In 2011, the U.S. “returned” to Asia with loftiness; its strategic focus has moved to the oriental world. In terms of both depth and range, the U.S.’ global strategy has experienced the most significant changes in the past year. The main characteristics of the adjustments are as follows:
The front line has been shortened; the focus has been emphasized. After the termination of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the U.S. has moved its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific area. Even though the U.S. is facing a shrinking national defense budget, the U.S. army plans to enhance its military existence in the Asia-Pacific area. For example, adjustments of strategic powers suggest to gather 60 percent of its attack-capable nuclear submarines in the Asia-Pacific area; the U.S. is enhancing defense cooperation and communication with the Philippines, Vietnam and India; the U.S. also frequently holds military exercises with East and Southeast Asian nations, even building a warship base in Singapore; the U.S. also has a military base in Australia.
The focus has changed; the U.S. knows what to do and what not to do. To make sure that the strategic focus moves east, the U.S. involves its military selectively and partially. The U.S. has discriminatory policies toward different countries (the Middle East chaos is an example). However, the similar characteristic is: The U.S. doesn’t send ground forces to war in order to avoid major interference.
The role has changed; different countries have different responsibilities. The U.S. pushes its alliances to the frontline, but is itself only responsible for coordination and control. In the Libya military action, the U.S. pushed France, the UK and other allies to the front line in order to let them “demonstrate leadership,” but the U.S. itself “stepped back” and served as logistical support. Even in the strategically important Asia-Pacific area, the U.S. still pushes Japan, Australia, Korea and other allies to the front, especially Japan, even letting Japan interfere in the South China Sea issues or promote the “China threat theory” in order to limit China. The U.S. itself tends to serve as the wire-puller, which focuses on “planning,” “organizing” and “controlling.”
The methods are renewed; the U.S. focus more on employing strategies. In order to create conflicts and trigger the anger, which can cause contradictions, defense and suspicions between countries, the U.S. twists the truth, causes alienation between countries and stirs the flames. The U.S. has always been using such so-called “soft” strategies. In this way, every country must show friendliness to the U.S. so it can demonstrate its “leadership” and control every area.
What needs to be pointed out is that these adjustments reflect the U.S.’ decreasing power; it needs to “bargain” for the biggest benefits and the maintenance of its global leading role. The U.S. cannot be the man of his word as it used to, interfering in the affairs of other countries no matter the price. This is the current international political situation. Therefore, we should consciously realize that we shouldn’t “see the trees but ignore the forest”; we should intuit what is happening, smartly socialize and properly face any problems. Under continuous global development and the currently more balanced world powers, any ways of circumscribing China will be finally hindered.
The author is the vice chair of the China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (CNCPEC).
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