically and economically, and tried to enhance security by bolstering the military sector, as they had attempted in Bush’s first term. And this American investment continued in a number of Middle Eastern countries, despite the change of government in Washington.

Because military activity was not in itself enough to realize America’s vision of the region, the “American institutions” worked on three political factors, factors which are inseparable from America’s military and security presences:

Changing the existing political composition in some countries of the Islamic world, to be based on a blend of democratic mechanisms and ethnic or sectarianism federalism. When democracy is achieved without federalism (which is a result of strengthened feelings of fragmentation within a single society), these regimes and governments can conflict with the American administration and its vision, as happened between Washington and some Western European countries, or with the Turkish government with regard to the first Iraq War.

Focusing on “Middle Eastern” identity as a general framework for the countries of the region. This focus is due to the belief that work under the umbrella of the Arab League or the Organization of the Islamic Conference could lead in the future to the growth of large homogenous blocs based on a culture that differs from the American vision, a result that would be undesirable to the U.S. Here, Israel comes in as an important factor in the U.S.’s envisioned “Greater Middle East” — with Israel’s active presence, the Arab and Islamic identities would be absent from any partial or total regional bloc.

The third important factor in America’s vision for the Middle East rests on the importance of ending the Arab/Israeli conflict, and doing so by giving priority to the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations before a comprehensive settlement is reached. American decision-makers believe that the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations will push all sides to agree to a settlement and accept the minimum limits on demands and conditions, as well as facilitate the end of the resistance movement, even without a comprehensive political settlement.

Perhaps this summary of America’s vision clarifies its current positions on the several governments, opposition groups and Arab issues interacting throughout the year known as the “Arab Spring.” Of course, it’s impossible to separate the crisis between America and Iran from the other crises in the Arab region, or from Tehran’s allies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.

Indeed, Iran has an interest, direct or indirect, in the repercussions of any conflict that has happened or may happen as a result of the Arab crises now unfolding.

And from the womb of these conflicts throughout the Arab lands are born a host of political and security fears, the most pressing of which is still the danger of bloody sectarian and ethnic conflict. This is especially true in the shadow of the Arab popular movements currently fighting against corrupt authoritarian governments, and with the accompanying armed violence and political conflict between those competing for power, and sometimes for leadership of the opposition.

With the approach of the new presidential elections in America we find that the political fault lines there, with regard to the Arab world in particular and the Middle East more generally, are still for the Obama administration closely linked to the vision of the previous administration. This policy wasn’t broken up, and there was no revision of its substance.

One of the lessons of the “American experience” in Iraq, however, was that American policy, presented in the phrase “the Iraqi model of democracy” for the region and announced by the Bush administration right after the 2003 Iraq war, was subsequently accompanied by the “constructive chaos,” then by the “New Middle East” thesis after Israeli’s 2006 war on Lebanon. All of these American policies demonstrate that the present developments are a continuation of work toward the same goals, despite the changes in the White House.

The conclusion from all of this is that the Obama administration has carried out an in-depth examination of this policy at the highest security, military and political levels — but without revising its substance. American decision-makers have a great deal of hope now in the country’s political goals in the Middle East, after playing a part in the region’s ongoing conflicts without directly entangling the U.S. military in any of its countries!